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Morality, or what is considered right or wrong, varies seemingly across cultures. 
However, the literature shows that moral psychologists have mainly investigated moral 
reasoning assuming a universal morality. Cross-cultural psychologists in contrast have 
widely neglected moral issues such as prescriptive beliefs of what people ought to do in 
a culture, and have predominantly measured culture through personal values. This 
thesis attempts to bridge this gap by focusing on the values concept. Four empirical 
studies were conducted to critically examine values as a measure of culture and their 
relationship to morality.  
Chapter one is an introduction into the topics morality, culture and values. 
Chapter two outlines the conceptual and methodological issues associated with deriving 
cultural values through the statistical aggregation of individuals’ personal values. A 
value taxonomy is presented in which personal moral values and societal moral values 
are proposed as alternatives for measuring the cultural context. Following this critique, 
personal values are examined in two empirical studies in a cross-cultural context 
scrutinizing the validity of Schwartz’ (1994) Culture-level Value Theory. Study 1 is a 
cross-cultural meta-analysis using the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) showing 
that Schwartz’ culture-level value structure was replicable with different samples, and a 
different method for assessing value priorities. Nonetheless, a set of values not included 
in Schwartz’ analysis formed a new value type: Self-fulfilled Connectedness (SFC) 
which is related to the pursuit of non-material goals and endorsed in countries in which 
basic needs are fulfilled. Study 2 tested in a multilevel regression model whether 
Schwartz’ cultural values predicted individuals’ moral attitudes with data from more 
than 40 different countries. The findings indicated that the value dimension Autonomy-
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Embeddedness explained individuals’ lenient attitude towards personal-sexual, but not 
towards dishonest-illegal issues.  
Study 3 dealt with the fundamental critique raised in chapter two that Schwartz 
(1994) does not operationalize micro- and macro-level constructs independently when 
measuring cultural values. To address this empirically, personal moral values and 
societal moral values were explicitly measured in student samples from eight cultures. 
Societal moral values showed greater cross-cultural differences than personal moral 
values. Furthermore, societal moral values at the culture-level conceptually replicated 
the multilevel findings from Study 2. This suggests that societal moral values are a 
valid macro-level variable for the measurement of culture. Finally, Study 4 was 
conducted to elicit implicit moral values. Respondents from four cultures free-listed 
their associations of a ‘moral person’. Correspondence analyses revealed that 
collectivistic-oriented samples mentioned more traditional moral attributes, whereas 
individualistic samples reported more liberal attributes. Furthermore, accessibility of 
implicit moral values - matched with the SVS - correlated with explicit ratings of 
personal moral values from Study 3, providing convergent validity for this kind of 
values. This multi-method finding corroborated that personal moral values and societal 
moral values are different concepts.  
In sum, these studies support the validity of Schwartz’ theory and suggest that 
notions of right and wrong do indeed tell us something about culture, but it depends on 
(1) the issues studied (personal-sexual issues), and (2) the kind of values measured 
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PREFACE 
 
This thesis is a critical examination of the cultural values concept employed in cross-
cultural research. Cultural values are usually measured through the aggregation of 
personal values at the culture-level.  The study of moral values is here proposed as a 
valid alternative for identifying cultural differences and similarities.  
The motivation to study moral values across cultures was stimulated by my 
Master thesis research (Fuchs, 2004) which dealt with cultural differences at the 
workplace experienced by German expatriates in Brazil (see also Brökelmann, Fuchs, 
Kammhuber, & Thomas, 2005; Fuchs, 2005, 2006). I used the critical incident 
technique (Flanagan, 1954), refined and adapted to the investigation of intercultural 
encounters for German sojourners by my supervisor Prof. Alexander Thomas (see, e.g., 
Thomas, 1996). Critical incidents in the intercultural context are surprising or even 
upsetting events for an individual that occur because a person behaved in a way that was 
not expected. One of the take-home messages from this research for me was that people 
do have clear culturally-based expectations about how things ‘ought to be’ or ‘ought to 
be done’. There are culturally different conceptions of what is right and acceptable 
which if violated can lead to very upsetting experiences in intercultural encounters. 
Hence, the idea emerged that identifying the more general standards that guide people in 
their sense of right and wrong - i.e. their moral values - should provide valuable insights 
into the understanding of cultural differences and similarities in behaviour. This thought 
was further nourished by a controversy and critique in cross-cultural psychology, 
directed at the common practice to derive culture from a descriptive (i.e. statistical) 
norm by taking the average of what a group of people personally want in their lives 
instead of measuring the external constraints or the deontological and ideological norm 
(see Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; cf. Hofstede, 1998; Moghaddam & Studer, 1997).  
 - 2 - 
Besides intercultural encounters, the concept of moral values also plays an 
important role in other areas of societal relevance. In the political arena, for instance, 
moral values have been regarded as people’s motivation to vote for President Bush in 
the 2004 presidential election in the United States (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Wright, 
Cullum and Schwab (2008) pointed out that much political and social unrest involves 
discrepancies in what people believe to be a moral value or not. Skitka and Mullen 
(2002) demonstrated this with a real-life example: the custody battle involving Elián 
González, a Cuban boy whose mother died when they fled from Cuba. The case aroused 
enormous public interest and attention, and people from the USA and Cuba were 
divided about the right course of action. The authors argue that the violation of moral 
values can motivate people to publicly defend them and can even lead to civil unrest 
which may range from peaceful demonstrations to violent protests and even turn into 
terrorism and revolution (see also Skitka, 2002). This is also applicable to the recent 
conflict concerning the protests in the Islamic world after the publication of the 
caricatures of Mohammed by a Danish cartoonist. Heine and Norenzayan (2006) argued 
that the protests are a result of different conceptions of right and wrong. In this case it 
may have been a clash between the value of freedom to express one’s opinion in the 
Western world and the value of sacredness in the Islamic world. Though one might also 
argue that political reasons played an important role inciting the protests. Nonetheless, it 
was still a moral issue in the first place that motivated ordinary people to participate in 
demonstrations and that may have then been exploited for political reasons.   
The great importance of moral values for social interactions lies in the fact that 
what is believed to be moral is psychologically experienced as objectively grounded and 
non-negotiable (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). The intrinsic characteristic of moral beliefs as 
something non-negotiable renders divergent opinions especially difficult to deal with, 
since every side is convinced of knowing what is morally right or wrong. For example, 
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in the case of political liberals and conservatives who differ fundamentally in their 
moral outlook and values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This makes it especially 
hard to find common ground in moral dialogues. Recent research has also shown that 
simply believing an issue to be ‘moral’ results in greater intolerance and distancing 
from people with divergent beliefs (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Wright, et al., 
2008).  
But what exactly is behind the concept of ‘moral values’? What is the exact 
content of the moral values people adhere to, which seems to contain so much relevance 
and potential to mobilize people? Is there indeed a strong division in terms of the moral 
values people endorse in different cultures? Interestingly, there is not much research on 
moral values per se, i.e. on values operationalized as instrumental or terminal goals 
(Rokeach, 1973) and which may be believed to be morally relevant in a certain culture. 
Instead, moral values are often researched by focusing on attitudes towards 
transgressions or immoral behaviour. Hence, moral values are investigated in a form in 
which there is actually a lack of moral values. By reviewing the literature, one is left 
with the impression that it is a somewhat elusive concept. The difficulty in researching 
moral values may also lie in the fact that the term combines two distinct research 
traditions (Eckensberger, personal communication, August 28, 2007): research in moral 
psychology, which so far has not paid much attention to values, and research in social 
and cross-cultural psychology which has not focused on morality in the measurement of 
values. The vast majority of values research in cross-cultural psychology has dealt with 
personal values. However, values may be expressed in ways beyond personal 
importance and in ways that have important consequences for the assessment of culture.  
A number of cultural psychologists have, for example, pointed out that morality 
and culture are inextricably linked to each other (Eckensberger, 2007; Miller, 2001) so 
that identifying the moral values of a culture goes hand in hand with identifying its 
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cultural values. Nevertheless, there is a lack of research regarding the assessment of 
moral values in different cultures. This is also evident by inspecting the publication 
output of the two most prominent journals for cross-cultural studies: the Journal of 
Cross-cultural Psychology (JCCP) and Culture & Psychology (C&P). If “moral values” 
are used as a keyword in publication titles, there are zero hits for both journals. The 
term “moral*” yields 22 hits for JCCP and 3 for C&P which corresponds to 1.3% and 
0.6% of all publications in the two journals. Most of the publications in JCCP (81.1%) 
and all of the papers in C&P referring to “moral” in their title concern moral reasoning 
and/ or moral development. A similar search in the Journal of Moral Education (JME) 
using “cultur*” as a keyword in publication titles yields 20 hits and shows that the 
majority of these articles (80%) are theoretical contributions or empirical papers dealing 
primarily with moral reasoning and moral development. Although the key term “moral 
values” in publication titles yields seven relevant hits in JME, two of these articles are 
again theoretical papers and the remaining five are empirical studies measuring moral 
values through immoral behaviours, religious commitment or value inventories that 
assess the personal importance of values rather than moral values per se.  
Hence, there is a lack of research on moral values across cultures. I intend to 
address this lack in my thesis by pursuing two goals. The first of these is a critical 
examination of the cultural values concept in the way it is commonly employed in 
cross-cultural research using the Schwartz’ Value Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1992) as an 
example. Schwartz’ survey and the model he developed on the dynamic relations among 
value types, is widely regarded as the most important recent development in research on 
values. The second goal is to propose an alternative assessment of values that focuses 
on evaluations of what is morally relevant at the personal and societal-level, and to test 
this theoretical proposal empirically. The following paragraphs provide a brief outline 
of the chapters in this thesis.  
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Chapter one is an introduction to the link between culture and morality, followed 
by a summary of the different theoretical frameworks, and their definitions of morality 
in moral psychology. In the process, I will elaborate on my own theoretical position. 
Cross-cultural value definitions and research are then critically reviewed in light of their 
link to morality. The Schwartz’ Value Theory and survey is finally described.  
Chapter two specifically scrutinizes the common practice in cross-cultural 
research of measuring culture through the aggregation of personal values. I take the 
Schwartz’ Value Survey as an example and highlight conceptual and methodological 
issues associated with this practice. I propose to study moral values as an alternative for 
the measurement of culture and finish with making suggestions of how this could be 
implemented.  
Chapters three to six describe the empirical studies in this thesis. A schematic 
overview of the purpose and main characteristics of the four empirical studies is 
provided in Figure 0.1. All four studies have a cross-cultural focus and comprise both 
individualistic and collectivistic samples, as identified in prior research (Hofstede, 1980; 
Schwartz, 1994b). The data are based on both primary and secondary sources and 
analyzed with a variety of statistical techniques including multidimensional scaling 
(Kruskal & Wish, 1978), multi-level regression analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) 
and prototype analysis (Fehr & Russell, 1984).  
Study 1 in chapter three assesses the generalizability of Schwartz’ (1994) 
Cultural Values Theory using different samples and a different value survey. The 
Rokeach Value Survey (RVS, Rokeach, 1968, 1973) was utilized for this purpose. Data 
from 37 cultural samples were gathered by conducting a meta-analysis on the RVS. The 
underlying culture-level value structure of the RVS was examined and compared to 
Schwartz’ (1994, 2006) culture-level value structure.  
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The critical examination of Schwartz’ cultural values continues in chapter four 
by testing their predictive validity in the moral realm. Study 2 examines whether 
cultural values account for individuals’ moral attitudes. A multilevel regression model 
was used with Schwartz’ cultural values as the higher level independent variables and 
data from the European/ World Value Survey (EVS/ WVS) on moral attitudes as the 
lower level dependent variables.  
Chapter five (Study 3) describes an empirical test of the theoretical proposal 
suggesting that moral values may be an indicator of culture (see chapter two). A survey 
was constructed using the Schwartz’ Value Survey with modified response scales in 
order to measure moral values. Similarly to the previous study, a multilevel regression 
analysis was conducted to examine whether moral values at the aggregated level 
predicted moral attitudes at the individual-level.  
Study 4 in chapter six was aimed at deriving moral values using a qualitative 
method. Individuals were asked about attributes they associate with a ‘moral person’. 
The open-ended responses were examined using prototype and correspondence analysis. 
The resulting moral trait categories were also matched with values from the SVS and 
compared to the findings from Study 3.  
Finally, chapter seven summarizes the main findings and their contribution to 
the literature. The strengths and limitations of the studies are discussed as well as some 
ideas on future studies and practical implications of this research.   
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Figure 0.1: Schematic overview of purpose and main characteristics of the empirical studies conducted within this thesis. 
Note. RVS = Rokeach Value Survey, SVS = Schwartz’ Value Survey, EVS/ WVS = European/ World Value Survey, HLM = Hierarchical Linear Modelling, CLOP = Cross-
level Operator.  
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The moral sense is so ubiquitous that its lack is regarded as a 
pathological condition […]. 
 
 - Diane Sunar (2002) 
 
The term morality is quite abstract for something that is central in our everyday social 
life. Morality facilitates group functioning (de Waal, 1996; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 
Krebs, 2008) and makes group living easier by regulating personal behaviours that 
reflect self-interest and self-indulgence (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). A 
shared morality is vital for the functioning of any society (Bandura, 1991). Many 
behaviours are personally advantageous, but detrimental to others or violate their rights. 
Without some consensus in moral codes, people would disregard other’s rights and 
welfare whenever their desires come into social conflict.  
Despite agreement in the research community on the social psychological 
importance of morality, there is considerable disagreement on what exactly is morality. 
Definitions of morality vary depending on the underlying theoretical framework the 
researcher adopts (e.g. Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Turiel, 1983), so 
some of these frameworks will be briefly discussed below. What is common to the 
different perspectives on morality is that morality refers to notions of right and wrong. It 
concerns often actions and behaviours with an ought or should quality. When it refers to 
a ‘code of conduct’, the focus is usually on what a person should not do as, for example, 
in the moral rule ‘You should not steal’. This focus on negative outcomes has been 
called ‘proscriptive’ morality (cf., for example, Janoff-Bulman, et al., 2009). 
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An immoral person is one who has transgressed a rule and failed to inhibit a certain 
behaviour (for instance, not to steal).  
Besides this mandatory and transgression-focused morality, there is also a 
‘prescriptive’ morality which is more abstract and sensitive to positive outcomes and 
hence focused on what one should do. This kind of morality often refers to values like, 
for example, the value ‘to be helpful’. A prescriptive immorality is an omission, i.e. a 
failure to activate a certain behaviour when, for example, not helping a person in need. 
Hence, a prescriptive morality has been ascribed to involve a motivational activation or 
an “approach-based motivational system” (Janoff-Bulman, et al., 2009, p. 533). It 
provides a more general than specific guidance of behaviour as is the case with 
proscriptive morals.  
 
Moral Values 
A prescriptive morality is sensitive to positive outcomes and refers as such to 
moral values (e.g., to help others, see Janoff-Bulman, et al., 2009). Since Rokeach’s 
(1973) seminal research, values are commonly conceptualized in terms of instrumental 
values (i.e. modes of conduct, e.g. to be helpful) and terminal values (i.e. end-goals, e.g. 
equality). Moral values can be regarded as the modes of conduct or end-goals that are 
the “normatively prescriptive constructs by which we evaluate and regulate our social 
actions and shared lives” (Vine, 1983, p. 23). They are expectations defined for oneself 
and for others about how people should live their lives, serving as yardsticks against 
which people assess the social propriety of behaviours or outcomes (cf. Henry & Reyna, 
2007). Moral values can be similar to virtues, but they are not identical with them 
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Virtues are commonly conceptualized as character 
strengths measured through traits and habitual actions (e.g. gratitude, persistence). 
Hence, virtues contain a narrower focus on morality (Graham, et al., 2009), whereas 
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moral values are the broader concept including also values that are not character 
strengths, such as the value of social justice.  
Moral values are mostly a group-level phenomenon that requires shared 
agreement, and refers to the individual’s knowledge and internalization of moral norms 
and conventions. However, moral values exist also at the individual-level. A personal 
moral value can be defined as “a particular individual’s concept of an ideal state of 
affairs or relations among people which he uses to assess the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’; 
the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of [what] he observes” (Scott, 1959, p. 301). Personal 
moral values can be consistent with the moral values of the wider society. However, in 
individual cases personal moral values can also be distinct from the shared moral values 
of the collective, because society is not the only source of moral value education. 
Parents, peers, other adults and other symbolic models play an influential role, too, and 
can stimulate the development of differential moral values (cf. Bandura, 1991).  
Another group-level phenomenon that is closely related to moral values is the 
concept of social norms. Social norms are expectations of “how people are supposed to 
act, think, or feel in specific situations” (Popenoe, 1983, p. 598). Much research on 
morality is focused on, or formulated around, the transgression of social norms (e.g. 
Turiel, 1983). Norms can be distinguished into injunctive norms, i.e. what most others 
approve or disapprove, and descriptive norms, i.e. what most others do (Cialdini, Reno, 
& Kallgren, 1990). Cialdini and colleagues (1990) have argued, and empirically shown, 
that it is crucial to distinguish between the is (descriptive) and the ought (injunctive) 
meaning of social norms, because each of them refers to a different source of 
motivation. Injunctive norms and moral values share the concept of how something 
‘ought’ to be and hence of moral and social approval. The difference between moral 
values and injunctive social norms is that the latter always refer to modes of conduct, 
whereas this may not be the case for moral values. For instance, the terminal values 
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freedom, equality, and sanctity of life do not refer to specific behaviours, but are 
commonly regarded as moral values (see e.g. Skitka, et al., 2005). Moreover, moral 
values may be conceptualized as the general and trans-situational principles that guide 
injunctive norms (cf. Power, 2004). For instance, an injunctive norm that prohibits 
stealing is likely to be guided by the moral value of individual ownership or, in a moral 
community, of trust. Hence, injunctive social norms are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions of how to behave in a certain way in a particular situation, whereas values, 
including moral values, are the general guidelines that may provide a rationale for why 
these behaviours are enacted in a given culture (cf. Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2002).  
It may appear from the description above that a proscriptive morality (with its 
focus on negative outcomes) has more weight in guiding individuals’ moral behaviour 
than a prescriptive morality. Although a proscriptive morality is more condemnatory 
and strict than a prescriptive morality, and often regulated by the legal system, a 
prescriptive morality is of equal importance for societies. Societies do not only want 
people to avoid bad behaviours, but also to engage in good deeds (Janoff-Bulman, et al., 
2009). The mandatory nature of laws, for example, is not suitable for this kind of 
morality. Instead, prescriptive morality is more regulated through norms and values in 
regard to role expectations and obligations, and this in turn is likely to be influenced by 
the cultural context. A prescriptive kind of morality and its possible cultural variation is 
one of the main foci in this thesis.  
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Culture and Morality 
 
No topic is more central to an understanding of culture than perhaps 
morality. Indeed, it is often difficult to delineate where culture ends and 
morality begins as culture and morality share an intricate and intimate 
relationship.  
 
- Joan G. Miller (2001, p. 151)  
 
Definitions of what exactly constitutes culture vary greatly, similarly to definitions of 
morality. Whereas the problem of defining morality is partly due to different 
epistemological positions (discussed in more detail below), the problem of defining 
culture lies more in different focal points of what to include or exclude in the definition 
(for discussions see, for example, Jahoda, 1984; Rohner, 1984; and Segall, 1984). 
Evidence for the problem of defining culture was first provided by Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn (1952): After performing a thorough literature search, they were able to 
compile a list of 164 different definitions of culture, recently updated by Baldwin, 
Faulkner, Hecht and Lindsley (2006) to 313 definitions. Nevertheless, there are 
commonalities in these definitions which may be regarded as necessary elements if one 
wants to refer to ‘culture’: culture is passed on by exemplary behaviour rather than 
inherited; it incorporates values, ideas and other symbolic meaning systems; it 
distinguishes one group from another since it contains something that is shared by 
individuals of a group (cf. also Rohner, 1984).  
The concept of cultural values has played a central role in differentiating one 
cultural group from another in cross-cultural research (cf. Gelfand, et al., 2006; Smith & 
Schwartz, 1997). Contemporary cross-cultural studies of values use mostly structured 
questionnaires (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). Cultural values are here commonly defined 
as the socially shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society 
or cultural group (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). Values are a useful concept for cross-
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cultural research because they can be expressed in a decontextualized manner (Smith, et 
al., 2002), meaning that respondents can be asked about their values without specifying 
the context, which facilitates considerably cross-cultural comparisons. In contrast, 
behaviours and norms are always expressed within a certain context and the 
interpretation of behaviour may change depending on the context and also on the 
culture.  
Besides these very general elements, there are also researchers who define or 
refer to culture in a way that is closely related to morality. For instance, Matsumoto 
(2007) says that culture is something that “prescribes limits and broad guidelines for 
acceptable personal and social behaviour” (p. 1302) which resembles a prescriptive kind 
of morality put forward earlier. In a similar vein, the anthropologist Shweder (2003) 
regards culture as shaping people’s notion of what is good, moral and virtuous. Culture 
provides group members with answers to fundamental questions such as how things 
should be, and what is the right course of behaviour and values (Brewer & Chen, 2007). 
In this way, morality can be regarded as one of the culture’s rule system (Eckensberger, 
2007). Henry and Reyna (2007) expressed this intrinsic relationship between culture and 
morality as follows: 
When a person or group behaves in ways that are consistent with important cultural 
ways, they demonstrate that they are upholding the moral foundations of the society 
and contributing to the overall benefit of its members […] On the other hand, those 
who violate values threaten the stability and moral foundations of that society and are 
therefore likely to be shunned or ostracized from that group.  
(Henry & Reyna, 2007, p. 293)  
 
Haste and Abrahams (2008) pointed out that it is the early experiences with care 
givers and peers that play an important role in shaping conceptions of the self and 
culturally based understandings of right and wrong. Each culture has its own values and 
expectations concerning its members (Zavalloni, 1980) and socialisation processes have 
the function that members of a society are taught to behave according to those 
established norms and values.  
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Hence, what has been mentioned so far as necessary elements for defining 
culture (sharedness, symbolic meaning systems, socialization) seems to apply equally to 
morality. In fact, some theorists in moral psychology have pointed out that culture and 
morality are intrinsically related to each other in a way that morality is a constitutive 
feature of the culture concept (e.g. Eckensberger, 2007; Miller, 2001). Culture cannot be 
defined or investigated without taking into account morality, and morality cannot 
equally be understood without reference to the culture concept. Definitions of moral and 
cultural values also seem to be intertwined when cultural values are seen as the socially 
shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a culture (Smith & 
Schwartz, 1997) and moral values as the beliefs “shared in a social group about what is 
good or right” (Maccoby, 1968, p. 229). If what is moral is cultural and what is cultural 
is - at least in part - moral then it seems difficult to distinguish one term from the other.  
 
Relevance to this Thesis 
The position adopted in this thesis is that when the moral domain is investigated 
in different cultures, then culture is simultaneously studied. However, it needs to be 
pointed out that this conclusion is based upon the view of cultural and cross-cultural 
psychologists as referenced above. Moral psychologists adopting a universalist 
perspective on morality, regard cultural conventions of ‘right and wrong’ as operating 
on a lower level of morality (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984) or as not pertaining to the moral 
domain at all (e.g. Turiel, 1983).  
A main focus in this thesis lies in a critical examination of the values concept as 
it has mainly been employed and studied in cross-cultural psychology. The novel 
contribution of this thesis is to combine moral psychology with values research, with 
the final aim of identifying cultural similarities and differences. The difficulty of this 
endeavour lies in the fact that the term ‘moral values’ combines two distinct research 
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traditions (Eckensberger, personal communication, August 28, 2007), i.e. research in 
moral psychology that is mostly not concerned with the concept of values, and research 
in social psychology/ cross-cultural psychology on values that is mostly not concerned 
with assessing the concept of morality. Not only is the concept of moral values 
neglected in some of the theories in moral psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984), but also is 
the variable culture disputed as having an effect on morality (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; 
Turiel, 1983, 2002). The social psychological (e.g. Rokeach, 1973) and cross-cultural 
(e.g. Schwartz, 1994b) literature on values face yet another issue: there is a mismatch 
between defining values in moral terms but operationalizing them as personal 
preferences. These two main issues will be explained in more detail below, followed by 
the presentation of a value measure that has been widely employed in cross-cultural 
studies, i.e. the Schwartz Value Survey, (SVS, Schwartz, 1992) and that has also been 
used in this research to study moral values.  
I begin with a brief introduction to moral psychology and I will focus in 
particular on the question of cultural variation in morality. The controversy of whether 
culture is related to morality is fundamental since it tackles not only the issue of 
defining constructs, but also of epistemology, i.e. beliefs about what is true moral 
knowledge, how it is acquired, and how it can be studied. The epistemology in moral 
psychology can be roughly distinguished into a normative and descriptive account. In 
the following section, I will briefly outline these two perspectives and then position my 
own research.   
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Moral Psychology 
The Normative Account 
 
Moral psychology is controversial stuff. Every psychologist who studies 
moral topics has had the experience of trying to share some fascinating 
nuance of his or her research with a (non-academic) friend only to 
encounter stiff resistance. The friend is not ready to concede the 
existence of morality in the first place, what morality means in the 
second and what gives the scholar any authority to determine right or 
wrong in the third. Controversial issues pervade the academic study of 
moral topics just the same and have since the field’s inception.  
 
- Jeremy A. Frimer and Lawrence J. Walker (2008, p. 333) 
 
In the normative account, morality and culture are seen as mutually exclusive 
(see e.g. Turiel, 1983). This is based on the assumption that there is a universal morality 
which can be attained through rational reflection, and which may or may not be 
reflected in social conventions. The epistemological perspective is that qualities such as 
goodness and rightness are real and knowable and that moral statements can therefore 
be objectively determined as either true or false (see Gewirth, 1984). This kind of moral 
cognitivism was the predominant position in the study of morality in the 1960’s 
(Shweder & Haidt, 1993) and its most prominent representative is Lawrence Kohlberg. 
Kohlberg (1984) further developed Piaget’s (1932/1965) theory on children’s moral 
reasoning, which proposed that there are two sources of moral obligation: a 
heteronomous orientation where the child’s reasoning is dominated by its own 
egocentrism within the context of the adult and child relationship, and an autonomous 
orientation where children develop a more equilibrated understanding of justice in the 
context of peers who are seen as equal. Drawing upon this distinction, Kohlberg 
provided a more detailed model of moral reasoning by distinguishing six successive 
stages of moral development. The three major phases were called preconventional, 
conventional and postconventional morality.  
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Kohlberg (1984) was not concerned with moral values, but only with the formal 
aspects of moral development, i.e. the different stages that lead to moral maturity (see 
also Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966). Nevertheless, each phase may be associated with a 
certain value orientation. In the preconventional phase, the child judges behaviour in a 
self-focused manner, i.e. right or wrong is determined in terms of personal gain and 
loss. Moral values that may be associated with this stage are those of an hedonistic kind. 
In the second phase, the child judges behaviour in terms of the known convention or 
“what people would say” is right or wrong, which therefore may depend on the cultural 
context. Trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude are the guiding moral values in this stage 
(cf. Krebs & Denton, 2005). In the final – postconventional – phase, the child judges 
behaviour according to internalized moral principles. This final phase of moral 
reasoning must be based upon the principle of justice to qualify as truly moral. The 
principle of justice as the pinnacle of morality had been derived from philosophy- more 
precisely from Kant’s (1785/1994) deontological theorizing about what constitutes 
morality. Hence, morally mature reasoning must be based on the moral values of rights, 
interpersonal justice and fairness which is expected to be universally valid. Kohlberg 
tested his model of moral development by interviewing children and adults in the USA 
about hypothetical moral dilemma and asking them how they would react and why they 
would react in this way.  
In the years after Kohlberg’s (1958) doctoral dissertation, some researchers 
examined whether the stages of moral reasoning were associated with the endorsement 
of certain values (e.g. Diessner, Mayton, & Dolen, 1993; Gorsuch & Barnes, 1973; 
Helkama, 1982). Helkama et al. (2003) recently reviewed the literature on the empirical 
link between personal values and Kohlberg’s stages, concluding that the pattern of 
relationships between moral reasoning and value priorities does not allow distinguishing 
a set of values that operates distinctively at ‘stage two’, ‘stage three’ and ‘stage four’. It 
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rather appears that Kohlberg’s stages and personal value priorities assess something 
different. 
Despite the enormous impact Kohlberg’s model has had on the research 
community and on subsequent studies in moral psychology (see, for example, Turiel, 
2008), his theory has also been criticized as being sexist (Gilligan, 1982), confusing the 
moral domain with the social conventional domain (e.g. Turiel, 1983), as being 
culturally biased (e.g. Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987) and neglecting the content 
of morality (cf., for example, Walker & Pitts, 1998b).  
The US-American feminist Gilligan (1982) argued against Kohlberg’s theory 
and findings which showed that women were typically ranked on lower stages and 
hence were more deficient in the morality of justice than men. She proposed that there 
may be two principles which underlie moral reasoning: the principle of justice and the 
principle of care. She showed that US-American females see justice and fairness as less 
important and are more concerned with prosocial responsibilities and the moral values 
of trust, loyalty and respect which Gilligan subsumed under the principle of care. 
However, subsequent research did not reveal consistent gender differences in moral 
reasoning (cf. Walker, 1991). Additionally, Gilligan’s theory does not consider possible 
cultural variations in the ethics of care and justice. Morality is still placed into an 
universalistic framework in which all cultures embody the same patterns of structural 
inequalities associated with gender which are supposed to have an effect on moral 
outlooks (Miller, 2001).  
Turiel et al. (e.g. Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983, 2002) have criticized 
Kohlberg for not clearly separating social conventional rules from moral rules. They 
developed the Social Domain Theory which posits that there are three different domains 
which differ in the extent to which behaviour is socially regulated: the personal, the 
social conventional and the moral domain (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983). The 
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personal domain is defined by actions considered to be outside the realm of societal 
regulation and moral concern (e.g. watching TV on a sunny day). Social conventions are 
defined as arbitrary acts that are based on consensus, and which serve the function to 
coordinate social interactions within social systems (e.g. whether or not to address the 
teacher by his/her first name). They may produce culturally idiosyncratic rules and are 
arbitrary because they do not have an intrinsically prescriptive basis, i.e. alternative 
actions can serve the same function. The moral domain is defined as “prescriptive 
judgments of justice, rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each 
other” (Turiel, 1983, p. 3; e.g. not to hit other people with no reason). Turiel’s (1983) 
early studies were based on interviews with children and adolescents in the USA about 
transgressions of moral, social conventional and personal rules. On the basis of his 
definitions of what constitutes morality, he specified a priori which acts were to be 
counted to which domain of social regulation. He measured the domain distinction with 
a number of questions such as rule contingency (is it OK if there was no rule about it?), 
rule relativity (would the act be OK in another country?), deserved punishment (should 
the transgressor be punished?) and evaluation of seriousness (how bad is the 
transgression?).  
In a series of studies, Turiel and his colleagues were able to show that children 
experience only moral rules as obligatory, universal and unalterable. Social 
conventional rules however were regarded as based on social consensus and seen as 
alterable (see Turiel, 1983, for a review of studies). This domain distinction was even 
found with children as young as two years old (Smetana, 1981) and with cross-
culturally diverse samples (e.g. Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983) which 
indicate an innate and universal kind of morality with moral values centred around the 
principle of justice. Hence, contrary to Kohlberg’s (1984) proposition, Turiel et al. 
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showed that moral development is not a process of progressively differentiating 
morality from social convention (see e.g. Nucci & Turiel, 1978).  
Despite compelling arguments and empirical evidence, Turiel’s strict 
differentiation of the moral, social conventional and even personal domain has been 
challenged. Smetana (1982), for instance, found that a women’s reasoning for or against 
abortion depends in many circumstances on whether the woman views abortion as a 
personal or moral issue. Research conducted by cultural and cross-cultural 
psychologists has also challenged Kohlberg’s and Turiel’s assumption that the moral 
domain is universally centred on the moral value of justice. Cross-cultural studies found 
that in different cultures and at different times people are morally mature when they 
respect principles other than justice, such as their codes of honour, their karma, or their 
desire to actualize their potential as human beings (see Campbell, Christopher, & 
Bickhard, 2002). Cross-cultural research testing the cultural invariance of Turiel’s 
Social Domain Theory has not always found the clear-cut division between morality and 
social convention (e.g. Nisan, 1987, in Israel; and Shweder, et al., 1987, in India). These 
studies have shown, that the intrinsic criteria for ‘harm’ and ‘suffering’ may not be as 
objective as proposed by the Social Domain Theory and that the distinction of moral 
and social conventional rules are in some cultures blurred (see also Krebs, 2008). For 
example, it is highly immoral for a son to cut his hair during the ten days that follow the 
death of his father among Brahmans in India (Shweder, et al, 1987). Hence, what causes 
harm is often understood from a localized normative point of view (see also Miller, 
Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990).  
The problem with Piaget’s, Kohlberg’s and Turiel’s research paradigm is that 
they defined morality through the adoption of externalistic criteria (see also Pittel & 
Mendelsohn, 1966). This means that the standards for judging a person’s morality were 
taken from sources outside the person being assessed (a Kantian philosophy) and neither 
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her own moral values nor her cultural context were taken into account as possible 
sources of alternative moralities.  
Instead of normatively specifying as a researcher what morality is (or should be) 
for all human beings, some psychologists advocate to simply describe the different 
moral conceptions that exist (Haidt, 2001; Walker & Pitts, 1998b). This does not 
necessarily imply the adoption of a moral relativism position. The goal of moral 
psychology is simply viewed as understanding the values that human beings acquire, 
even if their moral ideology is immoral and detrimental to others. As Campbell, 
Christopher and Bickhard (2002) stated: “Acknowledging a plurality of moral 
conceptions does not mean endorsing all as equally right or good, [but …] to explain 
how human beings could arrive at such diverse endpoints through the normal process of 
development” (p. 798). In order to do so, it is necessary to change the concept of 
morality from an individual perspective, where the individual is isolated from the 
society and its influence, to a socio-cultural perspective of morality (Tappan, 2006). 
This allows (1) broadening the moral domain from the issue of harm (and justice) to 
social expectations and social conventional values, and (2) relying on what laypeople 
commonly regard as moral without subjugating their responses to philosophical 
definitions (see also  Walker & Pitts, 1998b).  
 
The Descriptive Account 
Shweder and colleagues (e.g. Shweder, et al., 1987; Shweder, et al., 1997) 
developed the Social Communication Theory which takes the cultural context into 
account in the development of morality. Children acquire morality through engagement 
in and perception of social communications and interactions which contain cultural 
judgments and ideologies. Social practices contain the main sources of moral content 
and can be perceived as moral imperatives, as research in India has shown (Shweder, et 
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al., 1997). Shweder et al. (1987) found in qualitative interviews that the concept of 
social conventions, in relation to arbitrary rules that are based on social consensus and 
that are alterable, was not meaningful to Indians of any age. With increasing age, Indian 
children saw more and more issues as a question of universal moral principles, whereas 
US-American children showed the opposite tendency, i.e. that the same issues pertained 
to social conventions. Based on their findings, Shweder et al. (1997) proposed that there 
are two alternative types of morality to the justice-based morality that stem from 
discourses with different conceptions of the self and social relations. Together with the 
justice-morality, they were called the ‘big three’ of morality: the ethics of Autonomy, 
Community, and Divinity.  
The ethic of Autonomy is similar to Turiel’s (1983) justice-based morality with 
moral values related to justice, human rights and prevention from harm. The moral 
agent is defined as an autonomous person who is free to make his/her own choices, only 
restricted by concerns whether a behaviour would inflict harm on others or restrict their 
rights. The ethic of Community defines the moral agent in terms of their membership in 
social groups (e.g. family) and the obligations that go along with this membership. 
Moral values are those that benefit the functioning of the community, such as duty, 
honour, chastity, respect, modesty, and self-control (see also Vélez García & Ostrosky-
Solís, 2006). The ethic of Divinity defines the moral agent as a spiritual entity who aims 
to follow divine laws trying to achieve moral purity. Moral values are grounded in 
divine law and often derived from religious authorities and texts (Jensen, 1995), and are 
those that protect and dignify the divinity inherent in people (Vélez García & Ostrosky-
Solís, 2006). These ethics vary in their emphasis and distribution across and within 
cultures. The ethic of Autonomy has been found to be dominant in the Western moral 
discourse, whereas the ethic of Community is more prominent in collectivistic-oriented 
cultures such as Asian cultures where there is a moral obligation in regard to the 
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sensitivity of others’ needs, and individual self-fulfilment is regarded as secondary (e.g. 
Chiu & Hong, 1997). Chiu et al. (1997) labelled these two different ethics as a ‘rights-
based morality’ (ethic of Autonomy) and a ‘duty-based morality’ (ethic of Community).  
Although the moral theories discussed so far - i.e. Gilligan’s Ethic of Care, 
Turiel’s Social Domain Theory and Shweder et al’s Big Three of Moraliy - differ in 
critical ways from Kohlberg’s Cognitive-developmental Theory, their emphasis remains 
on moral reasoning (Walker & Pitts, 1998b), i.e. people’s explanations for why a 
behaviour is right or wrong. Researchers have recently pointed out that moral reasoning 
is not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of moral functioning (e.g. Frimer & 
Walker, 2008). In this context, it has been proposed that morality consists of two 
different processing systems of which only one pertains to moral reasoning (Haidt, 
2001; Lapsley & Hill, 2008): (1) the explicit/ deliberative process, and (2) the implicit/ 
tacit process. The explicit process has been widely studied in the past by analyzing 
individuals’ reasoning on moral dilemmas or moral transgressions (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; 
Turiel, 1983). The implicit process operates at another more unconscious level; it is 
automatic and relatively effortless. This process has only recently drawn attention as a 
research focus (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) partly triggered by Haidt’s (2001) Social 
Intuitionism Theory.  
Haidt (2001) argues that people rely on gut feelings to distinguish right from 
wrong. Moral intuitions are both innate and learned or enculturated respectively. Moral 
intuitions can be defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral 
judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a 
conclusion” (p. 818). Haidt regards morality, like language, as a major evolutionary 
adaptation that is universal, but requires input and shaping from a particular culture. His 
Social Intuitionism Theory is social, because it emphasizes the importance of social and 
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cultural influences on morality. It is an intuitionist model, because moral judgment is 
viewed in general as a result of quick and automatic evaluations. One of the main 
differences to rationalist models (morality as an explicit/ deliberative process) lies in the 
hypothesised causes. Haidt proposes that moral intuitions come first and directly cause 
moral judgment. The moral reasoning serves to rationally justify the intuition in the first 
place. The opposite causal relationship is assumed in the rationalist model.  
Social Intuitionism Theory is consistent with recent findings from diverse 
disciplines such as social psychology, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, and 
primatology (Haidt, 2001). Empirical evidence has so far underpinned the importance of 
affective reactions in moral judgments. Haidt, Koller and Dias (1993), for example, 
found in a cross-cultural study (Brazil and USA) that ‘harm’ cannot explain all moral 
judgments that individuals make. They constructed stories in which no plausible harm 
was involved, for instance, cleaning one’s toilet with the national flag, eating a dog or 
masturbating with a dead chicken. Respondents’ affective reactions to these stories were 
better predictors of their moral judgments than their claims about harmful 
consequences. Haidt and Hersh (2001) found similar results when interviewing liberals 
and conservatives in the USA on the issue of homosexuality.  
The social intuitionism model not only accommodates affectively heavily 
charged actions, but the entire range of moral judgments. Haidt (2001) points out that in 
every society people make evaluations. Many of these evaluations, with respect to 
virtues or goods, are applied to everyone in a certain society or to everyone in a certain 
social category. These virtues are obligatory in the sense that everyone (within the 
relevant category) is expected to strive for them. People who fail to do so are subject to 
social criticism or punishment. Moral judgments can then be defined as “evaluations 
(good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set 
of virtues held obligatory by a culture or subculture” (p. 817). Haidt emphasizes that his 
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definition of moral judgment is an intentionally broad definition to accommodate 
different possible moral outlooks. For instance, eating a low fat diet may not readily 
qualify as a moral issue from a philosophical point of view, but within many health-
conscious subcultures people who eat junk food are seen as morally inferior to those 
who eat healthy food (Stein & Nemeroff, 1995).  
Haidt’s epistemological approach in researching morality is to study individual 
and cultural facts about moral functioning and not to impose a priori definitions of what 
qualifies as truly moral. This approach is more bottom-up, both empirically and 
conceptually (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). He takes it as given that what people think are 
their moral concepts are in fact moral concepts - rather than separating them into moral 
and social conventional concepts on the basis of externalistic criteria. By doing so, he 
leaves room for a culturally relative morality. Nevertheless, his position is also that 
some aspects of morality are universal. In line with evolutionary theorists (e.g. 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005), he suggests that a universal morality evolved because it was 
most effective in upholding mutually beneficial cooperative relations. A culturally 
relative morality evolved because people from different cultures experience different 
adaptive problems in different ways, and because norms may emerge from social and 
cultural processes that stand only in indirect relationship to biological evolution.  
Haidt’s social intuitionism model of morality is highly flexible, since there are 
no a priori assumptions of what counts as morally relevant. Haidt empirically evokes 
moral evaluations through vignettes containing short stories about behaviours that may 
be intuitively judged as immoral (see e.g. Haidt, et al., 1993). However, Social 
Intuitionism Theory can also be applied to the concept of values. Batson, Engel and 
Fridell (1999), for example, used the values freedom and equality and gave participants 
false physiological feedback about their emotional reactions when listening to stories in 
which these values were threatened. Respondents relied on their assumed visceral 
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reaction to make value-relevant decisions in subsequent tasks. Another very different 
approach would be to ask individuals to judge which values are intuitively morally 
relevant or not. This approach, with the goal to compare the outcome cross-culturally, 
has not been adopted so far.  
More recently, Haidt et al. (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) 
developed the Moral Foundations Theory which posits that people use five sets of moral 
intuitions to judge wether an issue is right or wrong: harm/ care, fairness/ reciprocity, 
ingroup/ loyalty, authority/ respect, purity/ sanctity. These five moral foundations 
provide a taxonomy for the bases of moral judgments, intuitions, and concerns. Graham, 
Haidt and Nosek (2009) suggest to use Moral Foundation Theory if one’s goal is to 
study the sources of moral intuitions across cultures. Yet, if one’s goal is to describe 
moral discourse across cultures, then Shweder et al.’s (1997) three ethics can be used 
and if one is interested in examining values, then Schwartz’ (1992) value types are 
useful. In fact, the measure that Haidt and colleagues (Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire, Graham, et al., 2009) developed to test the different moral foundations 
does not assess values as instrumental or terminal goals, but the relevance of various 
concerns tapping into the five sets of moral intuitions (e.g. whether or not someone was 
harmed). Hence, it can be said that there have not been attempts so far to map the moral 
domain from a motivational perspective using the values concept.  
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Theoretical Stance in this Thesis 
 
As an empiricist, I believe that we can study things like life without 
defining them…This strategy, I believe, works just as well for the aspect 
of life that we call ‘morality.’ For empiricists, rigorously defining 
morality is a distant goal, not a prerequisite. If anything, I believe that 
defining morality at this point is more of a hindrance than a help, as it 
may artificially narrow the scope of inquiry…Rather than seeking out 
morality by the light of a philosopher’s definition (Kantian or 
otherwise), I and like-minded scientists choose to study decisions that 
ordinary people regard as involving moral judgment.  
 
- Joshua Greene (2007, October 9) 
 
Greene’s quote summarizes the position that is taken in this thesis in regard to a 
psychological and cross-cultural investigation of morality. This research does not take 
an a priori stance on what qualifies as moral and what does not from a researcher’s or 
philosopher’s perspective - this judgment is left to the respondents. This thesis is a 
cross-cultural investigation of what is morally relevant in different cultures. As such, the 
outcome of this research is to be understood as descriptive - in terms of what people in 
different cultures regard as morally relevant - and not as prescriptive - in terms of how 
morality should be construed. Equating what ‘is’ with what ‘ought to be’ would in fact 
mean committing the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1903). Hence, the study of morality is 
here seen as the study of agreements among people and is therefore a kind of social 
knowledge (cf. Haan, 1982).  
Haidt’s (2001) Theory of Social Intuitionism is the most flexible model of all to 
study this kind of social knowledge. A cross-cultural study of moral values and virtues, 
i.e. those that elicit judgments of good and bad, or right and wrong, should provide 
valuable insights into cultural differences and similarities. Despite the fact that values 
have played a major role in assessing cultural differences in cross-cultural psychology 
(see e.g. Gelfand, et al., 2006), moral values have not been a major focus in previous 
investigations.  
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Cross-cultural Psychology 
Culture is often seen as a system of values (e.g. Rohner, 1984). As a 
consequence, research on cultural differences and similarities is frequently centred on 
the concept of values (see e.g. Gelfand, et al., 2006). Cross-cultural research that takes a 
quantitative approach to the study of culture conceptualizes values as broad frameworks 
that underlie the functioning of cultural groups and aid to understand the differences 
between them (Smith, et al., 2002).  
Similarly to the culture concept, there are many different definitions of values 
which amounted to 180 different conceptualizations in the 1980’s (see Harding & 
Phillips, 1986). Values are often so broadly defined, that anything wanted by a person is 
regarded as a value (Kilby, 1993). Despite all these different definitions, there are 
commonalities which aid pinning down the very essence of the value concept: values 
are always positive (Roe & Ester, 1999) and they can be endorsed by a single person or 
by a collective unit (e.g. Rokeach, 1973). Values are positive, because they have an 
intrinsic worth. A certain value that is endorsed by one person (or collective unit) may 
not be regarded as something positive to another person (or collective unit), but in this 
case this other person (or collective unit) would not regard it as a value. Hence, the 
intrinsic worth of values is relative.  
Many value definitions refer to values as something ‘desirable’ and not as 
something ‘desired’. It will be shown that while the latter is unrelated to morality, the 
former has been implicitly linked to the concept of moral values. The concepts of the 
‘desired’ and the ‘desirable’ will be contrasted in more detail and it will be shown that 
despite the consensus that values pertain to the ‘desirable’, the operationalization in 
practice often does not match the conceptualization in theory.  
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Values as the ‘Desirable’ 
 
Man is an evaluating animal.  
- Clyde Kluckhohn (1952, p. 403) 
 
It has often been stressed in the literature that the concept of values includes a 
valuation and differs from something that is simply ‘desired’ which can be free from an 
evaluation (e.g. Dewey, 1939, in his manuscript the Theory of Valuation). Something 
that is ‘desired’ can just be something that is ‘wanted’ by someone but it does not 
necessarily contain a valuation of being something positive, worthwhile, right or 
prescriptive (cf. Kilby, 1993). Kluckhohn (1952), for instance, in his seminal paper on 
values emphasized that it is critical to distinguish values as the ‘desired’ and the 
‘desirable’
1
. In all cultures people have desires or wants for themselves. However, this 
is not the same as the ‘desirable’ which is not just a preference, but a standard that is felt 
to be morally justified. Social life would be impossible without values as the ‘desirable’ 
(Kluckhohn, 1952).  
‘Ought’ and ‘should’ statements do not vary randomly, but show some degree of 
pattern and add predictability to social life. Values are for the most part cultural 
products and can be distinctive of a plurality of individuals. Group values consist of 
socially sanctioned ends and socially approved modes and means. Values as the 
‘desirable’ refer to goals of action which are evaluated on an approval-disapproval 
continuum and therefore have an affective component. They represent what individuals 
believe they ‘ought’ or ‘should’ desire for their own sake, or the sake of the group. 
                                               
1
 Hofstede (1980) later referred to the pitfall of equating the ‘desired’ and the ‘desirable’ as the 
‘positivistic fallacy’ after Levitin (1973).  
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Value statements can then be regarded as normative or prescriptive statements and the 
“cue words are right or wrong” (Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 398).  
Subsequent value researchers and theorists have followed Kluckhohn’s 
suggestion to regard values as bipolar in their valence (e.g. Rokeach, 1973) with 
evaluations in terms of what is good and desirable as opposed to bad and undesirable 
(e.g. Harding & Phillips, 1986; Kilmann, 1981) and to relate them implicitly or 
explicitly to the moral realm. For instance, Smith (1969) posits that “values pertain to 
the desirable, the preferable, rather than the merely desired or preferred; to the realm of 
‘ought’ rather than that of […] ‘want’ (p. 102). The contemporary philosopher Louis 
Pojman (1995) argues that “…values are central to the domain of morality” (1995, p. 
93) and that from “our values, we derive principles” (p. 94). Kristiansen and Zanna 
(1994) suggested that from a psychological perspective values are people’s beliefs about 
obligations and what they ought to do and strive for. Prominent cross-cultural and value 
researchers also include values as the “desirable” in their value definition (e.g. Feather, 
1996, p. 222; Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 395; Schwartz, 1994, p. 21). Cultural values are 
commonly regarded as the socially shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right and 
desirable in a society or cultural group (Smith & Schwartz, 1997).  
To conclude, there is a consensus in the research community that values contain 
a moral connotation. Despite the widespread definition of values as the ‘desirable’, 
surveys that indeed operationalize moral values are scattered and few (Zavalloni, 1980). 
And therefore there are only a few empirical investigations of moral values (cf. Harding 
& Phillips, 1986). The scales that exist can be put into two categories: (1) scales for 
which it is claimed that they measure moral values, but which do not directly assess 
values, but other psychological constructs such as attitudes and beliefs, and (2) 
measures for which values are defined in moral terms (as the ‘desirable’), but are 
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operationalized as personal preferences (see also Harding & Phillips, 1986). The most 
relevant research falling under these two categories is summarized next.    
 
Moral Values Scales 
Research on moral values is scarce, especially in terms of more recent research. 
Empirical studies on moral values until the mid 1960’s have been reviewed by Pittel and 
Mendelsohn (1966). Their review is summarized here since it provides an insight into 
the origins of some of the measures that are still used, and the issues associated with 
research on moral values. Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966) divided the developments in the 
measurement of moral values into three different periods. The first period from 1900 to 
1930 was marked by paper and pencil tests of moral knowledge mostly used to 
distinguish between normal and delinquent adolescents (e.g. Brotemarkle, 1922). From 
1932 to the 1950’s, moral values were examined in the scope of broader theoretical 
orientations. There was a methodological shift from paper and pencil tests of moral 
knowledge to studying the formal aspects of the child’s moral behaviour through 
interviews and observation (e.g. Piaget, 1932). The second phase was also marked by 
omnibus investigations in the USA in which personality was assessed primarily based 
on psychoanalytic and behaviouristic models. The main interest was to investigate 
individual differences in ‘normal’ subjects on diverse aspects related to morality, such 
as impulse control, guilt and judgments of moral transgressions. This was also the era in 
which scales were developed to assess moral values which are still in use - in the same 
or a more contemporary version. One such example is Crissman’s (1942) scale, that 
includes a number of ‘immoral’ behaviours (e.g. ‘having sex while unmarried’ or 
‘taking one’s own life’). The third period, the 1960’s and 1970’s, were characterized by 
the use of projective techniques such as the Rorschach test to examine psychoanalytical 
moral concepts like the super-ego.  
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Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966) heavily criticized all these attempts to measure 
moral values. Among their main arguments were that the  investigators decided a priori 
what is moral and what is not; the majority of instruments have not been standardized or 
validated; and often knowledge of legal, moral and ethical standards were assessed 
rather than the individual’s moral beliefs. Their conclusion was that there had been 
insufficient effort to conceptualize the nature of moral values.  
Since the 1970’s, there have been a number of cross-cultural studies mainly 
using a version of Crissman’s (1942) scale in which respondents were asked to evaluate 
a number of different behaviours in terms of their ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’. Tomeh 
(1968), for instance, used the Crissman scale in a cross-cultural sample with 
respondents from the Middle East (Christians and Muslims) as well as an American 
sample. She found that Middle Easterners were more severe in their overall judgment of 
immoral behaviours, while Americans were more severe in codes regarding individual 
responsibility. Klinger (1962) also studied offences with a scale more adapted to 
students’ (immoral) behaviour (developed by Mueller, 1958) in a cross-cultural sample 
of  male students living in the USA (American Protestants, Arab Moslem, Chinese non-
Christians, Indian Hindus, Roman Catholics from Latin-America and Turkish 
Moslems). He found certain behaviours to be condemned by all (e.g. drunk driving) and 
others to be judged differently depending on the culture (e.g. premarital sex).  
More recent research has been conducted with data from the European and 
World Value Survey in which a more contemporary version of Crissman’s scale- the 
Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale (MDBS, Harding & Phillips, 1986)- has been used 
to assess people’s moral outlook. Using these data, individuals’ moral attitudes have, for 
example, been linked to religiosity (Nevitte & Cochrane, 2006) and also studied in 
terms of their change over time (Moors & Wennekers, 2003).  
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When reviewing mono-cultural studies that claim to have measured moral 
values, it becomes evident that the term moral values is stretched to include a number of 
other concepts such as norms and schemas (Biel, Fransson, & Dahlstrand, 1997), ethical 
ideologies (Singh & Forsyth, 1989), moral attitudes towards transgressions (Bovasso, 
Jacobs, & Rettig, 1991; Halpern, 2001; Hardy, Padilla-Walker, & Carlo, 2008) and 
more specifically towards aggression, sexuality or discipline (Rosenthal, 1955; Schmidt, 
1988). Further assessments of individuals’ moral values include open-ended questions 
(Hogan & Dickstein, 1972) and scenarios focusing on the moral value of justice 
(Herndon Jr., Fraedrich, & Yeh, 2001). Other researchers used personal value measures 
such as the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) or Chinese Value Survey (Chinese 
Culture Connection, 1987) and claimed that some of the values in these inventories 
assess moral values, however without further conceptual or empirical justification (e.g. 
Shen & Yuan, 1999; Sikula & Costa, 1994).  
To conclude, Pittel and Mendelsohn’s (1966) main criticism of moral value 
measures in the 1970’s can also be applied to the more recent publications: it is the 
researcher who defines what is moral or not (e.g. Hardy, et al., 2008; Herndon Jr., et al., 
2001; Schmidt, 1988; Shen & Yuan, 1999; Wojciszke, 1997); what is moral is often 
equated with a strict moral outlook on sexual and criminal behaviours (e.g. Halpern, 
2001; Singh & Forsyth, 1989). In addition to that, values are often not operationalized 
as end-goals or modes of conduct, but inferred from other constructs such as moral 
attitudes (e.g., Bovasso, et al., 1991; Moors & Wennekers, 2003; Nevitte & Cochrane, 
2006). This confusion of concepts impedes a deeper understanding of their relationship, 
such as whether people’s specific attitudes can be predicted from their more general 
value orientation (see, e.g., Rohan, 2000). 
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Values as Terminal and Instrumental Goals 
One of the most innovative contributions to values research is attributable to 
Rokeach’s work (Rokeach, 1968, 1973). He defined a value as “an enduring belief that 
a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable 
to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (p. 5). One of his 
major contributions lies in the fact that he does not infer values from responses to 
specific attitude statements, but measures them directly. The survey he developed, i.e. 
the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS, Rokeach, 1973), operationalizes values by explicitly 
naming them as either terminal goals (represented by nouns, e.g. freedom) or 
instrumental goals (represented by adjectives, e.g. helpful). He gathered his data by 
presenting respondents two lists of terminal and instrumental values (with 18 values in 
each), and asking them to rank order the values “in order of their importance to YOU, as 
guiding principles in YOUR life” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 27).  
Rokeach proposed a theoretical taxonomy of values by subdividing terminal 
values into those with a personal or social focus, and instrumental values into those 
referring to one’s competence or morality. However, a factor analysis on the basis of 
data from 1409 American adults could not support this theoretical distinction of values. 
He concluded that “it is unlikely that the 36 values can be effectively reduced to some 
smaller number of factors” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 44). This is one of the main criticism that 
has been raised in regard to the RVS. Single-item measures are problematic according 
to psychometric theory. No single item is a pure measure of the construct of interest, 
because each reflects error, some attributable to other irrelevant constructs or to random 
fluctuation (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). A further point that can be added to this 
critique is, that the survey assesses what is personally important and not what is 
regarded as prescriptive.  
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Hence, despite the widespread consensus in the literature that values refer to 
what is ‘desirable’ and therefore to the moral realm and not the ‘desired’, which is a 
personal preference, many value measures (including the RVS) do not operationalize 
values as a conception of the ‘desirable’. Kilmann (1981), for instance, criticized that it 
is often the personal importance of values that is assessed and that the outcome can be 
interpreted as what people merely want in their lives. Kilmann (1981) concludes in his 
review on value measures that “researchers may define their concept of values a 
particular way, the critical issue is how the value is operationalized in the measurement 
process” (p. 956) which usually does not match the concept of values as the ‘desirable’. 
Smith  (1969) has also criticised popular value inventories for focusing on personal 
preferences and neglecting the social aspect of values. Cross-cultural research on values 
has examined almost exclusively value importance (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). 
There have been a few studies that have addressed this very issue. Mueller and 
Wornhoff (1990), for example, measured personal values (the ‘desired’) and social 
values (the ‘desirable’) in regard to different aspects such as work ethic and altruism. 
Personal values (e.g. independence) were assessed in terms of what people like, prefer 
or regard as personally important and social values in terms of whether they think other 
people should value these goals. Although, this study is very promising in regard to 
researching prescriptive values, the authors used only seven value items, and their list is 
therefore not exhaustive. Another relevant study has been conducted by Wojciszke 
(1997). He asked individuals whether some of the instrumental values of the RVS were 
related to competence or morality, the latter defined as traits pertaining to breaking or 
maintaining moral rules and/ or doing good or bad things for another person. He found 
that collectivistic values as defined by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) and Schwartz (1992) 
were more strongly related to morality, whereas individualistic values were more related 
to competence. This study is one of the few that comes close to the aims of my thesis. 
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Yet, the exclusive focus on instrumental values, the use of a single-item measure and 
the lack of a more precise theory about the underlying value system structure, makes it 
impossible to understand how the rating of one value item is related to the rating of 
another value item (cf. Schwartz, 1996). A theoretical pattern of value responses is also 
crucial for predictions of how ratings of a particular value type are related to other 
variables. Furthermore, a theoretical value structure is necessary to test for cross-
cultural equivalent meaning of values prior to investigating cross-cultural comparisons.  
More recently, a value theory and corresponding measure has been developed 
that meets these stringent requirements (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990). The Schwartz 
Value Survey assesses individuals’ personal values by asking them to rate terminal and 
instrumental values in terms of their importance to them as guiding principles in their 
lives. Schwartz and his colleagues (e.g. Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) define values as 
“desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles 
in people’s lives” (pp. 269, see also Schwartz, 1992, for a fuller elaboration). Hence, 
Schwartz intentionally links values as the ‘desirable’ with their operationalization 
through personal importance ratings. His value definition can be viewed in terms of 
both the ‘desired’ and the ‘desirable’ (Rohan, 2000). He derives cultural values through 
the statistical aggregation of personal values which are claimed to reflect shared 
conceptions of what is good and desirable in a culture (Schwartz, 2004).  
Recently, researchers have used Schwartz’ list of values, but modified the 
response scale to assess, for instance, societal values rated as how important the values 
are to a particular society (Bernard, Gebauer, & Maio, 2006), social value systems 
assessed as how important each value is for most people in the respondents’ country of 
birth (Fischer, 2006), and perceived cultural values rated as how important each value is 
for an average person from a particular cultural group (Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007; 
Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007). So far, there has been no study in which the response 
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scale has been changed to assess moral values. Yet, there is clearly a precedent for such 
appropriate modification.  
Schwartz’ theory, his survey for the assessment of values, and his concept of 
cultural values play a central role in contemporary value research. They were used in 
this thesis and will therefore be presented in more detail below.  
 
Schwartz’ Value Survey and Theory  
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) developed a theory about how instrumental 
and terminal values are organized in a coherent value system. One of their main 
statements is that the value system is organized in a quasi-circumplex structure. As 
such, value priorities have an effect on all the other values in the value system. 
Neighbouring values in the circle are closely related in their underlying meaning and 
will most likely be endorsed in a similar fashion. However, opposite values in the 
circumplex exhibit opposite underlying meanings and are therefore most likely to be 
endorsed in opposite ways. The theory was first developed for the individual-level (see 
also Schwartz, 1992). However, since values are presumed to encapsulate the 
aspirations of both individuals and societies (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Parsons & 
Shils, 1952), Schwartz (1994) also developed a theory for the culture-level. Despite the 
fact that there are two different theories, the hypothesized underlying dynamic of value 
conflicts and compatibilities is the same at both the individual- and culture-level. The 
next sections outline the two theories and also the measurement of values in more detail.  
 
The Individual-level  
The Theory. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; 1990) proposed a nearly universal 
theory of human values. They suggested that there are three universal human needs to 
which all individuals must respond: (1) biologically based needs of the organism, (2) 
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social interactional requirements for interpersonal coordination, and (3) social 
institutional demands for group welfare and survival. Values are the cognitive 
representations of these needs and they can be categorized into different motivational 
goals. Individuals differ only in the relative importance they place on these universal 
motivational goals.  
Schwartz (1992) later proposed that two higher order motivational dimensions 
structure the value system. Each of the two dimensions represents a fundamental human 
problem that needs to be solved. And each dimension is marked by a bipolar value 
orientation which stands for the fundamental value conflict. One dimension is labelled 
as openness-to-change versus conversation and relates to the conflict of being 
motivated to follow one’s own interests (intellectual and emotional) or to follow other’s 
interests by “preserving the status quo” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 43). The second dimension 
is labelled as self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and represents the conflict of 
being motivated to enhance one’s own personal interests (even at the expense of others) 
or to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others (both close and 
distant ones as well as nature). Schwartz (1992) proposed ten value types which 
represent universal motivational goals and which are arranged along these two 
dimensions: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, 
benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security. Figure 1.1 shows the location of these 
value types along the two higher order value dimensions.  
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Figure 1.1: Circular model of relations among ten motivational value types at the 
individual-level (adapted from Schwartz, 2006b, p. 965; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995, p. 
96). 
Note. The dashed lines delineate the region occupied by the value type ‘hedonism’, because Schwartz 
(1992) indicated that this value type can be considered as part of both adjacent value types.  
 
The Survey. In order to empirically test the value theory, Schwartz (1992) 
developed the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) which has become a 58 item value 
measure (Schwartz, 2007a) assessing the ten motivational goals. Table 1.1 shows the 
motivational goals, their definition and the value items through which they are 
operationalized in the survey. Respondents are instructed to rate how important each of 
the values is to them as guiding principles in their lives. Schwartz (1992) conducted an 
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extensive cross-cultural study which so far has amounted to samples from 66 nations 
composed of secondary school teachers, university students and the general public 
(Schwartz, 2007b). Using smallest space analysis, which is a non-metric 
multidimensional scaling technique (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), he demonstrated 
that the hypothesized value structure was present in most of the cultural samples 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Of all value items, 45 indicated a nearly 
universal meaning by clustering consistently together in the hypothesized way in at least 
75% of the samples (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz recommended using only these 45 
values since cross-cultural equivalence had been established only for them (see Table 
1.1.).  
The relation of value types to other variables can empirically be investigated by 
constructing indexes of each value type. This is done by averaging the ratings of the 
specific value items that are representative of the respective value type (cf. Schwartz, 
1992). The value type indexes can then be examined in relation to other variables 
through correlation or regression analysis, for example. The circumplex structure of the 
theory implies that there is a sinusoidal curve to expect when correlating the value types 
with other relevant variables. This curve follows the order of the value types around the 
circle with first decreasing and then increasing correlations when moving away from the 
main diagonal (Schwartz, 1992, 1996). The highest positive correlations are to be 
expected with the value type that is theoretically related to the variable of interest and 
the highest negative correlation with the value type that is opposite to it. For example, 
Schwartz (1996) investigated the relationship between individuals’ personal values and 
their readiness to cooperate with another person in an adaptation of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game. He found that benevolence was most positively correlated with 
cooperation and power most negatively with it. Moreover, the order of the correlations 
followed the order around the value circle from benevolence to power.   
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Table 1.1: Value types, their definitions and cross-culturally equivalent value items that 
represent them. 






Understanding, appreciation, tolerance 
and protection for the welfare of all 
people and for nature.  
 
broadminded, wisdom, social justice, 
equality, a world at peace, a world of 





Preservation and enhancement of the 
welfare of people with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact.  
 




Restraint of actions, inclinations, and 
impulses likely to upset or harm others 
and violate social expectations or norms.  
 
politeness, obedient, self-discipline, 
honoring parents and elders 
TRADITION  
(TR): 
Respect, commitment and acceptance of 
the customs and ideas that traditional 
culture or religion provide the self.  
 
humble, accepting my portion in life, 
devout, respect for tradition, moderate  
SECURITY 
 (SE): 
Safety, harmony, and stability of society, 
of relationships, and of self.  
 
family security, national security, social 
order, clean, reciprocation of favours  
POWER  
(PO): 
Social status and prestige, control or 
dominance over people and resources.  
 




Personal success through demonstrating 
competence according to social standards.  
 
successful, capable, ambitious, influential 
HEDONISM  
(HE): 
Pleasure and sensuous gratification for 
oneself.  
 
pleasure, enjoying life  
STIMULATION 
(ST): 
Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.  
 





Independent thought and action-choosing, 
creating, exploring.  
 
 
creativity, freedom, independent, curious, 
choosing own goals 
 
Note. Adapted from Schwartz & Sagiv (1995, p. 95).  
 
For less refined distinctions among values, it is also possible to use the four 
higher order value orientations (for example, Bernard, et al., 2006; Verkasalo, 
Lönnqvist, Lipsanen, & Helkama, 2009). A score for conservation is computed by the 
mean of conformity, security and tradition items, for self-transcendence by the mean of 
benevolence and universalism items, for self-enhancement by averaging power and 
achievement items and for openness-to-change by averaging self-direction, stimulation 
and hedonism items (see also Schwartz, 2003). Like the ten basic value types, the higher 
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order value orientations should exhibit a sinusoidal trend when correlated to other 
relevant variables.  
Benefits of the SVS. There are a number of benefits of Schwartz’ theory and 
value measure. The theory is explicit in the hypothetical relationship between value 
types and other relevant variables, and the empirical approach is therefore theoretical 
and not exploratory which renders the survey more advanced compared to a number of 
other value measures (e.g. the Rokeach Value Survey, Rokeach, 1973). Through the 
predictions about motivational conflicts and compatibilities between values, the model 
provides a single nomological net which allows it to merge diverse research on values 
across cultures (Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007). Pakizeh et al. (2007) argue that 
because of this characteristic, the SVS is the most important recent development in 
research on values.  
Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995) also pointed out that the theory 
includes a comprehensive set of values. No major value dimensions seem to be left out. 
The SVS is highly suitable for cross-cultural research: so far it has been translated into 
47 languages using rigorous translation methods (Schwartz, 2006a). Data have been 
gathered from more than 70 nations including university students, secondary teachers 
and near-representative samples. Cross-cultural equivalence of 45 value items has also 
been established (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz & Sagiv, 
1995; Spini, 2003). The survey shows sound psychometric properties with satisfying 
reliabilities ranging from .61 (tradition) to .75 (universalism) when averaging across 
cultural samples (Schwartz, 2005b). Because of these benefits, Schwartz’ theory and 
also his survey for the assessment of values were used in this thesis.  
 
Chapter one: Introduction 
 - 43 - 
The Culture-level  
The Theory. Schwartz (1994b; 2006b) also developed a Culture-level Value 
Theory. Similarly to the individual-level, he postulated that there are basic issues in 
every society for which a solution must be found: (1) to what extent a person is 
embedded into a group, (2) how to preserve the social fabric, and (3) how to relate to 
the natural and social world. The solutions take the form of three bipolar value 
orientations: Autonomy (with the subtypes Intellectual and Affective Autonomy) versus 
Embeddedness; Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism; and Harmony versus Mastery. An 
Autonomy value orientation encourages individuals to pursue positive experiences for 
themselves (Affective Autonomy) as well as their own ideas and intellectual aspirations 
(Intellectual Autonomy). The opposite pole Embeddedness becomes more important in 
societies in which social relationships, the traditional order, and the maintenance of the 
status quo are seen as priorities. The second solution is either characterized by a 
Hierarchy orientation which emphasizes the legitimacy of a hierarchical social order 
and unequal resource allocation, or by Egalitarianism which emphasizes that all 
individuals of a given society are equal and mutual concern, as well as cooperation, is 
necessary to ensure everyone’s welfare. The third societal issue is solved by a Harmony 
orientation which is accentuated in societies where the social and natural world is 
accepted as it is and emphasis is laid on fitting in harmoniously, or by a Mastery 
orientation which means to actively control the social and natural environment through 
self-assertion values. Cultural differences on these value dimensions emerge because 
culture has an influence on what pole of the orientation is emphasized in a society. The 
value dimensions again form a hypothetical circumplex structure which is depicted in 
Figure 1.2. Like the individual-level value structure, adjacent values signify 
compatibility and opposite values are in conflict with each other.  
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Figure 1.2: Circular model of relations among seven value dimensions at the culture-
level (from Schwartz, 2006, p. 142). 
Note. Values in italics are example items for the respective value orientation.  
 
The Empirical Test. Schwartz (1994, 2006) investigated the culture-level value 
structure by analyzing the same data as for his individual-level study (i.e. personal 
values), but this time at the aggregated culture-level. He used only the 45 value items 
that proved to be cross-culturally equivalent in meaning, and aggregated the data at the 
nation-level so that for each of the 45 value items a single average country score was 
available. Hence, any subsequent analysis was not based on the number of individual 
cases, but on the number of countries. He then examined the hypothesized value 
structure with smallest space analysis - initially with 38 nations (Schwartz, 1994) and 
later with 67 nations (Schwartz, 2006) - and was able to corroborate his theory. The 
culture-level value dimensions are computed by (1) aggregating the dataset at the 
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culture-level so that for each value item there is a ‘nation’ score and then by (2) 
averaging the scores for value items that fall into the respective value cluster as depicted 
in Figure 1.2. The culture-level value types have been shown to relate meaningfully to a 
number of nation-level indicators, such as socio-economic development as well as 
political and population characteristics (Schwartz, 2006). 
Benefits of the Cultural Values. Schwartz’ cultural values dimensions belong to 
the broad frameworks that have advanced research in cross-cultural psychology (Smith, 
et al., 2002). Like Hofstede (1980), Schwartz (1994, 2006) has provided a map of 
cultures not based on geography, but on aggregated psychological data in terms of 
values. This has benefited cross-cultural research in two ways: First, with the help of 
this ‘map’ a systematic sampling could be employed in which cultures were selected in 
a systematic, theory-guided fashion to investigate cultural differences (cf. van de Vijver 
& Leung, 1997). Secondly, it has become possible to ‘unpackage’ culture, i.e. to use 
values as a measure of culture and to investigate their effect on the variables of interest, 
instead of assuming cultural differences on the basis of prior cross-cultural research (cf. 
Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Both strategies will be employed in 
this thesis (systematic sampling in Study 3 and 4 and unpackaging of culture with the 
help of a multilevel model in Study 2).  
Most studies have focused on individualism and collectivism which has initially 
been identified by Hofstede (1980). Individualism/ collectivism is still the most 
important dimension in cross-cultural theory and research (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). It 
has been proposed that the fundamental difference between individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures lies in the way well-being is attained (see Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002). Personal goals, happiness and personal control are central to the 
well-being of individuals in individualistic societies, while carrying out duties and 
obligations are central to the well-being in collectivistic societies. This bipolar value 
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dimension is also present in Schwartz’ Value Theory yet under a different name - 
Schwartz’ Autonomy versus Embeddedness dimension parallels the individualism-
collectivism distinction (see also Gouveia & Ros, 2000; Inglehart, 2006; Kağıtçıbaşı, 
1997).  
The Critique. While Schwartz has made an indelible contribution to the study of 
values, and the SVS is justifiably popular, it is not without its detractors. The main 
critique put forward in this thesis is that Schwartz’ (1994) operationalization of cultural 
values does not assess the ‘ought’ character of desirable values in terms of a separate 
intrapsychic value system. The main drawback is one of ‘circularity’ which has already 
been identified as a problem for the construct individualism/ collectivism (Berry, 1992, 
as cited in Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997). Circularity is here a lack of independent measurement at 
the two levels of analysis (the individual- and the culture-level) combined with the use 
of correlations between them. This impedes a deeper understanding of the relation 
between the cultural context and the individual in research areas such as value change. 
According to Roe and Ester (1999), for example, it is difficult to conceptualize how a 
change in societal values may influence individuals’ values if the societal values consist 
of the sum of all individuals’ values. Hence, the operationalization of cultural values as 
the ‘desirable’ and as an independent macro-level construct is needed. This issue will be 
addressed in more detail in chapter two and empirically followed up in Study 3 and 4.  
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A Note on the Ecological Fallacy 
Cross-cultural research on values is carried out on two different levels of 
analysis: the individual- and the culture-level (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). As has been 
explained above, the two levels of analysis produce somewhat different value structures 
and some value items cluster differently across levels. Examples are the value authority 
and humble. At the individual-level, they are negatively correlated which means that 
individuals who see authority as a guiding principle in their life tend to reject being 
humble as their guiding principle (Smith, 2002). However, at the culture-level both 
values are positively correlated with each other, which means that nations that 
emphasize authority also show a preference for humility as a value. Hence, researchers 
have been advised to analyze their data at the individual-level if their interest lies in 
examining individual differences in values, and to analyze the data at the culture-level if 
their interest lies in comparing the values of different cultural groups (Smith & 
Schwartz, 1997). Equating the culture-level with the individual-level, e.g. by claiming 
that individuals show an orientation towards Autonomy or Hierarchy, would mean 
committing the “ecological fallacy” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 29). The “reverse ecological 
fallacy” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 29) is committed when individuals’ value types are taken to 
describe cultures.  
Despite the compelling example from the Schwartz Value Survey corroborating 
the difference between the individual- and culture-level value structure, it seems that 
culture-level factors are not easy to understand, especially for psychologists who are 
used to interpret and operate with psychological phenomena at the individual-level 
(Bond & Pang, 1991). Many writers in cross-cultural psychology have committed the 
ecological fallacy when they referred to individualism/ collectivism as a characteristic 
of individuals (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Smith, 2002). As Kagitcibasi (1997) puts it: “The 
discrepancies between culture-level and individual-level constructs do not make 
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immediate psychological sense and are confusing” (p. 16), even though it is statistically 
clear that a country-level analysis uses country scores and an individual-level analysis 
uses individuals’ scores. This confusion is mainly based on one vexing question: “How 
can it be that when the same data are analyzed at two different levels, the results are not 
the same?” (Smith, Bond, & Kağıtçıbaşı, 2006, p. 41). Since in the case of value 
measures the country scores are derived from averaging responses of a sample of 
individuals, the individual- and culture-level could be expected to have a parallel 
psychological meaning (Berry, 1992 as cited in Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997). However, with 
different value labels for dimensions at the culture- and individual-level, it is difficult to 
make sense of the culture-level dimensions. Kağıtçıbaşı (1997, p. 33) even suggests that 
we may be dealing with a statistical artefact, instead of a true fallacy.  
The issue is not only one of conceptual confusion, but also of methodological 
restriction: Value theories that can only be applied to certain levels impede, for 
example, a direct comparison of the predictive power of values at the individual- and 
the culture-level in multilevel models. For instance, Schwartz’ (1992) openness-to-
change versus conservation dimension has been compared with Hofstede’s concept of 
individualism and collectivism (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997). The question whether openness-to-
change predicts criterion variables in a similar fashion at both the individual- and 
culture-level would be interesting to examine. Imagine that openness-to-change at the 
individual-level is a significant predictor of tolerance towards homosexuality. It would 
be interesting to know whether openness-to-change at the culture-level would also 
significantly predict individuals’ tolerance towards homosexuality. Moreover, the 
question could be examined whether the same kind of values would add any additional 
explained variance at the culture-level if individual differences in value priorities are 
controlled for. This would provide a new insight into the effect of culture on 
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individuals’ attitudes. This question, however, cannot be investigated if value 
orientations are not equivalent at both levels of analysis. 
Schwartz (1994) himself has pointed out that it is reasonable to assume that 
there is some structural isomorphism between values at the individual- and the culture-
level. However, until very recently it has never been studied how much overlap there is 
indeed between the two levels of analysis (cf. Matsumoto, 2003). Fischer, Vauclair, 
Fontaine and Schwartz (in press) directly examined the degree of similarity between the 
structure of values at the individual- and culture-level using recent data from the 
Schwartz Value Survey drawn from more than 50 countries. The findings suggest that 
Schwartz’ individual- and culture-level value structures are very similar to each other 
and that a conceptual separation of value orientations according to the level of analysis 
is possibly not justified. Even though the authors did not find perfect isomorphism, they 
found a substantial similarity in structure across levels. Fischer and Poortinga (2009) 
also examined isomorphism of value structures across levels of analyses. They 
compared personal, social (ratings of other people’s values) and cultural value systems 
as assessed with the SVS. They found that the value structures were highly similar 
which led to the conclusion that a single value structure is most parsimonious. There 
was little empirical evidence that would suggest that the individual- and culture-level 
value structure were different from each other to the extent that they needed to be 
treated as distinct. The authors stated that using the same individual-level value clusters 
at both levels of analysis would simplify value research without a substantive loss of 
information. This provides an empirical justification for a practice that has already been 
implemented in some studies (see e.g. Lönnqvist, et al., 2009; Verkasalo, et al., 2009). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the most relevant theoretical frameworks on morality 
and clarified in which framework this thesis is positioned. It has outlined the two 
distinct research streams of morality and social psychological values research that come 
together in the concept of moral values. I have pointed out that there is a gap of research 
in investigating the social psychological concept of values, as terminal or instrumental 
goals, in terms of their moral relevance to individuals. I have also indicated that the 
assessment of moral values may be a valid and necessary alternative to measuring 
cultural values through the statistical aggregation of personal importance ratings of 
values.  
In the next section, I shall examine more thoroughly the issue of inferring 
culture from personal importance ratings of values. This theoretical chapter is aimed at 
addressing the following questions: What is culture? What does it mean if culture is 
measured by aggregating personal values? What kind of conceptual and methodological 
issues are associated with this practice? Is this a real problem or, in other words, is there 
empirical evidence that shows that it posits indeed a problem to the understanding of 
culture? This literature review will be followed by a proposal to measure culture 
through the assessment of moral values. Chapter two ends with a value taxonomy in 
which the different kinds of values (e.g. personal values, moral values) can be 





  - 51 - 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PROPOSAL 
 
Measuring Cultural Values: 
Considering Morality in Cross-cultural Value Research 
 
Introduction 
Research in cross-cultural psychology has investigated culture by focusing mainly on 
cognitive systems comprising different concepts such as values, attitudes, and beliefs. 
Most of the research has dealt with the concept of values to understand culture (e.g. 
Bond, et al., 2004; Earley, 2006). This is probably due to the common understanding in 
the field that values are “among the building blocks of culture” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25). 
More recently, cross-cultural researchers have raised doubts about the usefulness of the 
value concept (Gelfand, et al., 2006). Empirical findings show mixed results with some 
studies supporting the explanatory power of values and other studies showing that 
values are not sufficient for understanding cultural differences (see Gelfand, et al., 
2006). Furthermore, there is growing scepticism at a theoretical level that the mere 
cognitive approach to culture, where cultural values are detached from contextual 
processes such as social constraints and norms, is useful to understand culture (Earley & 
Mosakowski, 2002; Gabrenya, 1999; Mogghaddam & Studer, 1997). It is not surprising 
that some researchers have suggested abandoning the value concept and have turned to 
potentially more useful concepts such as social axioms (Leung, et al., 2002) or ‘cultural 
intelligence’ (Earley & Ang, 2003).  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. An earlier version of this chapter has been published and is hereafter referenced as follows: 
Vauclair, C.-M. (2009). Measuring cultural values at the individual-level: Considering morality in cross-
cultural value research.  Mackenzie Business Review. Special Issue: Human Values - Theory and 
Practices, 10(3), 60-83. 
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The scepticism may be legitimate to the extent that most cross-cultural 
researchers define cultural values as a conception of ‘the desirable’ (Braithwaite & 
Scott, 1991), by describing them as “desirable transsituational goals” (Feather, 1996; 
Kluckhohn, 1952; Schwartz, 1994b, p. 21), but surprisingly take a rather asocial or 
acultural stance, when measuring values through personal importance ratings of 
individuals. This approach assesses values as ‘the desired’ or in other words what 
people personally want in their lives. In contrast to that, values as ‘the desirable’ target 
people’s opinion of what they ‘ought’ or ‘should’ strive for, which is influenced by 
culture and implies social constraints and pressures imposed upon the individual (see 
also Hofstede, 1980; Higgins, 2006; Kluckhohn, 1952; Lewin, 1952). The purpose of 
this chapter is to highlight this distinction and to stress the importance of social 
constraints and normative pressures for the measurement and understanding of culture if 
culture is defined as shared values and beliefs. With the help of a value taxonomy, past 
research is classified regarding their focus of measurement. Within this taxonomy 
suggestions are made how it may be possible to measure values as ‘the desirable’.  
Finally, the benefits of distinguishing these different kinds of values are discussed in 
regard to future research. 
 
Definition of Culture 
While culture can be defined in many different ways (cf. Baldwin, et al., 2006; 
Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952), there seems to be a minimal consensus - at least in the 
field of anthropology and psychology - that it is a phenomenon of a collective and it is 
shared among its members (Kashima, 2000; Kuper, 1999; Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 
2004; Rohner, 1984). Yet, there seems to be no agreement of what exactly this 
‘sharedness’ means (Rohner, 1984). Some cross-cultural researchers have 
conceptualized it in terms of observable patterns of cognitive structures which are 
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distinctive to social groups (e.g. Hofstede, 1980). These are concepts such as values and 
beliefs that are assumed to influence behaviour. This places culture inside the minds of 
individuals as members of a cultural group, like in Hofstede’s definition of culture as 
“the collective programming of the mind” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 13). Other definitions of 
culture in cross-cultural psychology go beyond the structural view by including the 
functions of culture (e.g. Matsumoto, 2007). Functional definitions suggest that 
concepts such as cultural values exist for a reason or purpose. One of the most important 
functions of culture is possibly its “guidance function” (cf. Baldwin, et al., 2006, p. 38; 
cf. Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961): Culture helps to organize collective life by 
providing solutions to problems of everyday activities. It guides individuals by reducing 
the number of available interpretations of an event or person and in this way it is giving 
order to the world. It is this sense of order that people transmit via cultural values to 
new cultural members, which can be employees in an organization, migrants in a host 
country, or growing children (Baldwin, et al, 2006; Roe & Ester, 1999). Individuals are 
constrained by culture in so far that to be accepted as group members, they need to 
conform to cultural standards, which reinforce learning and internalization of cultural 
values (see also Triandis, 1972). This kind of structural-functional understanding of 
culture has been widely adopted by current cross-cultural theorists (e.g. Schwartz, 1994, 
2006b; Triandis, 1994).  
From this point of view, shared values serve a purpose in social groups or 
cultures. Shared values are general guidelines which regulate behaviour of its members 
so that collective life is organized and individuals interact more smoothly. New 
members are explicitly and implicitly taught what is appropriate or socially desirable. 
Thus, culture draws boundaries and limits the individual’s freedom by creating external 
constraints on what is accepted or appropriate and what is not. In this way, cultural 
values refer to what is judged as right or wrong, i.e. they refer to issues of morality. In 
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fact, it has been proposed that it is difficult to delineate where culture ends and morality 
begins as culture and morality share an intricate and intimate relationship (Miller, 
2001). Yet, this close interrelationship between culture and morality has so far been 
neglected in quantitative research on cultural values.  
In the following section the usual approach in identifying cultural values is 
briefly outlined as well as the methodological and conceptual problems associated with 
it. Subsequently, selected empirical studies are presented to corroborate the raised 
concerns of neglecting morality in form of social constraints in cultural values research. 
Recent alternative approaches of measuring cultural values are introduced and classified 
in a value taxonomy. A possible solution for measuring the so far neglected moral 
component of cultural values at the individual-level is finally presented.   
 
Past Approach in Identifying Cultural Values 
The Culture-level Analysis Approach 
Cross-cultural research on values is carried out on two different levels of 
analysis: the individual- and the cultural-level (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). At the 
individual-level, values are conceptualized as motivational goals serving as guiding 
principles in individuals’ lives (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). The 
procedure consists usually in asking individuals from different countries to respond to 
the same value survey and to indicate which values are personally important to them. 
After establishing equivalence of the scale, structure-oriented techniques, such as factor 
analysis or multidimensional scaling, can be employed to identify value dimensions that 
characterize individuals in their motivational goals. Schwartz (1992), for example, 
found that values are ordered in a circular fashion with the consequence that if 
individuals place emphasis on one value type (e.g. hedonistic values), they are likely to 
deemphasize the opposite value type on the value circle (here traditional values). Yet, 
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these value dimensions do not represent cultural values, but just personal values. To 
measure cultural values, the responses of individuals need to be taken a step further and 
analyzed at the cultural-level. Here, the scores of individuals within countries are 
averaged, meaning that the culture-level dataset consists of countries as cases instead of 
individuals. These country scores can then also be analyzed with structure-oriented 
techniques to identify cultural value dimensions. Schwartz (1992, 1994), for example, 
found that a culture-level analysis of his cross-cultural data yielded also a circular value 
structure. Only that this time the value dimensions characterize whole societies and are 
different in their content compared to the individual-level dimensions. Countries that 
emphasize one value type (e.g. Egalitarianism) deemphasize the opposite value type in 
the value circle (here Hierarchy). These values are seen as representing the socially 
shared ideas of what is desirable or good and right in a society (cf. Smith & Schwartz, 
1997). They characterize cultures and are therefore labelled “cultural values”.  
 
Conceptual and Methodological Problems 
As already indicated above, the concept of values is multifaceted in the sense 
that it can describe not only individuals, but also cultural groups. Yet, since Hofstede 
(1980) it is common knowledge that what applies to cultural groups does not necessarily 
apply in the same way to individuals. Hofstede (1980) found that his country-level 
dimensions, such as collectivism and individualism, could not be replicated at the 
individual-level. Since then, the two levels of analysis are neatly separated, and 
applying country-level dimensions to individuals is seen as committing the “ecological 
fallacy” (cf. Hofstede, 1980, p. 28-31). The consequence of this fallacy problem is, that 
in a strict sense one cannot compare individuals in terms of cultural value dimensions 
such as individualism and collectivism. This is a characteristic that applies only to 
countries, cultures or other social entities. From a psychological perspective, the 
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ecological fallacy remains a puzzling and less well-understood phenomenon until today 
(Smith & Schwartz, 1997). After all, the country-level dimensions are derived from 
individuals’ responses. Yet, statistically aggregating their responses at the country-level 
renders them inapplicable to individuals. Another puzzling issue is that, only the 
culture-level approach is seen as measuring culture in the sense of what is socially 
shared and the abstract ideas of what is good, right, appropriate and desirable in a 
cultural group (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; Smith & Schwartz, 1997). An 
inevitable conclusion is that if we want to study cultural values, we need to ‘limit’ 
ourselves to country-level analyses. However, there are several objections to this 
inference.  
The first objection is epistemological in nature referring to the assumption that 
only country-level dimensions reflect shared cultural values. In country-level analyses, 
culture is treated as the sum of all sampled individuals from a specific cultural group. 
That means that culture is seen as only measurable when the responses of individuals 
within a cultural group are aggregated. This may be adequate for sociological 
endeavours, also reflected by the usual procedure of validating country-level 
dimensions with sociological indices such as gross domestic product (e.g. Hofstede, 
1980). However, from a psychological perspective of culture, with the aim to 
understand human behaviour, it seems more relevant to try to comprehend each human 
being as an expression of culture (Bruner, 1990), and thus to investigate the 
manifestation of cultural values at the individual-level relying on intrapsychic cognitive 
structures of individuals. A possible way of doing this could be by including morality as 
a concept in the measurement of values to capture external normative pressures in a 
society. This will be discussed in more detail below.  
A further objection concerns the way cultural values are operationalized. Most 
of the value surveys measure the personal importance of values (e.g. Chinese Value 
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Survey, Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Rokeach Value Survey, Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz Value Survey, Schwartz, 1992). The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) 
(Schwartz, 1992), for example, requires individuals to indicate “What values are 
important to ME as guiding principles in MY life?” From a social psychological point 
of view, the statistical average of personal value priorities does not tell us what kind of 
social constraints or normative pressures are prevalent in a certain culture. It does not 
answer questions such as: What are we supposed to value or strive for? Or what kind of 
behaviour are we supposed to adopt in different cultures? Averaging personal value 
priorities reflects merely what a majority deems as important in a culture and can be 
called “actual rather than ideal cultural value priorities” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 51). The 
problem is that operationalizing values with personal importance ratings conflates two 
different motives of valuing: values may be seen as personally important, because (1) 
they are well internalized socially desirable values, or (2) they have an intrinsically 
positive quality which leads to a hedonic experience of appraisal when the value is 
fulfilled (see also Feather, 1999; Higgins, 2006). For instance, the value ‘pleasure’ from 
the SVS may be judged as important because of this very hedonic motive and not 
because it is a socially desirable standard. Values as ‘the desirable’ go beyond the 
evaluation of whether a value is just pleasant or unpleasant for oneself by implying 
judgments of what is desirable or morally right or wrong. The usual procedure of 
averaging personal values and deriving cultural values from that neglects these kinds of 
social constraints and expectations that culture imposes upon individuals.  
The last objection deals with the methodological consequences. Sticking to the 
culture-level approach to identify cultural values restricts future research in a practical 
sense: either we limit ourselves to cultural value dimensions that have already been 
identified, for example, the seven culture-level value types by Schwartz (1994), or every 
researcher who suggests potentially new and meaningful values (e.g. 'protestant ethic 
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values', Verkasalo, et al., 2008) needs to conduct an extensive cross-cultural study to be 
able to claim that they are valid cultural values. This would mean sampling of 
individuals from at least 50 countries or cultural groups to ensure that the new culture-
level value dimension is stable (Fischer, et al., in press). It would also mean conducting 
a very costly, effort-and time-intensive research project (cf. Norenzayan & Heine, 
2005). 
 
Empirical Evidence Underpinning the Problems 
One may wonder whether personal and cultural values are indeed different. Or 
whether it would really make a difference if cultural values were not derived from a 
culture-level analysis, but measured at the individual-level and differently from personal 
values. Would it really add something to our understanding? There is indirect empirical 
evidence that it would. It seems indeed that personal importance ratings of values do not 
capture the normative aspect of values prevalent in social groups. 
As Fischer (2008a) pointed out, if culture is defined in terms of shared values, 
any measure of cultural values should show that individuals from the same culture 
endorse similar values, and that cross-national variation exceeds indeed intranational 
variability. Cross-cultural data from the Schwartz Value Survey study analyzed at the 
individual-level revealed that there is “substantial individual variance in response to 
every single value” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 50) instead of consensus which would have 
been an indicator for shared cultural values. Furthermore, this individual variance does 
not seem to reflect measurement error as it was systematically associated with 
individual differences in participants’ background characteristics, their attitudes or 
behaviour. Schwartz eventually concludes that his survey is measuring personal values 
and that “one cannot derive the normative ideals of a culture from the average of 
individual responses” (p. 51). 
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Furthermore, it seems that personal values can even be compromised when the 
normative pressure is high. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) conducted a study to investigate 
the value-behaviour link at the individual-level. They assessed values with the SVS and 
sampled behavioural items supposed to represent the values. Their results showed that 
the more frequent a behaviour was reported, the less consistently values were associated 
with the behaviour. In other words, if everybody seems to behave in a certain way or if 
a certain behaviour is the norm in a social group, people report to behave the same way 
even if it is not congruent with their personal values. Only when external pressure is 
absent, the personal importance of values may influence their behaviour. Since from a 
functional perspective culture can be seen as creating external constraints and putting 
normative pressures on the individual, Bardi and Schwartz’ study underpins the here 
proposed argument that personal importance ratings may not reflect the ‘shared’ ideas in 
a social group what one should do or should strive for. And from a conceptual 
perspective this does not change if the data is analyzed at a statistically higher level.   
Another area of research in which the conceptual and empirical distinction of 
personal values and those of the social context may play an important role, is in the area 
of value fit between individual and social group as well as value change. Rohan and 
Maiden (2000) used a modified form of the SVS to measure value priorities of teachers 
and what they call the ‘ideological’ value system of their schools which is the teachers’ 
perception of the school’s value priorities. They showed that the fit between teachers’ 
personal values and their perception of the school’s values strongly predicted reported 
stress, job commitment, and satisfaction. As Rohan and Maiden state, this prediction 
could not have been obtained by merely constructing an index of fit based on teachers’ 
personal values and the aggregated value priorities of all teachers in the respective 
schools. The fundamental issue lies in the fact that aggregated personal values of 
individuals do not contain much social psychological information.  
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If value change is investigated, the importance and benefit of operationalizing 
values of the social environment and of the individual differently becomes even more 
obvious. There is the problem of causal inconsistency if cultural values are represented 
by mere aggregation of individuals’ personal values. As Roe and Ester (1999) highlight: 
“It is hard to assume that a change in cultural values causes a change in individual 
values if the change in cultural values is operationally defined as the sum of individual 
changes” (p. 4).  
These empirical studies and examples suggest that personal value priorities (1) 
do not contain information about values that are socially desirable, and (2) impede a 
deeper social psychological understanding if they are not operationalized separately for 
the micro-and macro-level. The following section proposes how values can be 
operationalized at these two conceptually different levels.   
 
Alternative Ways of Measuring Cultural Values 
Recent Approaches: Changing the Frame of Reference 
Recent studies have adopted the approach to measure cultural values by 
changing the frame of reference from ‘self’ to ‘others’. Here individuals are asked about 
their perception of other people’s values (Fischer, 2006; Wan, Chiu, Peng, et al., 2007; 
Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007). For instance, Wan et al.’s (2007) underlying assumption 
is that cultural values are those that are strongly endorsed by most members of the 
culture. Instead of just averaging the value priorities of a social group, they argue that it 
is more appropriate to let research participants estimate how an average member of a 
cultural group would respond to the value survey as culture resides in its members’ 
intersubjectivity. Consequently, a value has high intersubjective importance when most 
of the research participants agree that an average member of their group would strongly 
endorse the value. Wan and colleagues used the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) and 
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measured personal values of Chinese university students. They also asked the 
participants in a modified version of the SVS to rate the importance of the values to ‘an 
average student at the university’ and to an average person of their cultural group. They 
called this measurement strategy ‘intersubjective consensus approach’ or ‘perceived 
cultural importance’ approach alternatively. They used this approach to identify those 
cultural values that differentiate between Chinese, Singaporean and the local university 
culture. Their findings showed a general tendency, namely, that the more personally 
important ‘culturally’ distinctive values were rated, the more respondents identified 
with the respective cultural groups suggesting that personal values may reflect cultural 
identity and thus cultural values. However, as the authors note this relationship did not 
hold for all cultural identifications, but only for those referring to subcultures, for 
instance, identification with the university culture. The reason may be that it is difficult 
for respondents to rate the value importance of an average person belonging to a greater 
cultural entity such as national culture.  
Fischer’s (2006) solution for measuring cultural values also consisted in 
changing the frame of reference. The SVS was taken for this purpose and modified by 
instructing respondents from ten different countries to rate the importance of each value 
for most of the people in their country of birth. He analyzed the data at the culture-level 
and correlated them with Schwartz’ culture-level data on self-referenced ratings of 
values. The results illustrated that self- and culture-referenced ratings did not show great 
overlap, sharing only 7.84% of their variance. Only values of the cultural value 
dimensions embeddedness (feeling attached and socially connected to social groups) 
and affective autonomy (pursuing affectively positive experiences for oneself) were 
related to self-referenced ratings. Fischer concluded that researchers need to be careful 
about interpreting aggregated self-reports in terms of cultural values and that there is 
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more research needed that investigates the normative aspects of culture to understand 
the functions and processes of culture.  
These value studies have contributed to an advancement in cross-cultural value 
research by considering different references when using self-reported ratings of 
individuals. To provide a better overview, a value taxonomy is presented where these 
studies can be classified.  
 
Classifying Value Research at the Individual-level: A Value Taxonomy 
Table 2.1 shows how past research investigating values at the individual-level 
may be classified. There are two dichotomous features of values: they can either refer to 
the individual or collective and to ‘the desired’ (what and individual wants as a goal in 
life) or ‘the desirable’ (what an individual ought to want as a goal in life). This yields a 
2 X 2 classification of four different value types. Personal values refer to the individual 
and what they desire for themselves which has, for example, been studied by Schwartz 
(1992). Studies that change the frame of reference to value importance ratings of a 
social group measure conceptually also what is desired (cf. Fischer, 2006; Wan, et al., 
2007). However, here it does not apply to an individual, but to a whole social group. 
These kinds of values may be labelled ‘social value system’ (Rohan, 2000). The term 
does not refer to the content of values, for instance, prosocial, desirable or moral values, 
but to the holder of these values, which is a social entity. In order to assess the 
normative component of values in the sense of what one should or ought to strive for, 
values need to be measured as the desirable. Possible solutions to achieve this are 
proposed next.  
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Table 2.1: Value taxonomy: The measurement of values at the individual-level 
 
 Frame of Reference 




Personal Value System 
 
Operationalization: Important to 
me/ you 
 
Social Value System 
 
Operationalization: Important to 






Personal Moral Value System 
(personally desirable) 
 
Operationalization: What one 
ought to strive for; right vs. 
wrong; feeling of guilt if value 
violated 
Social Moral Value System 
(socially desirable) 
 
Operationalization: What one is 
expected to strive for in the 





 Incorporating Morality in the Measurement of Values 
The Difference between ‘the Desired’ and ‘the Desirable’. While studies 
described above measure what is desired, cultural values may be better operationalized 
if measured as ‘the desirable’. Values as ‘the desired’ refer to what individuals 
intrinsically ‘want’ to strive for or what they personally desire in their life (e.g. 
Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). Value instruments that measure ‘the desired’ address 
individuals by instructing to ask themselves, for example, what values are important to 
them as guiding principles in their life (e.g. Schwartz, 1992, p. 50). In contrast to that, 
values as ‘the desirable’ refer to what individuals ‘ought’ to strive for or what they 
should desire (Dewey, 1939) which in regard to culture is something that has been 
extrinsically imposed upon them. An alternative way of conceptualizing the difference 
between ‘the desirable’ and ‘the desired’ is by assigning values ‘direction and intensity’ 
(Hofstede, 1980, p. 20; see also Higgins, 2006; Kluckhohn, 1952; Lewin, 1952). ‘The 
desirable’ represents the directional component of values and has an evaluative 
meaning, in the sense that individuals judge whether a certain value is right or wrong to 
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strive for (cf. Kluckhohn, 1952). ‘The desired’ on the other hand refers to the strength or 
intensity of a value. Thus, holding a value means not only that this value is relevant or 
important to a certain degree (intensity), but at the same time it can also be evaluated in 
a sense of whether it is right or wrong to strive for it (direction). Hence, values as ‘the 
desired’ and ‘the desirable’ relate to values of two different natures. According to 
Hofstede (1980) this has implications for the interpretation of their norms. Taking the 
statistical average of values as ‘the desired’ indicates to what extent the majority 
endorses the values. This is an approach which has been mostly adopted in cross-
cultural value research (e.g. Chinese Culture Connection, 1989; Schwartz, 1994). In the 
case of ‘the desirable’, the assessed values contain implicitly an ideological norm in the 
sense of what is seen as morally
2
 right or wrong (cf. Hofstede, 1980; Kluckhohn, 1952). 
Hofstede (1980) provides a plausible example as an illustration of the difference 
between ‘the desired’ and ‘the desirable’: An individual may ‘desire’ “wealth” as a 
value or “having money” and consider it as highly relevant (intensity), in the sense that 
one needs some of it to lead a decent life. Thus, ‘wealth’ is seen as something important 
and its fulfilment may lead to a positive intrinsic feeling, such as satisfaction. However, 
the same person, especially if adhering to Christian principles, could judge this value as 
wrong in the sense of adopting it as ‘a guiding principle in life’.  
 Yet, how can ‘the desirable’ component of values be measured? This is 
discussed next with regard to whether values refer to what an individual deems as 
desirable or to what a social group judges as desirable.  
Social Moral Values: ‘The Desirable’ and the Collective. Similar to the 
operationalization of ‘the desired’ for a collective, the choice of reference may be that 
individuals are asked about other people in their culture and what kind of values others 
                                               
2
 Hofstede (1980) does not use the term moral, but says that the ideological norm is “pertaining to what is 
ethically right” (p. 21). I use the term ethics and its derivations only to refer to philosophy as the science 
of ethical reasoning. When it is about people’s everyday judgments of right and wrong, I assign it to the 
realm of morality.  
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may regard as right to strive for. Values have been described as possessing a bipolar 
valence (e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Rokeach, 1973). Thus, a possible way of 
measuring desirable values is to ask individuals whether other people in their society 
would judge certain values right or good as opposed to wrong and bad (see also 
Hofstede, 1980). The evaluation factor of the semantic differential developed by 
Osgood  and colleagues (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) may be very useful for 
this purpose. Osgood et al. (1957) found in an extensive cross-cultural study in more 
than 20 cultural groups that three distinctive factors emerge when bipolar adjectives are 
taken to assess different concepts: evaluation (e.g. good-bad), potency (e.g. strong-
weak), and activity (e.g. active-passive). The evaluative valence of values may be 
examined to find out which values are desirable or judged as right to strive for in a 
society. However, if questions are referred to other people, there is always the 
possibility that respondents simply do not know or are not aware of the values that 
others deem as desirable (see also Wan, et al., 2007). Another problem is that 
individuals may infer from their own values to those of others and regard them as 
normative, known as the false consensus effect in the social psychological literature (for 
a review see Marks & Miller, 1987). A solution may be to rely on intrapsychic cognitive 
structures which are based on individuals’ own experience. This could be done, for 
instance, by asking what kind of social expectations individuals experience in a 
particular social group or society. A possible question to measure socially desirable 
values is then, for instance, “to what extent do you think you are expected (or supposed) 
to follow this value in your society/ culture etc.?” Since internalization of cultural 
values is a lifelong process (cf. Allport, 1955) where individuals try to reconcile social 
constraints with their personal desires (see also Deci & Ryan, 1995; Rohan & Zanna, 
1998; Zavalloni, 1980), the kind of social expectations that are imposed upon 
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individuals may be psychologically very well accessible. To the best of my knowledge, 
there are no cross-cultural studies measuring this aspect of values.  
Personal Moral Values: ‘The Desirable’ and the Individual. Assessing what is 
desirable for an individual gives moral values another spin. What is important here is 
that values are not only imposed, but are also internalized by the individual to a certain 
degree (cf. Ryan & Deci, 2000). How can these kinds of values be measured? One could 
again use a bipolar evaluative response scale of ‘good vs. bad’ or ‘right vs. wrong’ (cf. 
Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), but this time the choice of reference would be the 
individual in the sense of what she/he regards as right or wrong to strive for in life. The 
average of respondents’ answers represents then not only a statistical norm in a cultural 
group, but also a deontological one (pertaining to what one ought to strive for). 
Following this procedure, a researcher may be able to ask simultaneously for each value 
the personal importance (important-unimportant) and its evaluative meaning. Thus, it 
would be possible to examine the congruence between what people ‘want’ to strive for 
in life and what they think they ‘should want’ to strive for as a guiding principle in life. 
 The drawback of this method could be that individuals may not assign ‘deeper’ 
meaning to the evaluative scale and rate what is ‘important’ and what is ‘right’ in the 
same way, possibly as an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
Another possibility of measuring ‘the desirable’, which may be more reliable as it is less 
subjected to response styles, is to ask for moral emotions such as the feeling of guilt 
when violating a value. Moral emotions are in general seen as an important motivational 
factor to do good and avoid doing bad (Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Tangney, 2002). It is 
the self-conscious emotion of guilt that plays a major role in morality (Amodio, Devine, 
& Harmon-Jones, 2007; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Eisenberg, 2000; 
Haidt, 2003). Guilt is widely recognized as an important self-punishing emotion for 
action evaluation and regulation (Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, & Markam, 2002). It is a 
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negative affective experience that is evoked when one’s behaviour falls short of either 
personal moral or societal standards (Amodio, et al., 2007). Shame is also a moral 
emotion, but associated with a rather egocentric concern for one’s self-image. Guilt is 
more an allocentric concern for the consequences of one’s behaviour on other people 
(Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Tangey, 2002). As a consequence, moral transgressions have 
generally been considered to be more linked to guilt than to shame (Bedford & Hwang, 
2003). Thus, asking for guilt feelings when violating a value and examining its 
statistical average may be a good indicator for shared desirable and therefore cultural 
values that have been internalized.  
 
Benefits of Distinguishing Different Value Measurements 
Personally Desired versus Personally Desirable. The value taxonomy classifies 
value research into the dichotomous dimension of measuring ‘the desired’ aspect of 
values (through importance ratings) or the evaluative component of values in form of 
what is ‘desirable’. Furthermore, it distinguishes whether values refer to the individual 
or a collective. Crossing these dimensions yield, for example, that values can be 
classified as ‘personally desired’ and ‘personally desirable’. It may not be obvious to 
see the difference between these two kinds of values. This section deals with their 
fundamental distinction and how it may relate to the prediction of behaviour.  
The problem with measuring values as ‘the desired’ through importance ratings 
is that there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding their underlying meaning. Values that 
individuals judge as important may have two different motivational sources: First, 
important values may be those that were initially extrinsic and have been imposed upon 
the individual by the social environment. Through socialization processes, the 
individual may have integrated it as part of the self, so that they become personally 
important (cf. Ryan & Deci, 2000). The second motivational source is completely 
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different representing an intrinsic kind of motive. Here, individuals may judge values as 
important, because fulfilling them leads to enjoyment or inherent satisfaction (see also 
Wan, et al., 2007; Ryan & Deci, 2000). The problem is that assessing the personal 
importance of values does not allow distinguishing between these two different sources 
of motivation. As already outlined above in which the Bardi and Schwartz (2003) study 
has been referred to, it seems that this is not a trivial distinction. Bardi and Schwartz 
(2003) showed that personal values - which conflate the intrinsic and extrinsic 
dimension of values - were not related to behaviour when the normative pressure of the 
behaviour was high. It is possible that the value-behaviour link is more stable if not 
personally desired values are measured, but personally desirable values as they may 
provide an internal compass of ‘oughts’ and ‘shoulds’.   
Research on moral mandates may corroborate this assumption showing that 
personal moral values have a potential to influence people’s behaviour (Skitka, 2002; 
Skitka & Houston, 2001; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). Skitka and colleagues showed that 
the value-behaviour link is especially strong for individuals with moral mandates, which 
are selective expressions of values and central to people’s sense of personal identity. 
Moral mandates are characterized by attitude strength, importance, and certainty, but 
include the additional layer of moral conviction, i.e. a strong belief that an issue is right 
or wrong. People who develop moral mandates are highly motivated to express and 
protect them. Skitka and Mullen (2002) examined reactions of US-American adults to 
the Elian Gonzales case that became the centre of a heated public controversy and 
custody battle between his father in Cuba and his extended family in the USA. People in 
both the USA and Cuba engaged in demonstrations to defend their divergent position 
and values on the same issue. Skitka and colleagues research can be interpreted in the 
way that personally desirable values may yield strong links between values and 
behaviour. Hence, the reputation of values as being only distally related to behaviour 
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may be eventually refuted when assessing values as the ‘personally desirable’ (cf. Hitlin 
& Piliavin, 2004).  
Individual versus collective - when is culture measured? Values may refer to the 
individual or a social entity. Socially desirable values as depicted in Table 2.1 have been 
discussed as measuring the values of the social environment such as the cultural group. 
Yet, personally desirable values may also be used to measure cultural values. If 
individuals are, for example, asked whether they would feel guilty after violating 
values, a high statistical average on certain values may indicate that these are the 
internalized shared values in the respective culture. Thus, both procedures may lead to 
the assessment of cultural values. However, they are fundamentally different in two 
ways: First, socially desirable values measure only the perceived values of a social 
group. This is adequate if operationalizing the cultural context, for example, is the focus 
of the study. Yet, it does not provide any information whether the respondents adhere to 
these values. Whether these values have been internalized or not may be important to 
assess in studies that focus on the relation of values to other variables, such as 
behaviour. As it has been outlined above, there may be a strong value-behaviour link if 
individuals’ personal moral values are assessed. Secondly, if the focus of a study is on 
examining individual differences in personal moral values, assessing the perceived 
values of the social environment is inadequate.  
The intriguing feature of moral values and the process of internalization is that 
they can stem from different sources located on a continuum of more proximal sources 
such as caregivers and peers to more distant sources such as teachers, media and society 
(Bandura, 1991). Therefore, internalized moral values may potentially reflect those of a 
culture. However, especially when it comes to strong political ideologies, it is also 
possible that individuals develop different internalized values, provided by their 
caregivers, for example, than those that are perceived as prevalent in the wider society 
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and in the political propaganda. Prominent examples are the German siblings Sophie 
and Hans Scholl who during the third Reich in Germany opposed actively the national 
socialist regime and their supporters. They strongly supported the humanist values of 
their father. They regarded these values as the morally right ones and fought for it, 
taking into account that they may be and finally were sacrificing their own lives. The 
proposed value taxonomy takes this important aspect of moral values into account, i.e. 
the possibility that there are individual differences in moral value endorsement despite 
normative pressures.  
 
Conclusion and Final Remarks 
There has been a lot of definitional inconsistency in values-related theory and 
research (Rohan, 2000). Values have been used to refer to other psychological 
constructs such as attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behavioural self-reports (cf. Hitlin & 
Piliavin, 2004) as well as interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral 
obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, and many other kinds of selective orientations 
(see Rohan, 2000). However, if values as ‘the desirable’ are the target concept to 
understand culture, it is important not to confound them with other related concepts. 
Each type of concept may play a distinctive role in explaining and understanding 
behaviour. This is why a value taxonomy has been proposed to clearly distinguish 
between individual and collective values as well as ‘the desired’ and ‘the desirable’. 
While ‘the desired’ may be associated with a purely intrinsic motivation to pursue 
values, ‘the desirable’ contains also social psychological information, such as the 
internalization of extrinsic demands and behavioural regulation.  
While some researchers argue to abandon the value concept (e.g., Gelfand, et al., 
2006; Leung, et al., 2002), I see values as a useful concept to understand culture. The 
dissatisfaction with the value concept may rather be associated with the fact that value 
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research has still not come to its full potential. Hopefully, the value taxonomy may 
inspire researchers to operationalize cultural values beyond mere importance ratings.  
As De Munck (2001) states: “collective constructs, [must] be easily learned, 
acquired from everyday life experiences, abstract and flexible enough to be used for a 
wide range of situations” (p. 14). Values fulfil this task and have a number of other 
advantages. They are highly suitable for cross-cultural research as they are cross-
culturally relevant and valid and allow for both within- and between-group comparison 
(Hills, 2002). They are trans-situational guidelines and in this sense not tied to specific 
situations making it easier to assure cross-cultural equivalence for comparisons. The 
total number of values that people may pursue is assumed to be relatively small 
(Rokeach, 1973) which reduces their complexity in research. They are also less 
subjected to change as it is the case with attitudes (Hills, 2002). Last but not least, they 
may be essential in understanding the underlying motives of social norms, which are 
prescriptions/ proscriptions to behave in a certain way in a specific situation (Rokeach, 
1973). 
In this account, the Schwartz Value Survey has been referred to several times 
which can be understood as an indication of its popularity to measure explicit value 
priorities. Recent research has also been presented where the instruction of the survey 
has been modified to measure cultural values at the individual-level. The SVS is an 
excellent instrument to measure values and can be easily modified in its response scale 
to capture the different value types as proposed in the value taxonomy. Thus, the SVS 
provides a sound foundation for exploring and extending value research to enrich our 
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CHAPTER THREE: STUDY 1 
 
The Structure of Human Values at the Culture-level:  
A Meta-analytical Replication of Schwartz’ Value Orientations 
Using the Rokeach Value Survey  
 
Introduction 
Values are considered to be one of the defining concepts for differentiating cultural 
groups from one another (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). An important question is how 
values are structured across different societies, so that cultures can be meaningfully 
described and compared to each other. Schwartz (1994b, 2006) developed a value 
structure theory at the culture-level, which was validated with numerous samples from 
all inhabited continents. Applying multidimensional scaling techniques on 45 values, he 
was able to show that they form seven value types organized in a quasi-circumplex way 
in a two-dimensional space. This value configuration forms a coherent and integrated 
system of societal value preferences. The culture-level value structure has been shown 
to relate empirically to a number of nation-level indicators, such as socio-economic 
development, gender equality, justice perceptions and optimism (Fischer & Chalmers, 
2008; Fischer, et al., 2007; Schwartz, 2006b). Yet, before an empirical result can serve 






Note. An earlier version of this chapter has been accepted for publication and is hereafter referenced as 
follows: Vauclair, C.-M., Hanke, K., Fischer, R. & Fontaine, J. R. (in press). The structure of human 
values at the culture-level: A meta-analytical replication of Schwartz’ value orientations using the 
Rokeach Value Survey. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology.  
Chapter three: Generalizability of cultural values 
- 73 - 
To the best of my knowledge, the culture-level structure has not been independently 
replicated yet
3
. Hence, the first step in scrutinizing the validity of Schwartz’ theory is 
here to test the replicability of his cultural value types. To accomplish that, I chose to 
conduct a meta-analysis on the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS, Rokeach, 1968, 1973). 
The RVS contains an additional set of value items that have either not been included in 
Schwartz’ survey to assess values (SVS) or that have been excluded from the culture-
level analysis. I examined whether these omitted values form a value type of their own. 
Despite the commonly shared opinion about replication studies as not producing 
anything new (Neuliep & Crandall, 1993), I will show that my replication contributes to 
the generation of new knowledge and prepares the ground for new theoretical 
perspectives.  
For the sake of a more comprehensive structure of the paper, I have separated 
the analyses into two studies according to the aims of my research: Study 1a deals with 
the replicability of Schwartz’ culture value structure; Study 1b focuses on those 
Rokeach values that were omitted in Schwartz’ analysis. Before presenting the results, I 
provide the rationale for using a meta-analysis to replicate Schwartz’ culture-level value 
structure.  
 
Different Replication Strategies 
Aiming to replicate Schwartz’ culture-level findings, I was confronted with 
choosing between two possible procedures: the test of reproducibility and the test of 
generalizability (Amir & Sharon, 1990). These different kinds of replication strategies 
differ on their conceptual level, the method employed to carry them out, and also the 
value of their outcome. Testing the reproducibility has the aim to ensure that the 
                                               
3
 An exception is Schwartz’ (2006) culture-level analysis using the PVQ which replicated the structure of 
values. Yet, it is based on data from the European Social Survey project comprising European countries 
and Israel only. 
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empirical results are reliable. It is important herein to conduct a study that is as identical 
as possible to the original one in terms of the specific context where it has been carried 
out, i.e. the population, the setting, and the time frame. If this so-called ‘fairly precise’ 
replication is successful, it supports the theory; if it is unsuccessful, it has the potential 
to impair the established theory (Rosenthal, 1991). Compared with reproducibility, 
replication studies concerned with the generalizability of an empirical result are located 
more on the opposite pole of precision and value of outcome. In the words of Rosenthal 
(1991), “The more imprecise the replications, the greater the benefit to the external 
validity of the tested relationship if the results support the relationship” (p. 5, italics 
added). Hence, the test of generalizability is achieved when certain aspects of the 
original study are modified, so that its external validity can be examined and the 
findings can be generalized across a larger sample or context.  
 
Testing the Generalizability of Schwartz’ Theory 
In cross-cultural psychology, the actual interest for individual-level studies lies 
in conducting fairly imprecise replication studies. This is usually done by sampling 
respondents from other cultures, so that an extension of the theory in question to these 
cultures can be achieved if the replication is successful (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
If the replication fails, the theory or instrument may be specific to certain cultural 
groups. The same rationale can be applied to culture-level studies. If Schwartz culture-
level findings cannot be replicated with a different set of cultures, his value types may 
only be valid for a specific composition of cultures.  
Yet, testing the generalizability of culture-level studies, such as Schwartz’ 
cultural value dimensions, is more difficult to achieve than for individual-level studies. 
Culture-level studies require data collection from a wide range of different cultures, 
which is very costly, effort- and time-intensive. This difficulty applies also to the 
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replication of them, if it involves primary data collection. A solution to overcome the 
problem of data collection is to carry out a meta-analysis on studies that have already 
been conducted in different countries (cf. Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).  
 
Meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis can be used as a tool to obtain a cross-cultural dataset. Meta-
analysis is a set of techniques that statistically combines the results of several studies to 
provide an answer to the overall research question (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). There is a 
distinction between a domain-based and instrument-based meta-analysis (van Hemert, 
2003). The former uses a thematic domain from which cross-cultural studies are 
sampled. In an instrument-based meta-analysis, studies are sampled that uses the same 
psychological instrument. I chose to conduct an instrument-based meta-analysis since it 
fits my purpose to obtain a cross-cultural dataset on personal values. Yet, in terms of the 
specific instrument, I was confronted with two possible options: a) a meta-analysis on 
studies that used the SVS; or b) a meta-analysis on another value instrument containing 
conceptually similar values. One such an instrument is the Rokeach Value Survey 
(RVS), developed and published in the late 1960’s by Rokeach (1968, 1973). The RVS 
is especially suitable as it has been widely used around the world (Rohan, 2000). Hence, 
a meta-analysis on the RVS should yield an extensive cross-cultural dataset.  
There are both advantages and disadvantages regarding the two approaches 
mentioned above. A meta-analysis on the SVS would yield results that are better 
comparable to Schwartz’ primary analysis, but at the same time it would comprise 
studies published in a much narrower time frame compared to a meta-analysis on the 
earlier published RVS. This may also result in the inclusion of samples that are very 
similar to the ones in Schwartz’ analysis as most of the published papers emerge from 
Western countries (Quinones-Vidal, Lopez-Garcia, Penaranda-Ortega, & Tortosa-Gil, 
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2004), consisting mainly of university students as the most accessible group for 
empirical analyses (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Eventually, this would come close to a 
‘fairly precise’ replication which does not allow drawing conclusions on the 
generalizability of Schwartz’ findings. In contrast, a meta-analysis on the RVS, which 
has been used in research for approximately 40 years, has the potential to yield a much 
bigger pool of studies that may allow generalizing beyond the sample characteristics of 
Schwartz’ study.  
Another point of consideration is that by choosing the RVS, there is the unique 
opportunity to test whether Schwartz’ cultural value dimensions are also identifiable if 
the measurement of values is based on a different response format. The main difference 
between the SVS and the RVS is that the latter is based on a rank order procedure, 
whereas the former follows a rating instruction on a 9- point Likert scale ranging from 
“opposed to my values” (-1) through “important” (3) to “very important” (6) and “of 
supreme importance” (7). Comparing different measurement techniques that assess the 
same theoretical construct with the purpose of identifying the same underlying structure 
can be seen as another attempt of generalizing. If I find similar results with a different 
instrument, I can conclude that I have replicated a very robust phenomenon despite the 
variations in value assessment (cf. Kline, 2004).  
I decided to conduct a meta-analysis on the RVS to obtain a cross-cultural 
dataset that would enable me testing the structure of values at the aggregated culture-
level. This implies (1) coding of the rank orders or ratings of Rokeach Values that are 
provided for specific samples in the studies, (2) aggregating the sample scores within 
cultural groups by using the arithmetic mean. This kind of meta-analysis in which the 
mean is coded as the variable of interest is less often reported in the literature. In 
conventional meta-analysis, the results are usually combined by taking effect sizes as an 
indicator of the strength of the relationship between two variables. Yet, meta-analyses 
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using central distribution information are possible (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) and provide 
useful information for cross-cultural analyses (e.g., Dekker & Fischer, 2008; Fischer & 
Chalmers, 2008; Fischer & Mansell, in press).  
 
Study 1a: Replicating the Culture-level Value Structure 
I conducted a meta-analysis on the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) by coding 
samples’ mean rankings or ratings of values as reported in the respective studies. The 
RVS consists of 18 terminal values (goals in life) and 18 instrumental values (modes of 
conduct) which are rank ordered separately by assigning low rank orders (minimum 1) 
to important values and high rank orders (maximum 18) to unimportant ones
4
. Each 
value is followed by a defining phrase which clarifies its meaning (see Table 3.1).  
Following Schwartz’ choice of method, I used multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
on all 36 Rokeach values to identify the culture-level value types. As the MDS is 
applied on a smaller set of values compared to Schwartz’ (1994b) culture-level analysis 
(45 values), I expected that some neighbouring value types may merge. The Rokeach 
values may not provide as much detail in value type specification as the larger list of 
values in Schwartz’ instrument. I did not expect to identify a Hierarchy value type as 




Literature Search and Inclusion Criteria. I searched for relevant studies in the 
database PsycINFO covering the period 1968 (year of first publication of the RVS) to 
March 2006. The keywords used were Rokeach and values which resulted in 558 
references. 
                                               
4
 To facilitate the interpretation of correlations that I report later in the manuscript, I recoded the ranks so 
that higher numbers correspond to higher importance of the respective values and vice versa. 
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Rokeach and Schwartz’ values. 
 RVS (Rokeach, 1973) SVS (Schwartz, 1992, 1994b) 
1 A Comfortable Life (a prosperous life) - 
2 A Sense of Accomplishment (lasting 
contribution) 
- 
3 A World at Peace (free of war and conflict) A World at Peace (free of war and conflict) 
4 A World of Beauty (beauty of nature and arts) A World of Beauty (beauty of nature and arts) 
5 Ambitious (hardworking, aspiring) Ambitious (hardworking, aspiring) 
6 An Exciting Life (a stimulating, active life) An Exciting Life (stimulating experiences) 
7 Broadminded (open-minded) Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and 
beliefs) 
8 Capable (competent, effective) Capable (competent, effective, efficient) 
9 Cheerful (lighthearted, joyful) - 
10 Clean (neat, tidy) Clean (neat, tidy) 
11 Courageous (standing up for your beliefs) - 
12 Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all) Equality (equal opportunity for all) 
13 Family Security (taking care of loved ones) Family Security (safety for loved ones) 
14 Forgiving (willing to pardon Others) Forgiving (willing to pardon Others) 
15 Freedom (independence, free choice) Freedom (freedom of action and thought) 
16 Happiness (contentedness)  - 
17 Helpful (Working for the welfare of Others) Helpful (Working for the welfare of Others) 
18 Honest (sincere, truthful) Honest (genuine, sincere) 
19 Imaginative (daring, creative) Creativity (uniqueness, imagination) 
20 Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 
21 Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflicts) Inner Harmony (at peace with myself) 
22 Intellectual (intelligent, reflective) - 
23 Logical (consistent, rational) Intelligent (Logical thinking) 
24 Loving (affectionate, tender) - 
25 Mature Love (sexual and spiritual intimacy) Mature Love (deep emotional and spiritual 
intimacy) 
26 National Security (protection from attack) National Security (protection of my nation 
from enemies) 
27 Obedient (dutiful, respectful) Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations) 
28 Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life) Pleasure (gratification of desires) 
29 Polite (courteous, well-mannered) Politeness (courtesy, good manners) 
30 Responsible (dependable, reliable) Responsible (dependable, reliable) 
31 Salvation (saved, eternal life) - 
32 Self-controlled (restrained, self-disciplined) Self-discipline (self-restraint, resistance of 
temptation) 
33 Self-respect (self-esteem) Self-respect (belief in one’s own worth) 
34 Social Recognition (respect, admiration) Social Recognition (respect, approval by 
Others) 
35 True Friendship (close companionship)  True Friendship (close, supportive friends) 
36 Wisdom (a mature understanding of life) Wisdom (a mature understanding of life) 
Note. Values in italics are those that were omitted in Schwartz’ culture-level analysis . 
Chapter three: Generalizability of cultural values 
 - 79 - 
As my aim was to obtain value priorities of ‘normal’ adult samples belonging to 
different cultures, studies with children and young adolescents (younger than 16 years 
of age), clinical as well as delinquent samples were not included in the study. 
Furthermore, only those studies were selected where the original 18 terminal and 18 
instrumental values had not been replaced by other values (as, for example, in Form G 
of the RVS in which happiness is replaced by health and cheerful by loyal). 
Furthermore, the mean or median rank orders needed to be reported for at least all 18 
terminal or all 18 instrumental values. Some researchers also added specific values to 
the original list of Rokeach values. I dropped these additional values from the analysis 
and recalculated the rank orders for the 18 original values. Foreign-language articles (22 
out of 130) were translated by me or bilingual speakers. The final dataset consisted of 
344 samples for which value priorities were coded. These samples had been assessed in 
173 independent studies. The findings had been published in 130 articles
5
.  
Samples. A summary of the sample characteristics can be seen in Table 3.2. The 
year of data collection of the studies ranged from 1967 to 2002. The majority of studies 
included in the meta-analysis were conducted in the USA, which is reflected in the large 
number of samples (98). The aggregated median sample size of cultural groups 
consisted of 349 respondents. Gender was not reported for 48% of all samples. Of those 
that provided this information, 47.2% of the samples were male. The age of respondents 
ranged from 16 to 75. Samples were coded as falling either into the category of 
university students (54% of all samples), working adults (27%), general population 
(8%) or ‘others’ (11%) (e.g. seniors). In total, the meta-analysis is based on the 
responses of 44,047 respondents from 32 different countries and five ethnic minority 
groups such as Hispanics in the USA and Chinese in New Zealand.  
                                               
5
 See Appendix A for the complete list of articles included in the meta-analysis.  
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Similarly to Schwartz’ dataset, the samples come from every inhabited 
continent. To compare the distribution of countries to Schwartz’ initial dataset from 
which he derived his culture-level structure (cf. Schwartz, 1994aa, pp. 29-29), I 
assigned each country to geographical regions. In Schwartz’ dataset, the majority of 
countries belonged to Europe/ Eurasia (52.3%), followed by Asia (22.7%) and Latin 
America (9.1%). Countries from Oceania, North America and Sub Sahara constituted 
each 4.5% of the sampled countries and the Middle East was represented by 2.3% of all 
countries. My dataset consisted of proportionally less countries from Europe/ Eurasia 
(27%) and the Sub Saharan (2.7%) region and more countries from Asia (29.7%), the 
Middle East (16.2%), and Oceania (8.1%). The proportions of countries representing 
Latin America (10.8%) and North America (5.4%) were about the same. In total, 62.2% 
of the countries overlapped between Schwartz’ and my study. 
Computation and Analysis. For each sample, the reported mean or median rank 
orders were coded. Mean ratings were coded in cases where a rating procedure (10.5 % of 
all samples) instead of the original ranking was used. To make this coded information 
maximally comparable, I rank ordered terminal and instrumental values again within each 
sample. I rank ordered the two sets of values separately. Before aggregating samples at the 
culture-level, I weighted all coded rank orders by their sample size in order to give more 
weight to large sample sizes. However, the weighting procedure transforms ordinal data 
into interval data. To obtain again ordinal data at the aggregated culture-level, I rank 
ordered the values, this time within each cultural group. For the nation Slovakia, only the 
instrumental values were available and for Slovenia only the terminal values. These 
countries were excluded from the analysis in Study 1a, as the statistical procedure I was 
employing deletes missing values listwise. Thus, all following analyses in this section are 
based on 30 nations and five ethnic minority groups.  
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Table 3.2: Sample characteristics of the meta-analysis per country. 
k N 
Country 




Australia 1986-2002 64 5,589 University students,  
Working population,  
Others 
 
Bangladesh  1982-2002 2 200 University students 
Brazil  1969-1988 18 3,136 General population,  
University students 
 
Canada  1974-1990 7 382 University students,  
Working population,  
Others 
 
Chile  1985 1 70 University students 
 
China  1985-1997 14 2,424 University students 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
1988-2002 5 1,672 University students,  
Others 
 
Egypt  1993 1 658 Working population 
 
Finland  1981 4 172 University students 
 
Germany (West) 1974-1990 5 1,093 University students, Working 
population 
 
Israel  1966-1985 25 1,059 University students 
Japan  1978-2002 9 709 University students, Working 
population 
 
Jordan  1986 2 2,000 University students 
 
Malaysia  1982-2002 2 150 University students 
Mexico  1983 6 168 Working population 
 
New Zealand  1974-2002 4 240 University students 
Papua New 
Guinea  
1971-2002 8 1,645 University students,  
Others 
Poland  1982-1998 10 1,276 University students,  
Others 
 
Romania  1997 2 200 University students,  
Others 
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Singapore  1988 1 65 University students 
 
Slovakia  1995 2 179 Others 
 
Slovenia 1985 2 1,409 Working population 
 
South Africa  1984 3 123 Working population 
 
Spain  1982-2001 2 632 University students, 
Others 
 
Sweden  1980 2 25 Others 
 
Taiwan  1982-2001 2 200 University students 
Turkey  1980 7 1,610 University students, 
Working population 
 
Ukraine  1969 2 84 University students, 
Working population 
 




United States of 
America  





Vietnam  1977 1 349 General population 
 
Malaysia Chinese 1982 1 79 University students 
NZ Chinese 1982 1 100 University students 
 
Hispanics in USA 1987-1993 2 161 General population, 
University students 
 
Africans in Egypt 1992 1 43 Working population 
Non-Egyptian Arabs 
in Egypt 
1992 1 101 Working population 
Totals 1967-2002 344 44,047  
Note. The year of data collection is based on the information given in the respective papers. If this 
information was missing, I calculated an estimated year of data collection by subtracting the average delay 
between data collection and publication (3.44 years) as inferable from some papers.  
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I applied a non-metric multidimensional scaling procedure (MDS; PROXSCAL 
in SPSS 14.01) on the Rokeach value rankings at the aggregated culture-level. MDS is 
like factor analysis a data reduction method, but with the difference that it visualizes the 
data structure. MDS represents the value items as points in a geometrical space in such a 
way that the distances between the points reflect the associations between the items, 
with small distances corresponding to strong positive associations and large distances to 
zero or negative associations (Borg & Groenen, 1997). The dissimilarity measure for the 
MDS was based on the Spearman correlations between all 36 value items.  
The Rokeach-MDS also includes values for which Schwartz’ (1992, 1994b) has 
reported unstable meaning across cultures or for which cross-cultural equivalence has 
not been established yet (see Table 3.1). There are two reasons why I decided to use all 
Rokeach values to derive a MDS configuration: (1) Recent analysis suggested that shifts 
for values that were found to be unstable in meaning are mostly due to other reasons 
than cross-cultural inequivalence (see below in more detail, Fontaine, Poortinga, 
Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008); (2) if there was indeed a problem of unstable meaning of 
values, it would increase random error at the culture-level (Fontaine, 2008), and thus 
lead to very low correlations of those items with other items. Empirically, this would 
most likely be shown by value items that take a central position in the MDS, since the 
correlations - and by implication the distances - would be low and about equal to all 
other values. Therefore, I would be able to detect unstable meaning of values in the 
MDS and I could report for which values this is the case. I concluded that it is important 
to include all values, otherwise important content might be omitted. 
I imposed a two-dimensional solution on the value items. The Kruskal stress 
index (Kruskal & Wish, 1978) indicates how well the distances in the MDS solution 
approximate the original distances. A lower Kruskal stress (with a minimum of 0) 
suggests better solutions. The Kruskal stress for the two-dimensional configuration was 
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relatively high with a value of .25. While adding dimensions can decrease the stress to 
an acceptable fit value, there is a trade-off between improving fit and reducing the 
interpretability of the solution. According to Kruskal and Wish (1978), the fit index 
should be used flexibly when a MDS configuration is seen as the foundation on which 
to display clusters of items: a two-dimensional configuration can be more useful than a 
three- or four-dimensional one. To the best of my knowledge, Schwartz provides no 
stress indices for his culture-level analysis. Considering that I aimed to replicate 
Schwartz’ model, I decided to keep the two-dimensional solution for the RVS-MDS.  
 
Comparison with the SVS 
I used archival datasets of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) collected by 
Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz, 1992, 2005) between 1988 and 2002, including 
samples of both students and teachers. Teacher data was available from 55 nations (N = 
15,975) and student data from 66 nations (N = 26,024). Further information on the 
samples is available in Schwartz (2005). I analyzed the SVS value structure separately 
for the student and teacher samples. The country level structure was derived from z-
transformed Euclidean distances based on the aggregated country means of students’ 
and teachers’ responses. Using PROXSCAL in SPSS 14.01, an interval-level MDS was 
run.  
I applied the MDS to all 55 value items
6
. Schwartz only analysed those 45 
values that did not shift too much from the hypothesized value structure at the 
individual-level. Large value shifts across cultural groups indicate a shift in meaning 
and therefore a lack of cross-cultural equivalence. Schwartz (1992, 1994b) used the 
configurational verification approach to detect these value shifts. Yet, very recent 
                                               
6
 The SVS consists of 58 values. I limited the analysis to 55 value items as the values ‘detachment’, 
‘privacy’, and ‘self-indulgent’ were not consistently included in all studies. 
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individual-level analyses using more rigorous methods showed that the average value 
structure across cross-cultural samples based on all 55 values is very robust (Fontaine, 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, Fontaine (1999) found that the actual size of shifts for 
excluded values from the culture-level analysis (e.g. mature love) were not 
systematically larger than for included values (e.g. clean, ambitious). Therefore, I used 
all 55 value items to derive the culture-level value structure.  
Qualitative Comparison. Schwartz (1994b) hypothesized a quasi-circumplex 
model consisting of seven axes that form wedge-like regions emerging from a common 
origin (see Figure 1.2). He employed the configurational verification approach meaning 
that he checked visually whether the empirical structure was similar to the theoretically 
postulated one. This was done by drawing boundary lines around clusters of value 
items, while avoiding overlap between regions as much as possible (see Schwartz, 1992, 
p. 22 for details). Then, partition lines between these boundaries were drawn. I used the 
same approach on the Rokeach values. First, I examined which of the Rokeach values 
are conceptually similar to Schwartz’ values. Schwartz (1992) indicated himself that the 
SVS contains some values which are “identical” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 17) to the RVS. I 
compared both surveys and found a conceptual overlap of 28 values altogether (see 
Table 3.1). Twenty-three of these values were part of Schwartz’ culture-level value 
structure. Therefore, I used these 23 matching values as a guideline to employ the 
configurational verification approach.   
Quantitative Comparison. I compared Schwartz’ and the RVS-MDS 
configuration more precisely by correlating the coordinates of the 23 matching values to 
get an objective measure of their similarity. As can be seen in Table 3.1, I have 
identified another five Rokeach values that are conceptually similar to Schwartz’ values, 
but were excluded from his culture-level analysis. Thus, additionally to the 23 matching 
values, I also examined the degree of similarity between all 28 matching values.  
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Prior to the correlation of value coordinates, the Rokeach and Schwartz’ MDS 
needed to be transformed to maximal similarity. The reason is that MDS can produce 
configurations that are altered through translation, reflection, rotation or shrinking and 
dilatation (Borg & Groenen, 1997). If the RVS and SVS configurations are not 
transformed before they are correlated, their similarity may be underestimated. I used 
Generalized Procrustes Analysis (GPA, Commandeur, 1991) to transform the data. I 
performed two separate GPA’s: one on 23 and another one on 28 matching values. 
Since I analyzed Schwartz’ student and teacher data separately, there were three 
different MDS configurations to be transformed with GPA: (1) the configuration for the 
Rokeach values, (2) the configuration for Schwartz’ students’ values, and (3) the 
configuration for Schwartz’ teacher’s values.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Configurational Verification Approach 
The General Value Structure. Figure 3.1 shows the MDS on all 36 Rokeach 
values in a two-dimensional space. The configurational verification approach revealed 
that there were four value clusters organized in a circular order that match Schwartz’ 
value clusters. As can be seen in the figure, the adjacent and thus compatible value 
orientations Egalitarianism and Harmony merged into a single value cluster. Similarly, 
Affective and Intellectual Autonomy merged together
7
. In line with Schwartz’ 
predictions, Embeddedness is opposite to Autonomy values and Egalitarianism and 
                                               
7
 It may be possible that the merging of value types is caused by the absence of hierarchy values. To 
confirm that, I conducted a follow-up analysis on Schwartz’ data. I applied a MDS on all 45 values that 
Schwartz used for the culture-level analysis, but I excluded the hierarchy values. The MDS solution 
shows that the overall value structure as such does not change. Yet, the mastery value type is more 
stretched and egalitarianism and harmony as well as intellectual and affective eutonomy are not clearly 
separable anymore. Drawing partition lines would result in at least one value that is misplaced in each of 
the value dimensions. This suggests that the distinction between these value types may indeed to some 
extent be driven by their differing relations with hierarchy values.   
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Harmony are opposed to Mastery. This confirms the organization of culture-level value 
types according to their conflicts and compatibilities. In summary, it can be concluded 
that the overall structure of conflicting value orientations is present in the solution.  
Shifting Values. There are five values, independent, capable, ambitious, a world 
at peace, and self-controlled (underlined in Figure 3.1), that are located in different 
value clusters as compared to Schwartz’ solution. The arrows in Figure 3.1 indicate 
where they should fit in Schwartz’ configuration. It is noteworthy that these values do 
not shift to opposite value types, but rather to adjacent ones with which they are 
theoretically compatible. Furthermore, the location of some of these values shows that 
they are meaningfully associated with the value types they shift to. The values 
independent and capable, for example, are not located in Mastery but in the Autonomy 
value domain. Independent can be regarded as a key value for both Intellectual and 
Affective Autonomy. Similarly, capable could be seen as a representative value for 
Intellectual Autonomy. Self-controlled falls into the domain Egalitarianism/ Harmony 
and not into Embeddedness as in Schwartz’s findings. Yet, both solutions seem to be 
meaningful: Being self-controlled as fitting into the social group is compatible with 
Embeddedness, whereas being self-controlled as a moral obligation (consistent with 
values such as responsible, helpful etc.) implies living harmoniously with the natural 
and social world, which is corroborated by its location within the Harmony value 
cluster. Besides these possible explanations in terms of different meanings of shifting 
values, the value shifts may also be due to methodological reasons, including sampling 
of different cultural groups, a different composition of countries representing 
geographical regions, and differences in translation of items. It is difficult to identify the 
precise reasons with the present study.   
 
Chapter three: Generalizability of cultural values 






























































































































































Figure 3.1: MDS representation of all 36 Rokeach values 
Note. This MDS solution displays not the GPA transformed value configuration, since this can only be 
done for matching values and would not allow displaying all 36 Rokeach values. However, an 
examination of the transformed and untransformed solutions showed that they are very similar.  
Values in bold were not included in Schwartz’ (1994b) culture-level analysis; values with an asterisk do 
not appear in the SVS. Underlined values are located in different value types compared to Schwartz’ 
solution. Arrows indicate their location in Schwartz (1994). 
 
 
To summarize, I was able to replicate four distinct value clusters. Taking into 
account that it is not possible to replicate the Hierarchy value type as there are no 
Hierarchy values in the RVS, I can state that conceptually I was able to identify four out 
of six of Schwartz’ value types. The reduced number of emerging value clusters may be 
a result of under-representation of value items in the respective value domains 
(Fontaine, 2005) and the absence of Hierarchy values. A comparison with Schwartz’ 
MDS shows that five values shifted to adjacent value types.  
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Correlational Analysis 
Similarity of the Value Structure. In the next step, I moved beyond the 
configurational verification approach as a descriptive procedure and applied a more 
stringent method to measure the degree of similarity between the Rokeach and 
Schwartz’ value structure. Table 3.3 shows the Spearman correlation coefficients for the 
value configuration based on 23 and 28 matching values after transforming the MDS 
solutions to maximal similarity with GPA. As can be seen, all correlations are 
significant and there is only little difference if congruence is tested for 23 matching 
values (upper diagonal) or 28 matching values (lower diagonal). The correlations for 
RVS and SVS value structures range from .48 to .85. There is a slightly higher 
similarity to the students’ SVS-MDS than to the teachers’ MDS. The first dimension 
shows a consistently higher correlation than the second dimension - a pattern that is also 
noticeable for correlations between the student and teacher value configuration of the 
SVS.  
 
Table 3.3: Spearman correlations between Schwartz’ and Rokeach culture-level value 

















Dim 1 1.00 -.03 .85*** -.14 .76*** .07 
RVS  
Dim 2 -.04 1.00 -.06 .51** -.07 .59** 
SVS student 
Dim 1 .82*** -.08 1.00 -.02 .93*** .10 
SVS student 
Dim 2 -.20 .56** -.06 1.00 .08 .64*** 
SVS teacher 
Dim 1 .75*** -.03 .95*** .02 1.00 .23 
SVS teacher 
Dim 2 .01 .48** .03 .64*** .10 1.00 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
Dim 1 and 2 refer to dimensions 1 and 2 in the two-dimensional space of the MDS. The lower diagonal 
shows the correlations for N = 28 matching values and the upper diagonal for N = 23 matching values. 
The correlations were computed after transforming the value configurations to maximal similarity with 
Generalized Procrustes Analysis (GPA).  
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Considering that the RVS data has been collected with another instrument, over a 
different period of time and with different independent samples, the correlations show 
that the cultural value structure is quite robust. Overall, the results reflect the finding of 
the configurational verification approach, namely that there is a considerable degree of 
similarity between the SVS and RVS value structures.  
Similarity of the Value Profiles of Countries. To test whether the value profile of 
countries obtained with the RVS data is similar to the SVS data, I also correlated 
country scores for the value types. The scores for value types were obtained by 
computing the mean importance ratings of the value items that represent them. Since 
Affective and Intellectual Autonomy merged into a single value type in the RVS- MDS, 
as well as Egalitarianism and Harmony, I could not differentiate between them. Thus, I 
had five Rokeach value types to correlate with the corresponding Schwartz’ value types. 
In order to increase reliability of SVS-country scores, I combined the teacher and 
student samples (see also Schwartz, 2006b). For ease of comparison purposes with the 
RVS data which only showed a single Autonomy value type, I also combined 
Intellectual and Affective Autonomy for the SVS data. For Jordan, only the teacher 
scores were available and for Romania, South Africa and Ukraine only the student 
scores. I obtained 29 matching countries between the RVS and SVS dataset. I corrected 
for scale use by centring the responses as advised by Schwartz (1992, 2007). Since I 
expected that matching value types yield similar rankings of countries, I used one-tailed 
statistical tests. I found the strongest relationship for the Rokeach and Schwartz’ 
Embeddedness value type (r
s
 = .67, p < .001), followed by a moderate and marginally 
significant correlation between the RVS- and SVS-Mastery value type (r
s
 = .31, p = 
.06). There was no significant correlation between the SVS- and RVS- Autonomy value 
type (r
s
 = .14, p = .23). There was also no significant correlation for RVS-
Egalitarianism/ Harmony and SVS-Egalitarianism (r
s
 = .24, p = .11) or SVS-Harmony 
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(r
s
 = -.08, p = .34). Thus, for the more ‘collectivistic-oriented’ values, the country scores 
from the RVS-data and the SVS-data showed a considerable degree of similarity. Yet, 
for the value types on the other side of the value circle, i.e. the more ‘individualistic-
oriented values, I found no significant relationships.  
There are several possible reasons for this. It is noteworthy that the correlations 
were less well confirmed for those value types that merged with other value types or 
consisted only of a few value items. A second important issue is that the RVS data 
covers a long time period during which ‘individualistic’ values may have been shifting 
in their relative importance (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). As a 
consequence the position of countries relative to the scores derived from Schwartz are 
likely to be different. While this can cause deviations in scores for specific countries, it 
does, however, not point to a real difference in the value structure as the position of 
values relative to each other was well replicated.   
Robustness of the Rokeach Value Structure. I conducted a follow-up analysis 
with the Rokeach dataset to test whether the structure is replicable with sub-samples 
consisting of different sample types. I was to some extent restricted in the analyses since 
many countries were only represented by a few samples in the meta-analytical dataset 
which does not allow testing the direct impact of sample type on structural stability. 
Hence, I split the non-aggregated dataset, i.e. the sample-level dataset, into two sub-
samples consisting either of student or non-student samples. I again aggregated these 
two datasets at the culture-level. The student sample dataset contained data from 
students of 27 different cultural groups. The non-student dataset contained primarily 
data from the working or general population from 24 cultural groups. There was an 
overlap of 15 cultural groups between the two sub-samples. I then performed a MDS on 
each of the two sub-samples. Afterwards, the MDS configuration for the student and 
non-student sub-sample were rotated to maximal similarity with GPA. Spearman 
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correlations of the two configurations for all 36 values revealed that the first dimension 
correlated .72 (p < .001, one-tailed) and the second dimension .60 (p < .001, one-tailed). 
Similar to the comparison with Schwartz’ value structure, I found that the second 
dimension correlated somewhat less than the first dimension. Considering that the two 
sub-samples consisted of different sample types coming to some extent from different 
countries, I concluded that the Rokeach value structure was replicable. Specific sample 
characteristics seem to have had little impact on the overall structure.  
 
Rokeach Values Excluded in Schwartz’ Study 
The other focus of the study was aimed at the 13 Rokeach values that were not 
included in Schwartz’ study on cultural value orientations. A visual examination of 
these values showed that they were not in the centre of the circle where they would be 
expected, if they were indeed unstable in their meaning across cultural samples. 
Therefore, a culture-level analysis of these values was meaningful. Schwartz did not 
rule out the possibility that other value types might be missing in his value circle. It may 
be possible that the excluded values form an additional value type of their own.  
Value Items Falling into Other Value Types. Figure 3.1 shows in bold the 13 
values that Schwartz omitted from his analysis, either because they were not included in 
the survey or because they did not pass his test of cross-cultural equivalence (the latter 
are additionally marked with an asterisk). Most of the values fall into value domains 
supporting their underlying meaning: courageous (standing up for your beliefs) clusters 
together with the ‘moral obligation’ values such as helpful and responsible. Salvation 
falls into the value type Embeddedness confirming its religious or conservative nature. 
A comfortable life is assigned to Mastery which can be seen as the final consequence of 
leading a self-assertive life. A sense of accomplishment, intellectual, self-respect, and 
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logical fit very well into the value type Autonomy, capturing the intellectual aspect of 
Autonomy.  
Values Forming a Separate Value Cluster. The remaining Rokeach values 
loving, cheerful, and happiness merit a closer examination. These three values were not 
included in the SVS, but clearly cluster together with the values true friendship, mature 
love and inner harmony that Schwartz excluded from his culture-level analysis. They 
fall in-between Autonomy and Egalitarianism/ Harmony. I suggest that this cluster 
represents a new value domain consisting of self-focused values on the one hand and 
other-focused values on the other hand. The self-focused values (cheerful, happiness, 
inner harmony) refer to a strongly positive emotional state of mind. The other-focused 
values represent mature relationships with profound feelings and attachment to others. I 
labelled this value cluster Self-fulfilled Connectedness (SFC) emphasizing the joint 
qualities of a sense of flourishing and satisfaction in life as well as profound attachment 
to others.  
Study 1b is devoted to examine this new value type. The aim is to answer the 
following questions: What is its meaning and correlates? Does this value type add 
something to what we already know about cultural values? Or in other words: Does the 
new value type have incremental validity? 
 
Study 1b: Examining the Separate Value Cluster 
Based on the meta-analytical Rokeach data, I found that SFC is a value type that 
is located adjacent to Autonomy and opposed to Embeddedness in the value circle. This 
is a first indication of its underlying meaning. It suggests that SFC is an individualistic 
value orientation, also fitting with the fact that individualism/ collectivism is a very 
broad theme in research on cross-cultural differences (Inglehart, 2006). Value 
orientations such as individualism/ collectivism (Hofstede, 1980), Autonomy/ 
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Embeddedness (Schwartz, 2006), as well as survival/ self-expression (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005), all reflect the common idea to what extent a given society emphasizes 
autonomous human choice (Inglehart, 2006). SFC may be another one of them. To 
make sure that SFC is indeed closely related to ‘individualistic’ values of the value 
circle, I tested its correlation with all other value types using the independent dataset 
from Schwartz. Due to the circumplex structure of Schwartz’ culture-level value theory, 
correlations of SFC and Schwartz’ cultural value orientations should produce a sinusoid 
association, i.e. correlations should first decrease and then again increase when moving 
away from SFC in the value circle. Thus I hypothesized that: 
H1: SFC and compatible value types, i.e. Autonomy and Egalitarianism, yield 
significant positive correlations. The conflicting value type Embeddedness 
shows the strongest negative correlation. 
 
Individualism and Relatedness 
Despite the fact that different value dimensions assessing individualism/ 
collectivism share a great deal of commonality in their underlying meaning, they also 
have been found to capture unique aspects of culture (cf. Schwartz, 2006). This may be 
equally true for SFC. Individualism and collectivism are multidimensional constructs 
(Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002) and SFC may measure one aspect of 
individualism that is not included in Schwartz’ value types of Autonomy. In Schwartz’ 
conceptualization, the focus of Autonomy is on the possibility to pursue hedonistic 
experiences (Affective Autonomy) and to follow own ideas and intellectual aspirations 
(Intellectual Autonomy). SFC appears to go beyond this ‘ego-centric’ focus. In SFC 
there is a synthesis of self- and other-focused values, i.e. a sense of personal 
gratification and relatedness. This may appear as a contradiction at first sight, yet, there 
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is theoretical evidence that this synthesis may be a meaningful variation of an 
individualistic value orientation at the societal-level.  
Hofstede (1980), for example, explicitly included relatedness in the form of 
‘concern for the immediate family’ into his definition of individualism. Waterman 
(1981) pointed out that individualism does not necessarily mean disconnectedness or 
alienation from others. He argued that societies may develop an ‘ethical kind of 
individualism’, in which not only self-determined choices and the pursuit of personal 
goals are important, but also self-chosen and pro-social interdependencies. These kinds 
of societies derive a number of social benefits from emphasizing interrelatedness 
compared to societies emphasizing purely self-focused values. Individuals in 
‘interrelated’ societies engage in pro-social behaviours not because they have to, but 
because they experience it as personally satisfying. The well-being of others becomes a 
function of their own personal well-being. According to Waterman (1981), social 
relationships that involve the most extensive mutuality and interdependence are 
friendship and romantic love, which are also values found in SFC. From this follows 
that societies emphasizing SFC should show higher levels of well-being and 
consequently lower levels of depression. Furthermore, pro-social behaviours in these 
countries should be motivated by autonomous reasons such as personal satisfaction. I 
predicted that:  
H2: SFC is positively related to well-being and inversely to depression.  
H3: SFC is positively correlated with pro-social behaviour motivated by 
intrinsic reasons.  
 
Pursuit of Non-material Goals 
Another indication of the meaning of SFC is that it contains values which are of 
non-material nature. This resembles the postmaterialism value orientation proposed by 
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Inglehart (1997). Societies with a postmaterialist orientation emphasize self-expression 
and belonging besides intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction. A materialist orientation 
constitutes the opposite pole of this value dimension and goes along with an emphasis 
on survival, as expressed by values which relate to economic and physical security. 
Inglehart also offers an explanation why materialist values are prioritized in certain 
societies. He draws upon the scarcity hypothesis which says that a materialist 
orientation is prevalent in societies where the economic and physical security is not 
guaranteed. Once these basic concerns are settled, there is a shift to postmaterialist 
values and non-material ambitions become primary concerns. He empirically showed 
that advanced industrial societies shift from materialist to postmaterialist values. This 
phenomenon is not uniquely Western but appears in any society that has experienced 
the transition to high mass security. Therefore, the hypotheses for SFC were: 
H4: SFC is positively related to postmaterialism.  
H5a: According to the scarcity hypothesis, SFC should be more strongly 
endorsed in countries with higher level of socio-economic security.  
H5b: The positive relationship between SFC and socio-economic security is not 




Values. I averaged the country-level mean scores for both the terminal values 
mature love, true friendship, happiness, and inner harmony as well as the instrumental 
values loving and cheerful as obtained from the meta-analysis. In that way, I derived a 
single country score for the new value type SFC (see Table 3.4). For the nation 
Slovakia, only the instrumental values were available and used for the computation of 
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the country score. Similarly, I used only the terminal values to calculate the country 
score for Slovenia as data were only available for terminal values
8
.  
I computed country scores for Schwartz’ cultural value types with the same 
archival dataset I used in Study 1a. In accordance with Schwartz’ (1994b) procedure, I 
used the same 45 values with which Schwartz obtained the seven value types 
Egalitarianism, Harmony, Embeddedness, Hierarchy, Mastery, Affective Autonomy, and 
Intellectual Autonomy. To enhance the reliability of the values, I combined student and 
teacher data. Prior to correlational analyses, I corrected for scale use by centring the 
responses as advised by Schwartz (1992, 2007a). 
Subjective Well-being. I obtained country scores on Subjective Well-being 
(SWB) from Diener, Diener and Diener (1995). They used data of national SWB 
surveys compiled by Veenhoven (1993). SWB comprises questions about people’s 
happiness and their life satisfaction and is therefore a relatively comprehensive 
assessment of people’s state of well-being.  
Depression. Country indices of depression were derived from van Hemert, van 
de Vijver and Poortinga (2002). The authors carried out a cross-national meta-analysis 
on studies using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) in normal populations and 
gathered data from 28 countries. Aggregated and standardized BDI mean scores at 
country-level (weighted by sample size) were directly obtained from van Hemert.  
Post-materialism and motives for helping behaviour. I used data on the 
materialism/ post-materialism value orientation from all waves (1981-2004) of the 
European and World Value Survey study which can be downloaded from the World 
Value Survey webpage
9
. Data were available from individuals belonging to 78 countries 
                                               
8
 Note that in Study 1a, Slovakia and Slovenia were excluded from the MDS due to listwise deletion of 
missing values. In Study 1b, I ran all correlational analyses with and without the two countries and found 
very similar results. To enhance the sample size and therewith the reliability of results, I decided to report 
the analyses that includes these two countries. 
9
 Retrieved, October 2008, from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  
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whose responses were aggregated at the country-level. I used the twelve-item instead of 
the four-item scale as it has been found to be more reliable (Inglehart, 1990). It consists 
of six questions measuring materialism (i.e. attitudes towards physical security and 
economic security) and six items measuring postmaterialism (i.e. non-material goals).  
I chose two items from the same database which assess autonomous motives for 
engaging in voluntary work (i.e. ‘personal satisfaction’ and ‘gaining new skills and 
useful experiences’). I also chose two items tapping to extrinsic reasons (i.e. ‘did not 
want to, but could not refuse’ and ‘to make a contribution to my local community’) to 
examine the discriminant validity of SFC. Data were available from the year 1990, from 
individuals belonging to 35 countries, which were again aggregated at the country-level.  
Basic Need Fulfillment. I obtained several country indices related to the socio-
economic development of nations. When possible, I computed average scores of these 
indices for the last 40 decades to deal with the fact that the Rokeach data had been 
collected across different times (see also Table 3.2). I took the Human Development 
Index (HDI) which combines indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and 
income. It is a single statistic which serves as a reference for both social and economic 
development of a country. The data were available from 1975 to 2005 and published in 
the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP, 2006). I obtained the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from 1968 to 
2003 as a measure of income (Maddison, n.d.). I derived measures of individual rights 
through the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The GEM is published in the 
Human Development Report 2007/ 2008 (UNDP, 2006) and indicates the current 
national level of equal opportunities for men and women concerning political and 
economic participation, decision power and command over resources. I also included 
indices measuring the level of political rights (e.g. freedom of the press and freedom to 
peacefully assemble) and of civil liberties (e.g. freedom of religion and the right to fair 
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trial) as assessed by Freedom House (n.d.). These civil rights indices were available for 
the years 1972 to 2005.  
Since these five indices were highly correlated, I performed a principal 
component analysis. The scree plot indicated a one-factor solution (eigenvalues: 4.07, 
0.64, 0.21, 0.07, 0.02) accounting for 81.32% of the total variance. I labelled it “Basic 
Need Fulfillment Index” (BNFI) and obtained a single BNF Index for each country by 
standardizing each of the five indices and then averaging the standardized scores. 
Countries that score high on BNFI show higher level of human development, higher 
gross domestic product per capita, more equal opportunities between men and women, 
and more political rights and civil liberties. Countries with the highest and lowest score 
on this index were the United States and Egypt respectively. An overview of all country 
scores that were used in the analyses are presented in Table 3.4.  
 
Test of Incremental Validity 
I have so far interpreted SFC as an individualistic value orientation, sharing 
some similarity with Autonomy. Since SFC is conceptually very close to Autonomy, I 
examined whether SFC significantly explains unique variance in the dependent 
variables over and above Autonomy. Thus, I ran six sets of regression analyses, i.e. one 
for each dependent variable. For each regression analysis Schwartz’ data on Autonomy 
was entered as a predictor in the first block and SFC was entered as a predictor in the 
second block. To reduce the likelihood of multicollinearity, I combined Schwartz’ 
Intellectual and Affective Autonomy into one single Autonomy value type. 
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Table 3.4: Relative ranking of SFC and socio-economic indicators of 32 countries. 
 




score of SFC 
Subjective 










Australia                                                                       
14.33 1.02 .05 2.75 1.14 - - - - 
Bangladesh                                                                       
7.42 -.29 - 1.79 -1.29 - - - - 
Brazil                                                                          
14.83 .57 .12 2.19 -.43 4.01 4.34 3.99 2.71 
Canada                                                                           
12.00 .97 .83 2.66 1.17 3.21 3.38 3.85 1.96 
Chile                                                                           
14.33 .13 - 2.41 -.37 2.98 3.87 3.85 2.03 
China                                                                            
8.33 -1.92 -.22 1.27 -1.30 2.35 3.65 3.58 2.07 
Egypt                                                                           
8.00 -.78 - 1.66 -1.40 - - - - 
Finland                                                                         
14.33 .74 -.97 2.90 .99 3.25 3.94 3.29 2.52 
Germany                                                                         
15.67 .18 -.47 2.56 1.00 3.37 3.72 3.02 2.05 
Hong Kong, 
 China (SAR)                                                          
12.33 - 1.74 - .74 - - - - 
India                                                                           
9.67 -1.13 1.60 1.73 -.70 - - - - 
Israel                                                                          
11.33 -.18 - 2.12 .50 - - - - 
Japan                                                                            
9.17 -.86 .96 2.34 .73 2.62 3.03 3.28 2.00 
Jordan                                                                          
7.33 -.77 - 1.60 -.94 - - - - 
Malaysia                                                                         
8.33 .08 - - -.54 - - - - 
Mexico                                                                          
14.17 -.28 -.15 2.36 -.24 - - - - 
New Zealand                                                                      
13.83 .82 -.33 2.43 1.00 - - - - 
Papua  
New Guinea                                                                
8.17 - - - -.40 - - - - 
Poland                                                                          
11.67 -.90 - 1.91 -.25 3.66 3.55 3.65 3.58 
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Table 3.4 cont’ 
 
      Motives for voluntary work 
Nation 
Mean ranking 










Romania                                                                         
9.33 - - 1.81 -.79 2.91 2.80 2.73 2.33 
Singapore                                                                       
13.67 .43 - 1.95 -.05 - - - - 
Slovakia†                                   
10.00 - - 1.79 .13 2.85 3.98 3.93 2.47 
Slovenia†                                 
8.50 - - 2.25 .35 2.64 3.25 3.46 1.47 
South Africa                                                                     
11.67 -.63 - 1.70 -.64 - - - - 
Spain                                                                           
13.83 -.41 -.31 2.58 .60 3.27 3.05 3.27 1.50 
Sweden                                                                          
14.83 1.03 -.45 2.60 1.22 2.30 3.92 3.21 1.77 
Taiwan                                                                          
14.42 - - 1.52 .01 - - - - 
Turkey                                                                          
13.00 -1.02 1.64 2.32 -.75 - - - - 
Ukraine                                                                         
11.42 - - 1.45 -.62 - - - - 
United  
Kingdom                                                                  
13.67 .69 .02 2.42 .99 2.87 2.95 3.77 1.72 
United States                                                     
10.17 .91 -.11 2.31 1.23 3.18 3.06 3.91 2.05 
Vietnam  
8.00 - - - -1.33 - - - - 
      
   
 
Mean 11.49 -.07 .25 2.12 -.075 3.03 3.50 3.52 2.15 
SD 2.66 .82 .84 .44 .86 .46 .46 .38 .53 
Note: High scores on all of these variables indicate more of that quality. ‡ BNFI means Basic Need Fulfillment Index and is an average score consisting of the following standardized 
country indices: Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product per capita in US dollar, Gender Empowerment Measure, Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Higher BNFI 
scores denote higher fulfilment of these basic needs. † = Mean rank for these countries is based on a subset of SFC values.  
Chapter three: Generalizability of cultural values 
- 102 - 
Results 
Since I have directional hypotheses, the results reported in this section are based 
on one-tailed statistical tests.  
 
Correlational Analyses 
SFC and Schwartz’ Values. The Spearman correlations between SFC and 
Schwartz’ cultural value types confirmed the hypothesized sinusoidal pattern (see 
Figure 3.2) with significant positive correlations for Autonomy values (Intellectual 
Autonomy: r
s
 = .39, p < .05, Affective Autonomy: r
s
 = .36, p < .05) as well as 
Egalitarianism (r
s
 = .45, p < .01) and Harmony (r
s
 = .36, p < .05). There were 
significant negative correlations for Embeddedness (r
s
 = -.56, p < .001) and Mastery (r
s
 
= -.31, p < .05), but not for Hierarchy (r
s
 = -.21, p = .13). The correlations support in 
general the location of SFC in Schwartz’ value circle as displayed in Figure 3.1. SFC is 
compatible with cultural values that lay emphasis on the individual and is conflicting 
with the more ‘group-focused’ values.  
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Figure 3.2: Spearman correlations between average ranking of SFC and Schwartz’ 
culture-level value types 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed. 
 
SFC and External Validity Measures. Concerning the relationship between SFC 
and Subjective Well-being, I found the hypothesized significant positive correlation (r
s
 
= .59, p < .001). The correlation with the Depression scores on the BDI shows a 
relationship of similar strength, but as hypothesized in the opposite direction (r
s
 = -.54, 
p < .05). As predicted, I found a correlation between SFC and postmaterialism that is 
significantly positive (r
s
 = .61, p < .001), meaning that a priority on SFC is related to an 
emphasis on non-material goals. I also found that intrinsic motives to engage in pro-
social behaviour are related to SFC. There was a significant positive correlation 
between SFC and the reason for doing voluntary work because of ‘personal satisfaction’ 
(r
s
 = .53, p < .05) and because of the opportunity to ‘gain new skills and useful 
experience’ (r
s
 = .48, p < .05). As hypothesized, SFC was unrelated to non-autonomous 
or extrinsic motives for engaging in voluntary work which was tested with the items 
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‘did not want to but could not refuse’ (r
s
 = -.04, p > .05) and ‘making a contribution to 
the local community’ (r
s
 = .08, p > .05). These findings support the discriminant validity 
of SFC.  
Regarding the question which societies tend to endorse SFC, I found the trend 
that countries with higher level of basic need fulfilment showed higher endorsement of 
SFC values (r
s
 = .60, p <.001). I also looked into the correlations of all other Rokeach 
value types with BNFI. The finding is that SFC is the only value type that shows this 
strongly positive relationship. The Egalitarianism/ Harmony type was only marginally 
significant (r
s
 = .24, p < .10) and the Autonomy value type did not reach statistical 
significance when correlated with BNFI (r
s
 = .09, p > .05). There were significant 
negative correlations with Embeddedness (r
s
 = -.46, p < .01) and with Mastery (r
s
 = -
.62, p < .001).  
In order to test Hypothesis 5b, i.e. to find out whether the relationship between 
BNFI and SFC applies only to Western countries, or is also replicable in non-Western 
nations, I split the dataset accordingly. Fourteen countries were identified as belonging 
to the West (Anglo-Saxon countries and Europe) and eighteen countries as pertaining to 
non-Western countries (Asia, Africa, Middle East, and South-America). I computed the 
correlations between SFC and BNFI for each sub-sample again. I found moderate 
correlations for both the Western (r
s
 = .53, p < .05) and non-Western sub-sample (r
s
 = 
.60, p < .01). These results support Inglehart’s (1997) proposition: the higher the level 
of socio-economic development of countries, the greater is the tendency to pursue non-
material goals, independent of cultural region. Hence, it is not a uniquely Western 
phenomenon, but holds in non-Western societies, too
10
.   
 
                                               
10
 See also Appendix B for a figure illustrating the distribution of countries regarding their socio-
economic development and importance of SFC values.  
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Regression Analyses 
I ran hierarchical multiple regression analysis to test whether SFC adds unique 
explained variance after controlling for the Autonomy value type. The finding was that 
SFC significantly accounted for unique variance, except for the case where Depression 
was the dependent variable (ΔF(1, 20) = .95, p > .05, ß = -.25). It can be concluded that 
SFC possesses incremental validity as a predictor for SWB (ΔF(1, 20) = 5.03, p < .05, ß 
= .43), for postmaterialism (ΔF(1, 24) = 6.30, p < .05, ß = .39), for intrinsic motives of 
pro-social behaviour (‘personal satisfaction’- item: ΔF(1, 12) = 7.10, p < .05, ß = .67; 
‘useful experience’- item: ΔF(1, 12) = 10.27, p < .01, ß = .74) and for BNFI (ΔF(1, 26) 




I validated the location of SFC in the value circle by correlating it with 
Schwartz’ data. SFC is compatible with Autonomy, Egalitarianism and Harmony, and 
conflicting with Embeddedness, Hierarchy, and Mastery. I further tested the 
relationship of SFC with a number of external variables. SFC is related to higher levels 
of Subjective Well-being and lower levels of Depression in a society. I also found that 
SFC is correlated with postmaterialism values indicating that it is a pursuit of non-
material goals. Regarding Waterman’s (1981) theoretical suggestions, that 
individualism may imply interrelatedness and express itself in pro-social behaviours 
motivated by the intrinsic satisfaction to help others, I found indeed evidence that a 
priority of SFC was related to engagement in voluntary work motivated by intrinsic 
reasons, and not by social obligations. The motive of helping behaviour corroborates my 
assumption that despite its relational component, SFC belongs to an individualistic 
value orientation. I also tested the scarcity hypothesis, as proposed by Inglehart (1997), 
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that the fulfillment of basic needs in a society gives way to the pursuit of non-material 
goals. While I cannot test causality, I found at least a significant correlation between the 
level of basic need fulfillment in a country and the importance of SFC values. Also 
consistent with Inglehart, I was able to show that this phenomenon is not unique to 
Western countries. I tested the incremental validity of SFC by assessing its potential to 
account for unique variance after controlling for the Autonomy value type. I found the 
incremental validity of SFC in all cases confirmed, except for Depression (which may 
be due to the smaller number of countries included in that analysis, see Table 3.4).  
 
What is the Societal Meaning of SFC? 
What does SFC mean for societies from a theoretical point of view? What are 
the basic issues with which each society is confronted and for which it needs to find a 
solution? I have so far interpreted SFC as an individualistic value orientation that is 
closely related to Autonomy. There were a number of reasons that guided me to interpret 
it that way and that I also found empirically confirmed: SFC is located very closely to 
Autonomy and clearly opposite to Embeddedness in the MDS. Furthermore, it contains a 
number of self-focused values and is empirically related to self-focused variables. 
Moreover, I did not find a new opposite value type to SFC which could have been 
interpreted as an entirely new value dimension. Taken all this together, it led me to 
conclude that SFC is a value type that is complementary to Autonomy. From this it 
follows that it relates to the same basic societal issue as Autonomy and Embeddedness, 
i.e. to the question of the boundaries between the person and the group.  
While Schwartz proposed that relationships play a major role in Embeddedness 
cultures, they do not seem to be important for Autonomy-oriented societies. Yet, 
establishing relationships with others is an important universal need (cf. Ryan & Deci, 
2002). I suggest that some societies may achieve it with embedding their members into 
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social groups (as in Embeddedness cultures), other societies may compensate the lack of 
social networks by emphasizing the value of independence and hedonistic experiences 
(as in Autonomy cultures) or by leaving it upon the individual to discover the intrinsic 
value of relationships (as in Self-fulfilled Connectedness cultures). But what is then the 
difference of relationships in ‘embedded’ and ‘connected’ cultures?  
In ‘embedded’ cultures, there is a social structure that assures that individuals 
are cared for by automatically belonging to an established social group. There is not 
much choice: the social expectation tends to fit into the pre-established social fabric 
with all its accompanying obligations. Thus, a sense of meaning and purpose in life may 
be derived from social relationships and from identifying with the group, but this is 
rather imposed by society than based on free choice. Consequently, there may be a 
lesser awareness of the positive impact that social relationships have for the self. The 
great sense of personal gratification derived from relationships may be less accentuated 
in ‘embedded’ than in ‘connected’ societies. In Self-fulfilled Connectedness societies on 
the other hand, the society provides the freedom for individuals to engage in 
discretionary relationships that in turn provide a sense of meaning and satisfaction. The 
resulting positive feelings of happiness and well-being derived from voluntary 
relationships provide the underlying motivation to pursue this value type when 
relatedness is not ‘institutionalized’ in a society.  
I provided empirical evidence that SFC is a meaningful value type. Based on the 
current evidence, I can conclude that Schwartz’ approach in constructing the SVS and 
conducting the culture-level analysis may have led to its omission. It would be of great 
interest to include these kinds of values in further studies. There is already empirical 
evidence at the individual-level that autonomy and relatedness are indeed compatible 
and not conflicting (for a review see, Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005). Studies that examine this 
phenomenon with the inclusion of SFC values in their value inventories, may certainly 
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give an extended insight into the system of values and its meaning for both individuals 
and societies.   
 
General Discussion 
Evaluation of the Replication 
The main purpose of this study was to replicate Schwartz’ culture-level value 
types by conducting a meta-analysis on the RVS. By deriving a MDS on Rokeach 
values and using the configurational verification approach, I was able to identify four 
out of six of Schwartz’ cultural value types. Some of the value types were not clearly 
separable, probably because of item under-representation in the respective value clusters 
(i.e. in Harmony and in Affective Autonomy). I assessed the degree of similarity between 
the RVS- and SVS-MDS more precisely by correlating the coordinates of matching 
values and found significant correlations of moderate sizes. The question remains 
whether the replication can be regarded as successful. I suggest that two factors need to 
be taken into account to answer this question: (a) the plausibility of the MDS; and (b) 
the level of imprecision in relation to the original study. Schwartz’ theory of cultural 
dimensions is based on the assumption that every society needs to solve universally 
occurring issues. The solutions to these issues take the form of value orientations with 
conflicting poles. The RVS-MDS confirms an approximate structure of these conflicting 
value types. Despite the merging of some value clusters, the MDS shows a plausible 
result: only value types that are compatible, and thus share some degree of similarity, 
merge and this is probably due to item under-representation and the absence of 
Hierarchy values. Given the fact that the comparison is based on a rather limited set of 
23 or 28 values respectively, it is encouraging to have been able to replicate a rough 
structure of culture-level value types.  
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Regarding the level of imprecision to the original study, the present study can be 
regarded as ‘fairly imprecise’. Schwartz’ (1994a, 2006) samples consisted of university 
students and teachers, whereas the meta-analysis included diverse samples such as 
working adults, and samples from the general population. The sampled cultural groups 
reflect also a somewhat different distribution in terms of geographical regions they 
belong to, compared to Schwartz’ first culture-level analysis (see Schwartz, 1994a). The 
response format of the RVS is entirely different to the SVS (ranking vs. rating). Finally, 
the time frame for which data is available is larger for the RVS dataset than for the SVS 
dataset. In regard of all these differences, I think that the replication can be considered 
as successful. The similarity of the Schwartz- and Rokeach values-MDS results, despite 
the high degree of ‘imprecision’ in the replication, can also be interpreted as a strength 
in terms of the robustness of Schwartz’ theory. 
 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations in this study. A major limitation is that I 
needed to average items across different decades to enhance the sample size of 
countries. In this way I ignored temporal effects, such as value changes, that may occur 
within societies. For some countries, data on the Rokeach values were only available for 
specific years or different time frames than for other countries. I tried to address this 
issue for the correlational analyses in Study 1b. I aimed to obtain scores for the external 
variables that match the large time frame of the RVS-dataset. In some cases this was not 
possible (e.g., pro-social behaviour items from the World and European Value Survey). 
This mismatch of time frames of country scores may be one explanation why I 
consistently found correlations of only moderate sizes and not higher. However, there 
are probably a number of other factors that may have lowered the correlations which are 
difficult to identify or which I could not control. Yet, the fact that I still found 
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significant correlations in the hypothesized direction suggests that the relationships are 
relatively stable. Countries from Eastern Europe, for example, experienced great 
political and socio-economic changes. Yet, I found a consistent result: they scored 
relatively low on the Basic Need Fulfilment Index and also showed relatively low 
priority on the SFC value type. This finding still emerged as significant even if the 
country scores were averaged across almost four decades, or if some data points were 
missing, such as in the case of Slovenia and Slovakia. Despite all these shortcomings, 
there is theoretical and empirical evidence that SFC is a meaningful value type at the 
culture-level. 
Another major limitation is that I was not able to examine the value structure at 
the individual-level. The meta-analytical dataset for the Rokeach values consists of 
mean or median rank orders for samples. In most of the cases the number of samples 
within countries is relatively low which does not allow conducting analyses at the 
sample-level. On the other hand, the aim was to replicate Schwartz’ culture-level value 
structure and not to examine the individual-level value structure. I showed that the 
RVS- and SVS- culture-level value structure were significantly related to each other 
despite a number of dissimilarities between both datasets, such as sample 
characteristics, sampling time frame, etc.  
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of a new finding is rather unusual when conducting replications. 
This may also be the reason why replication studies are often felt to be redundant and as 
not adding new knowledge or advancing the understanding of an issue. New findings 
are commonly seen as more informative and interesting, even if they are of unknown 
reliability and generalizability (Neuliep & Crandall, 1993). The present study meets 
both objectives: ensuring the generalizability of Schwartz’ theory and adding new 
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knowledge. I successfully replicated the structure of values at the culture-level and at 
the same time I was able to identify a new value type which I labelled Self-fulfilled 
Connectedness. I hope that this discovery stimulates further studies to explore this 
particular value type and its meaning to individuals in different cultures.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY 2 
 
Do Cultural Values Explain Individuals’ Moral Attitudes? 
A Cross-cultural Multi-level Approach 
 
Introduction 
Values - including cultural values - are seen as the abstract motivations that guide, 
justify, and explain individuals’ attitudes (Feather, 1985; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
2007c). But do cultural values also relate to moral attitudes? This question, as simple as 
it appears, taps into a major controversy of whether morality is universal or culturally 
determined. Moral universalists (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932/1965; Rawls, 1999; 
Turiel, 2002) posit that issues of justice and fairness are the common cornerstones of 
morality. Evolutionary theorists explain these universal moral norms with the adaptive 
benefit of social cooperation (see Krebs, 2008, for a review on morality and 
evolutionary theory). As expressed by Rawls (1999): “social cooperation makes life 
better for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts” (p. 4). 
From an evolutionary perspective, people who engage in unfair behaviour and thus take 
advantage of the system of social cooperation are judged as wrongdoers - regardless of 






Note. An earlier version of this chapter has been submitted for publication to the European Journal of 
Social Psychology and is hereafter referenced as follows: Vauclair & Fischer (2009). Do cultural values 
explain individuals’ moral attitudes? A cross-cultural multi-level approach. Manuscript under review . 
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In contrast, cultural psychologists (e.g. Haidt, et al., 1993; Miller, 2001; 
Shweder, et al., 1987) argue that judgments of right and wrong are influenced by 
culturally based conceptions of the self. People who live in societies in which they 
regard themselves as rather independent from the social group adopt the moral discourse 
of Autonomy (Shweder, et al., 1997). What is right or wrong depends on whether it 
affects individual rights and freedoms and has been called a rights-based morality 
(Chiu, et al., 1997; Dworkin, 1978). In a moral discourse of Community, however, 
individuals perceive themselves as interconnected with the social group and judge right 
and wrong on the basis of interpersonal duties, social roles and obligations - called a 
duty-based morality.  
Previous research on these two very different positions of morality has been 
mostly qualitative (e.g. Turiel, 2002; Shweder, et al., 1997) and based on comparisons 
between only a few cultural groups (e.g. Haidt, et al., 1993; Miller, et al., 1990; Nucci, 
et al., 1983; Shweder, et al., 1997). In the present study, I examined commonalities and 
differences in morality across a large number of countries. I conducted an analysis of 
the Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale (MDBS, Harding & Phillips, 1986) included in 
the European and World Value Survey (EVS/ WVS). The scale maps onto two different 
theories of morality by measuring individuals’ attitudes towards (1) cheating behaviours 
which violate the code of social cooperation, and (2) behaviours involving choices in 
the personal and sexual domain, such as divorce, abortion and prostitution.  
In order to rigorously test whether any observed differences between countries 
are indeed due to cultural effects, I adopted two strategies recommended for advanced 
cross-cultural research (see e.g. Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). First, I unpackaged culture, 
i.e. I used specific variables as a measure of culture in the form of Schwartz’ cultural 
values (Schwartz, 1994b, 2006). Secondly, I employed a multilevel model in which I 
tested whether cultural values accounted for individuals’ moral attitudes. This was done 
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after controlling for individual differences and economic development, as a contextual 
factor, to rule out the possibility that these non-cultural variables contribute to any 
observed country differences. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use 
such a comprehensive statistical model to shed light on both cultural similarities and 
differences in morality.  
In the following paragraphs, I will provide a brief summary of past research 
using the MDBS. I will then outline relevant theories tapping into the moral 
universalism and relativism debate from which I derive the hypothesis.  
 
The Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale (MDBS) 
A Measure of Moral Attitudes 
The initial Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale was developed in the 1980’s and 
consisted of 22 items (Harding & Phillips, 1986). The purpose of the scale was to assess 
the justifiability of behaviours reflecting moral issues (e.g. divorce) which people may 
confront in their lives or have an opinion about. There are no test-retest indices or 
reliability coefficients reported (see also Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). The items have 
been interpreted as measuring values in general (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Inglehart, 
2006), moral values in particular (e.g. Halpern, 2001; Nevitte & Cochrane, 2006), moral 
beliefs (e.g. Halman, 1996) or social attitudes (e.g. Schwartz, 2006b). This conceptual 
conflation of attitudes and values impedes a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between these two concepts, such as whether people’s attitudes can be predicted from 
their cultural values. Value theorists have differentiated attitudes from values by 
defining attitudes as evaluative judgments of specific entities and values as abstract 
beliefs about desirable goals, ordered by relative importance, that guide individuals as 
they evaluate events, people, and actions (Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
1992).  
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Attitudes elicit affective, behavioural and cognitive responses (Rosenberg & 
Hovland, 1960). In the case of the MDBS, the items are rated on a scale ranging from 
‘never justified’ to ‘always justified’. It can be said that these items elicit a cognitive 
response since individuals express their beliefs about specific behaviours related to 
morality. I conceptualized the scale as a measure of attitudes. The response to the items 
can also be called a moral judgment ranging from more lenient to stricter judgments. In 
regard to the MDBS, I did not draw a distinction between the terms moral attitude and 
moral judgment. For the present study, they both refer to an individuals’ evaluation of a 
moral issue as rather permissible and tolerable or not.  
 
The Factor Structure 
Harding and Phillips (1986) reported the most comprehensive analysis on the 
scale using data from the EVS carried out in 1981 in ten Western European countries. 
They found that the scale typically yielded a three factor structure distinguishing moral 
issues into a (1) personal-sexual morality with a focus on matters of life and death, as 
well as sexual relations, a (2) self-interest (or honest-dishonest) morality focusing on 
issues of personal integrity and honesty, and a (3) legal-illegal or (legal-punitive) 
morality defined by behaviours which are regulated by law. The authors also reported 
that items tapping into the personal-sexual domain loaded relatively clearly on a single 
factor. The other two factors had some cross-loading items (e.g., ‘avoiding a fare on 
public transport’ which may be expected as it is both ‘dishonest’ and ‘illegal’), raising 
the  question of whether a more parsimonious two-factor structure would not fit 
individuals’ perception of moral issues better than a three-factor structure. Furthermore, 
the cross-cultural validity of the factor structure was relatively consistent within all 
Western European countries (Harding & Phillips, 1986); however, it still needs to be 
shown whether this also applies to non-European countries which exhibit very different 
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cultures compared to Europe, and in particular when equivalence in factor structures is 
evaluated with more rigorous tests such as confirmatory factor analysis.  
 
Country-level Predictors of Individuals’ Moral Attitudes 
The Moral Universalism Account: Cheating is Wrong - Everywhere 
According to the universalistic paradigm (e.g. Kant, 1785/1994; Kohlberg, 1984; 
Piaget, 1965; Rawls, 1999; Turiel, 2002), morality is regarded as unrelated to the social 
or cultural context. Empirically, there are particular aspects of morality which have been 
found to be relatively invariant across cultures. This includes intentional acts with 
intrinsically harmful consequences to others, such as stealing or hitting, which are 
universally judged as wrong and as moral matters (Turiel, 1983, 2002). While this 
research gives some insight into cross-cultural commonalities, it does not provide an 
explanation why there is such a universal sense of justice and fairness. Yet, it seems 
paramount to uncover the underlying mechanism of morality in order to understand, 
explain and further investigate its manifestation in human behaviour. Theorists 
attempting to explain morality often adopt evolutionary theories (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971) which 
provide an intriguing framework from which predictions on human morality can be 
derived.  
The main argument of evolutionary theory is that the driving force of evolution 
consists of individuals trying to maximise the transmission of their genes to the next 
generation (Darwin, 1874; see Krebs, 2008). For the human species, this is facilitated 
through altruism and cooperation. In the ancestral environment, social cooperation in 
the form of group hunting or protection from predators has increased the likelihood of 
survival for both the individual and the whole group (Krebs, 2005; Krebs, 2008; Wright, 
1996). Thus, a genetic disposition for a moral code of social cooperation has been 
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transmitted to following generations and finally persisted as a human universal until 
today. Without this sense of morality, it would be difficult for members of a social 
group to coordinate their behaviours in a way that maximizes the benefits for 
themselves and the group as a whole. The regulatory force for the development of social 
cooperation has presumably been reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960): cooperation is rewarded 
with cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). In contrast, selfishness and cheating in 
the form of free riding and rule breaking are ultimately sanctioned socially (Broom, 
2003) or legally (cf. Harding and Phillips, 1983) - even if people are not personally 
affected by the act (Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002). Hence, there is a deep universal 
sense of justice that also involves a desire to condemn and even punish wrongdoers 
(Wilson, 1993). Evolutionary theorists propose that this universal moral norm evolved 
because it is an effective mean of upholding mutually beneficial cooperative relations 
(Krebs, 2005).  
The dishonest and illegal factor of the MDBS may be interpreted as capturing 
issues of selfishness and breaches of social cooperation (e.g., ‘cheating on taxes’ or 
‘avoiding a fare on public transport’). Considering the importance of social cooperation 
in the ontogenetic development of humans, I expected that attitudes towards these kinds 
of behaviours are not determined by culture or cultural values. This does not mean that 
there may be no individual differences or within-country variation respectively. Even in 
the framework of evolutionary psychology it is acknowledged that there are individual 
differences in adherence to moral codes with some individuals trying to take advantage 
of others (cf. Krebs, 2008). However, given the importance of social cooperation for the 
cohesion of all social groups, I assumed that it would be dysfunctional for any society to 
endorse cultural values which promote these kinds of behaviours. Hence, I expected 
cultural values not to be significant predictors of individuals’ attitudes towards 
dishonest and illegal behaviours.  
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The Moral Relativism Account: Right or Wrong Choices?  
According to the relativism paradigm, morality is seen as culturally influenced 
(e.g. Haidt, et al., 1993; Miller, 2001; Shweder, et al., 1987). Empirically it has been 
shown that this applies specifically to issues that are related to a culturally based 
conception of the self (e.g. Shweder, et al., 1997). The psychological dichotomy of 
independent and interdependent selves originally coined by Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) is here relevant. Miller et al. (1990), for example, found that Hindu-Indians, who 
endorse an interdependent conception of the self, tended to view ‘helping strangers’ as 
an interpersonal responsibility and therefore as a moral matter. In contrast, for 
European-Americans who tend to endorse an independent conception of the self, 
‘helping strangers’ was affected by personal preferences and non-moral considerations 
such as liking the stranger. They also thought that greater satisfaction is linked to 
voluntary, as opposed to role-based helping. Hindu-Indians assumed that individuals 
experience the same satisfaction in both cases.  
The moral discourses that goes along with these different cultural conceptions of 
the self have been labeled ethic of Autonomy versus ethic of Community (Shweder, et 
al., 1997) or a rights-based versus duty-based morality respectively (Chiu, et al., 1997; 
Dworkin, 1978). A rights-based morality is more person-centred by focusing on 
individual rights, including the right to pursue own interests and personal goals for the 
sake of one’s own personal well-being. An act is only judged as wrong if it causes harm 
or restricts another person’s freedom or rights (Shweder & Haidt, 2000). A duty-based 
morality on the other hand is more system-oriented and serves to maintain the status quo 
in a social group (Chiu, et al., 1997). Fulfilling social obligations is of supreme 
importance. A person’s choices and actions, such as whom to marry, are not seen as 
only affecting the individual but also closely related others. Hence, these decisions can 
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be cause of shame and dishonour and can be judged as wrong if the interests of the 
community are disregarded.  
Whether a society lays more emphasis on the individual or the social group or on 
Autonomy versus Community respectively can be empirically assessed with Schwartz’ 
(1994) cultural value orientations Autonomy versus Embeddedness. Autonomy values 
represent an emphasis on being independent, with the right to pursue one’s own self-
fulfilment, be it in an intellectual or affective way. Embeddedness values, however, 
resemble a duty-based moral orientation. They emphasize the importance of social 
relatedness, the traditional order and the maintenance of the status quo. This bipolar 
value orientation may also be regarded as paralleling the classical individualism and 
collectivism  distinction (Inglehart, 2006; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997) originally put forward by 
Hofstede (1980). Since the personal-sexual items from the MDBS draw on behavioural 
choices that are directly related to a person’s own life, I expected that countries 
endorsing Autonomy rather than Embeddedness provide a more lenient context in regard 





hypothesized that:  
In countries characterized by an Autonomy value orientation, individuals show a 
more lenient attitude towards personal-sexual issues than in countries 
characterized by an Embeddedness value orientation.  
 
                                               
11
 Additionally to the Autonomy/ Embeddedness dimension, Schwartz (1994, 2006) proposed two further 
bipolar cultural value orientations: Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism and Harmony vs. Mastery. Relationships 
of these additional cultural values with individuals’ personal-sexual attitudes was not expected. However, 
they were included in the regression model to examine whether they contributed to the explanation of 
moral attitudes. Therefore, it was tested whether Autonomy vs. Embeddedness is the active ingredient of 
culture, as predicted.  
Figure 6.1 in chapter five shows a co-plot of countries on these cultural value orientations. 
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‘Control Variables’ 
Economic Development of Countries 
Between-country differences in moral attitudes may not only occur because of 
cultural differences, but also because of ‘non-cultural’ variables such as economic 
factors. Affluence has often been found to be closely related to cultural values assessing 
individualism and collectivism (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; see also Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; 
Triandis, 2001). Schwartz (2006) reported correlations as high as .73 between GDP per 
capita and the Autonomy-Embeddedness value dimension. Furthermore, time-series 
analyses have shown that, with economic growth, societies tend to move from self-
constraining values to more secular-rational and self-expressive ones (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Hence, a country’s increasing affluence may 
provide a context in which individuals form more permissive moral attitudes. Given the 
considerable link between cultural values and the socio-economic development of 
countries found in past research, I examined the extent to which affluence operates as a 
predictor of moral attitudes. Since economic factors belong to the contextual variables 
that are usually regarded as non-cultural (cf. Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006), I controlled for 
it in the regression analysis when investigating the unique contribution of cultural 
values. In this way I was able to examine whether any of the observed between-country 
differences occur because of economic factors only or whether cultural values add 
incremental validity in the prediction of moral attitudes.  
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Individual-level Correlates of Moral Attitudes 
The most comprehensive study of individual-level differences in moral attitudes 
has been conducted by Harding and Phillips (1986) using data from ten Western 
European countries. The authors concluded that older age, religiosity and conservative 
political beliefs were all associated with greater strictness on moral issues. They did not 
find strong gender differences, but pointed out that women emerged as slightly stricter 
in their moral judgment. There were also differences in associations between the content 
of moral issues and individuals’ socio-economic status: the higher individuals’ income, 
their social class and their level of education, the more lenient they judged personal-
sexual issues. This relationship was less consistent in regard to the judgment of 
dishonest and illegal behaviours.  
It is unclear whether these relationships hold when non-European countries are 
examined. The findings nevertheless provide a rationale for controlling for certain 
individual-level predictors when aiming to explain between-country variation in moral 
attitudes. Hence, I examined whether socio-demographic variables (age, gender, 
religiosity, political orientation and socio-economic status) predicted moral attitudes. I 
also investigated whether the relationship between socio-demographics and moral 
attitudes varies across countries and might be moderated by context variables. For a 
better overview, the multilevel model with all hypothesized variables is depicted in 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Hypothesized multilevel model for the prediction of individuals’ moral 
attitudes. 
Method 
Instruments and Data 
Moral Attitudes as Dependent Variables 
 To assess individuals’ moral attitudes across different countries, I used data on 
the MDBS gathered through the European and World Value Survey (EVS/ WVS) as 
available from the World Value Survey webpage
12
. The WVS together with the EVS is 
carried out by a worldwide network of social scientists studying value change. All 
samples are representative within a country in terms of age, sex, occupation and 
regional distribution. Respondents are interviewed using a standardized questionnaire 
with a number of questions in regard to religion, gender roles, work, politics, attitudes 
towards other groups, environmental protection and subjective well-being.  
                                               
12
 Retrieved October 2008, from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Note that all details regarding the 
survey and samples are on this website.   
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I used survey data on moral attitudes from four study waves (1981 – 1984, 1989 
– 1993, 1994 – 1998 and 1999 - 2004). A number of items have been added to the 
MDBS until the 2004 study wave, so that the total scale consists of 31 items; however 
only ten of them have been used consistently across all study waves and countries. 
Therefore, I used only these ten items for the present analyses (see Table 4.1 in the 
results section for the content of items). The items are rated on a 10-point Likert scale 
with lower numbers reflecting a more severe attitude towards the issue in question (1 = 
‘never justified’) and higher numbers a more lenient or tolerant attitude (10 = ‘always 
justified’). Since my focus in this study was on cross-national differences and not on 
attitude change over time, I combined data from different time periods (from 1981 to 
2004). Responses to all ten items consisted of 242,048 individuals in average (SD = 
9,978) coming from 84 countries. The number of respondents within countries ranged 
from 417 (for the Dominican Republic) to 10,070 (for Spain) with a mean of 3,189 (SD 
= 1,930). 
  
Cultural Values  
As a measure of cultural values, I used archival data of the Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS) collected by Schwartz (1992, 2006). The data comprise samples of both 
university students (N = 26,024 from 66 countries) and secondary teachers (N = 15,975 
from 55 countries) and was collected in a similar timeframe as the EVS/WVS (from 
1988 to 2002). Further information on the samples is available in Schwartz (2006). 
Respondents rated the importance of each of 58 values as a guiding principle in their 
life on a 9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values), to 7 (of supreme 
importance). I used those 45 items that, according to Schwartz (2006), are cross-
culturally equivalent in their meaning. By analyzing the value items at the country-level 
with smallest space analysis (a form of multi-dimensional scaling), Schwartz derived 
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seven distinct value orientations which are arranged in a circular order: Affective and 
Intellectual Autonomy, Egalitarianism, Harmony, Embeddedness, Hierarchy and 
Mastery. Adjacent value orientations signify value compatibilities, whereas opposite 
ones imply value conflicts and can be summarized in bipolar value dimensions. I 
derived country scores for the value orientations by aggregating the data at the country-
level and averaging the items that fall into the respective value domain as reported by 
Schwartz (2006). To reduce the likelihood of multicollinearity in the regression model, I 
decided to average the two conceptually similar value orientations Affective and 
Intellectual Autonomy (see also Schwartz, 2006). Since, I was interested in broad 
cultural dimensions I used a single country score for each of the three bipolar value 
orientations, i.e. Autonomy (positive pole) versus Embeddedness (negative pole), 
Egalitarianism (positive pole) versus Hierarchy (negative pole) and Harmony (positive 
pole) versus Mastery (negative pole) (cf. Schwartz, 2006). 
 
Linking EVS/WVS Data with SVS Data 
In order to conduct a multi-level regression analysis, I needed to link the 
individual-level data (level 1) on moral attitudes from the EVS/ WVS to the Schwartz’ 
country-level data (level 2) on cultural values. The variable that linked the two datasets 
was ‘country’. For instance, the responses of individuals from Brazil on their moral 
attitudes (EVS/ WVS data) were linked to the aggregated country-level responses on 
values also obtained from individuals from Brazil. Missing values were deleted listwise 
within level 1 and level 2 as well as across levels (e.g. if data were available for a 
country at level 2, but not at level 1 and vice versa). Hence, after matching the datasets, 
I obtained a somewhat reduced dataset. Furthermore, I first analyzed the effect of 
cultural values on individuals’ moral attitudes with SVS student scores. I then validated 
the effect with the teacher scores. Hence, I obtained the following two datasets: (1) data 
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from 119,743 individuals at level 1 and from 51 countries at level 2 based on aggregated 
students’ value responses, (2) data from 100,621 individuals at level 1 and from 43 
countries at level 2 based on aggregated teachers’ value responses. Note, that the level 1 
datasets overlap and only level 2 data are entirely different (aggregated student scores 
versus teacher scores).  
 
‘Control Variables’ 
Economic Development of Countries. As a measure of socio-economic status of 
countries, I utilized the Human Development Index (HDI) from the United Nations 
Development Programme (2006). It is composed of a number of important aspects 
characterizing the development of countries, which are: life expectancy at birth, adult 
literacy rate, index for primary, secondary and tertiary education, and GDP per capita 
(PPP). I replaced the missing value for the HDI index for Taiwan with the Hong Kong 
score which shows relatively similar level of economic development (see, for example, 
the CIA World Factbook
13
). I computed an average HDI score for each country across 
the time span 1981 and 2004. This was done to match the HDI scores to the timeframe 
of data collected for the EVS/ WVS and SVS.  
Individual-level Predictors. I included individuals’ socio-demographic variables 
in the model to examine whether they accounted for differences in moral attitudes. 
Guided by previous research (Harding & Phillips, 1986), I selected the variables age 
(labelled as X003 in the EVS/ WVS dataset), gender (X001, 1 = male, 2 = female), 
religiosity (F063, 1 = God not at all important, 10 = God very important), political 
orientation (E033, 1 =  left-wing oriented, 10 = right-wing oriented) and income (X047, 
1 = lower step, 10 = tenth step
14
).  
                                               
13
 Retrieved, June 2009, from https://www.cia.gov/index.html   
14
 Respondents were presented with a ten-step scale of incomes and asked to choose the group their 
household belongs to before taxes and other deductions.  
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Analytical Strategy 
Construct Equivalence of Moral Attitudes 
Prior to conducting the regression analysis, I needed to ensure that individuals 
from different countries differentiate between dishonest, illegal and personal-sexual 
issues. If the issues had different meanings across cultures, I would be comparing apples 
with oranges in the subsequent analytical models. A way to establish equivalence in 
meaning of items is to examine whether the scale in question has the same structure 
across cultures. This is called structural or construct equivalence (van de Vijver & 
Leung, 1997). Hence, the first analysis targeted the factor structure of the scale and its 
cross-cultural application. The resulting factors were then treated as dependent variables 
in the subsequent multilevel regression analyses.  
Construct equivalence can be examined with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
which allows testing a priori specified hypotheses regarding the underlying structure of 
a scale (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Past research has shown that six out of the ten 
attitudinal items formed a subscale labeled as personal-sexual attitudes. However, the 
underlying meaning of the four remaining items is inconclusive to date (cf. Harding & 
Phillips, 1986). As it was not possible to derive a clear hypothesis on the factor structure 
of all items, I first explored it with principal component analysis (PCA) and then 
evaluated it with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Since exploratory and 
confirmatory analyses should be conducted on independent samples, I randomly split 
the total dataset into two equal datasets and performed the exploratory analysis on one 
dataset and the confirmatory analysis on the other. In order to avoid conducting an 
exploratory factor analysis for each country separately, which would have resulted in 84 
PCA’s, I performed a factor analysis on the overall pooled within-country correlation 
matrix. This procedure weighs the correlation matrices of each country equally, so that 
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they have the same influence on the overall matrix (Fontaine & Fischer, in press; 
Muthén, 1994). The PCA represents the average factor solution at the individual-level 
across all cultural groups. I then used the second dataset and tested the fit of the factor 
solution with CFA. I first examined whether the factor structure fits well for the pooled 
within-country data. If so, I proceeded using it as a norm solution for a multi-group 
CFA in which I also tested whether the average structure fits well in each country 
individually. This is the first study to report such multi-group analyses for the MDBS 
across the complete WVS data set.  
 
Multilevel Regression Analysis 
I used HLM 6 for the multilevel analyses, since individuals are nested within 
countries. Multilevel models have the advantage that they simultaneously analyze 
variables from different levels and that they statistically take into account the various 
dependencies occurring in hierarchical datasets (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In HLM 
terms, individuals’ moral attitudes and their socio-demographic characteristics were the 
level-1 variables. Cultural values and socio-economic development of countries were 
the level-2 variables. HLM can compute regressions within and across countries. The 
analytical procedure consisted here in five steps. First, I conducted a one-way ANOVA 
(Model 1) in which no predictors were included (all following equations are adopted 













 is the dependent variable (DV), i indexes the individual within a country and j 
indexes the country; γ
00
 is the grand mean of the DV across all countries when all 
predictors are zero, u
0j
 is the unique effect of country j on the intercept and r
ij
 is the 
deviation for case i from its country j. This model allowed me to examine whether there 
was sufficient variation in mean differences in moral attitudes within and between 
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countries. Using the Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), I determined how much of 












 is the variance between countries and σ
2
 is the level-1 variance.  
Secondly, if there was sufficient variation at both levels, I tried to account for it 
by first examining socio-demographic variables as predictors (Model 2). In this model 
the slope coefficients of the individual-level predictors were set to be fixed across 



















is a level-2 regression coefficient times a level-1 predictor. The 
















Third, I allowed the slopes to vary randomly across countries (Model 3). This 
permitted me to test for cross-cultural variability in regression coefficients and to assess 























 is the deviation of the country slopes from the overall slope for 
the level-1 predictor X
ij
.  
Fourth, I added country-level predictors to the best fitting level-1 model and 
examined whether they accounted for cross-cultural differences in moral attitudes (i.e. 
the intercept γ
00
) when individual differences were controlled for (Model 4). Cultural 
values as country-level predictors were first derived from students’ responses in 
Schwartz’ dataset: 
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 stands for a level-2 regression coefficient times a level-2 
predictor. The percentage of explained variance for country-level predictors was 













Fifth, if the slopes in Model 3 proved to be significantly different across 






) to examine whether 





























The final model was validated with cultural values derived from teachers’ 
responses from Schwartz’ dataset.  
Throughout the five models, I excluded non-significant predictors in subsequent 
models. I applied grand-mean centring to all predictor variables except for gender 
which was dummy coded (1 = female). I used full maximum likelihood (ML) as a 
method of estimation instead of restricted maximum likelihood (REML), since it has the 
practical advantage that any pair of nested models can be tested for significant 






complex model  
(9)
 
Degree of freedom for this chi-square test is the difference in the number of 




Factor Structure of the MDBS 
The PCA for the pooled within-country data in the first random split-half sample 
yielded a clear two-factor solution based on the scree plot and Kaiser’s criterion. Factor 
one consisted of six items and replicated the personal-sexual component (eigenvalue 
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3.50). Factor two comprised the remaining four items which were labeled as attitudes 
towards ‘dishonest-illegal’ behaviours (eigenvalue 1.61). Table 4.1 shows the factor 
loadings. The two factors explained together 51.1% of the total variance.  
 
Table 4.1: PCA factor loadings of the MDBS derived from the pooled sample. 
    Factor Loadings 









1. Someone accepting a bribe 
.17 .64 
2. Claiming government benefits 
.03 .70 
3. Avoiding a fare on public transport 
.14 .74 




























Note. Employed rotation method was varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Substantial factor loadings on 
Factor 1 and Factor 2 are in bold.  
 
I conducted a CFA (in AMOS 6) in the second split-half sample to test whether a 
two-factor model fitted the pooled-within data better than a one-factor model, using the 
pooled-within covariance matrix as data input. Each item was specified as loading on 
one single latent factor. The latent constructs in the two-factor model were assumed to 
be intercorrelated. In none of the models errors were allowed to correlate. The 
hypothesized two-factor model yielded a significant chi-square statistic (
2
(34) = 
15616.54, p < .001) which is common with big sample sizes (Bentler, 1992b). Yet, 
other goodness of fit indices suggested that the two-factor model fitted the data 
reasonably well. Bentler (1992b) suggested a cutoff value beyond .90 for approximate 
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fit indices such as the Normed Fit Index (NFI) or the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). The 
fit indices were all within this range: The NFI was .93 and CFI was .93. The root-mean-
square error of approximation (RMSEA) which considers the parsimony of the model 
was .07, which is below the .08 cutoff value that indicates approximate fit (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1992). The factor loadings were all significant and sizeable for the dishonest-
illegal factor (.53-.67) and the personal-sexual factor (.55-.69). There was a correlation 
of moderate size between the two factors (r = .44, p < .001). A comparison with the 
one-factor model showed that it yielded worse fit indices (NFI = .75; CFI = .75; and 
RMSEA = .13), and also a significant chi-square statistic (
2
(35) = 52981.64, p < .001). 
Based on the goodness of fit indices for both models, I concluded that the two-factor 
structure fitted the data well in the pooled-within sample and I used it as a norm solution 
for the subsequent multi-group analyses.   
I next tested configural invariance by examining the cross-cultural validity of the 
hypothesized two-factor structure across all 84 countries. Hence, I tested whether the 
two-factor structure fitted the data of all countries when no cross-country constraints are 
imposed. The results showed again a significant chi-square (
2
(2822) = 136425.26, p < 
.001). The values for NFI, CFI and RMSEA (.91, .91 and .01) indicated that the two-
factor structure fitted relatively well across all 84 countries. This high level is even 
more impressive considering that we are dealing with 84 data matrices and that these fit 
criteria were developed for assessing fit in single-group models. For multi-group and 
intercultural comparisons it may be acceptable to relax these criteria somewhat (van de 
Vijver & Fischer, 2009). 
 I next tested for metric invariance by imposing equality constraints on the factor 
loadings. The results showed that the Goodness-of-fit statistics for this 84-group model 
were still acceptable (NFI = .91; CFI = .91 and RMSEA = .01). Cheung and Rensvold 
(2002) recently suggested that values for ∆CFI smaller than or equal to -.01 indicate that 
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the null hypothesis of invariance should not be rejected. In this case ∆CFI was -.006 
leading me to accept invariance in factor loadings across all countries. This confirms 
structural equivalence for the ten items.  
To summarize, I found that the ten items of the MDBS are distinguishable into 
six items measuring attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviour and four items 
measuring attitudes towards dishonest-illegal behaviour. This distinction held for both 
the average individual-level data as well as for each of the 84 countries. Thus, I was 
able to use these two factors as distinct dependent variables for the subsequent 
multilevel regression analyses. I computed for each individual an average score for 
items tapping into (1) dishonest-illegal behaviours and (2) personal-sexual behaviours, 
analyzing them separately in the multilevel regression models. 
 
Prediction of Moral Attitudes 
The regression results for dishonest-illegal issues are displayed in Table 4.2 and 
for personal-sexual issues in Table 4.3.  
 
Attitudes towards Dishonest-illegal Behaviours 
Multilevel Regression. The one-way ANOVA model (Model 1, Equation 1) 
yielded an estimated grand mean of 2.26 (SE = 0.07, p < .001) indicating that 
individuals tended to hold a rather severe attitude towards these issues (note that the 
rating scale ranged from 1 ‘never justified’ to 10 ‘always justified’). Computing the ICC 
(Equation 2) showed that only about 8.7% of the total variance was associated with 
differences between countries. Hence, the larger part of the total variance, 91.3%, was 
due to individual differences within countries. This partition of variance provided to 
some extent first evidence that the rejection of dishonest and illegal behaviours is not 
strongly related to culturally specific attributes.  
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Table 4.2: Multilevel regression analyses for attitudes towards dishonest-illegal issues. 














predictors Full model Full model 
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EG/ HI  
(γ03) 





HA/ MA  
(γ04)    
0.13  
(0.91)   
 
Cross-level 
interactions:       
 
HDI * political  






HDI * religiosity  










HDI * age  










HDI * income  
(γ41) 






HDI * gender  







Chapter four: Predicting moral attitudes with cultural values  
 - 134 - 
Table 4.2 cont’ 














predictors Full model Full model 
Cross-level 


















































































































religiosity (γ24)  








































Explained variance:       
 Within countries  4.9% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 6.5% 
  Between countries       9.6% 7.1% 4.1% 
 
a
p < .10; 
b
p < .05; 
c
p < .01; 
d
p < .001.  
Note. AU/ EM = Autonomy vs. Embeddedness, EG/ HI = Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy, HA/ MA = 
Harmony vs. Mastery, HDI = Human Development Index (UNDP, 2006). Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. All predictors are grand-mean centred, except for 
gender which is dummy coded (1 = female). Coefficients in bold are highly significant moderations at p < 
.01 for both the student-based and teacher-based model.  
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However, there was some variability between-countries and a chi-square test indicated 
that this was significantly different from zero (
2
(50) = 28157.90, p < .001). I proceeded 
testing whether country-level predictors accounted for the between-country variance 
when individual-level predictors were controlled for.  
The second model included only individual-level predictors with fixed slopes 
(Equation 3). Consistent with past research (Harding & Phillips, 1986), I found that 
females were stricter in their moral judgments and that age, religiosity, and right-wing 
orientation were also related to a stricter moral outlook. Income was a significant 
negative predictor: lower income was related to a more tolerant attitude towards 
dishonest-illegal behaviours. This individual-level model explained 4.9% of the within-
country variance (Equation 4).  
The next model (Model 3, Equation 5), in which I tested whether slopes for 
individual-level predictors vary across countries showed that there was indeed 
considerable variation across all variables (political orientation: 
2
(50) = 219.60, p < 
.001, religiosity: 
2
(50) = 709.70, p < .001, gender: 
2
(50) = 144.68, p < .001, age: 

2
(50) = 495.84, p < .001, and income: 
2
(50) = 614.89, p < .001). Although the 
predictor variable ‘political orientation’ showed varying slopes across countries, its 
overall regression coefficient for the prediction of moral attitude did not reach statistical 
significance anymore (p > .05). This indicates that political orientation is differently 
related to dishonest-illegal attitudes across cultures, but shows no main effect 
independent of cultural context. This model explained 6.3% of the within-country 
variance. A chi-square test for nested models (Equation 9) yielded a significant 
difference between the two models (
2
(20) = 1463.24, p < .001) leading me to conclude 
that the random slope model fitted the data better than the fixed slope model.  
I proceeded testing whether the context variables, i.e. Schwartz’ cultural values 
and HDI, may account for the between-country variation in dishonest-illegal issues 
Chapter four: Predicting moral attitudes with cultural values  
 - 136 - 
when individual-level predictors are controlled for (Model 4, Equation 6). Autonomy/ 
Embeddedness significantly accounted for between-country differences (B = -0.34, SE = 
0.14, p < .05). However, the cultural value orientations Egalitarianism/ Hierarchy and 
Harmony/ Mastery as well as HDI were not significant predictors. This model explained 
9.6% of the between-country differences (Equation 7). The finding that the cultural 
value orientation of Autonomy/ Embeddedness was a predictor might be attributable to a 
suppression effect which renders a variable statistically significant when other variables, 
such as level-1 predictors, are considered in the analysis (see, for example, Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). I tested this possibility by running a model in which only level-2 
variables were included. I found that Autonomy/ Embeddedness was not a significant 
predictor anymore (B = -0.31, SE = 0.17, p > .05). Egalitarianism/ Hierarchy, 
Harmony/ Mastery and HDI remained non-significant.  
Since I found that slopes of individual-level predictors varied across countries, I 
ran a moderation model to explore whether cultural values and HDI accounted for these 
variations (Model 5, Equation 8), with all individual-level predictors and Autonomy/ 
Embeddedness as a country-level predictor. The findings showed that in this model 
Autonomy/ Embeddedness was not a significant predictor (B = -0.08, SE = 0.09, p > 
.05). There were seven significant cross-level interaction effects at an alpha level of .05 
(see Table 4.2). This explorative moderation model included 20 tests which increased 
the probability of spurious effects by 64.15%. To counteract a possible Type I error, I 
decided to interpret only those interactions that were significant at a more stringent 
alpha level of .01 - for both students’ and teachers’ cultural values scores. I present the 
significant interaction findings below when discussing the teacher scores. The full 
regression model explained 6.3% of the within country variance and 7.1% of the 
between-country variance.  
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Validation with Teachers’ Cultural Values. I tested whether the final model 
could be replicated with cultural values derived from teachers’ responses (see Table 4.2, 
right panel). Religiosity, age, and income significantly predicted stricter attitudes 
towards dishonest-illegal issues. Furthermore, females were stricter than males in their 
moral judgment and political orientation was not a predictor. The Autonomy/ 
Embeddedness dimension was not a significant country-level predictor. All slopes of the 
individual-level predictors proved to be significantly different across countries (political 
orientation: (
2
(38) = 165.63, p < .001), religiosity: 
2
(38) = 412.47, p < .001, gender: 

2
(38) = 79.71, p < .001, age: 
2
(38) = 309.24, p < .001, and income: 
2
(38) = 223.74, p 
< .001). There were the same moderation effects as in the previous analysis based on 
Schwartz’ students’ data and an additional significant cross-level interaction effect (i.e. 
gender and moral attitude moderated by HDI). In the following, I report only those 
interactions that were significant at p < .01 in both the ‘student’ and ‘teacher’ sample. 
There were three interactions that met this criterion, i.e. the moderation effect of (1) 
Egalitarianism/ Hierarchy on religiosity and moral attitude, (2) Egalitarianism/ 
Hierarchy on income and moral attitude, and (3) Harmony/ Mastery on income and 
moral attitude. These cross-level interactions are depicted in Figure 4.2 for the ‘teacher’ 
sample. The graphs show that individuals in countries emphasizing Egalitarianism are 
more tolerant towards dishonest and illegal issues when their religiosity and income are 
low compared to individuals in countries emphasizing Hierarchy. With increasing 
income and religiosity, however, individuals in egalitarian countries exhibit stricter 
moral judgments to such an extent that at a certain point they are less tolerant than 
individuals in Hierarchy countries. The same effect is found for Harmony/ Mastery in 
the sense that individuals with low income are more tolerant in Mastery countries than 
in Harmony countries, but with increasing income this relationship is reversed.  
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Figure 4.2: Cross-level interactions for attitudes towards dishonest-illegal and personal-
sexual issues based on teachers’ cultural values 
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Attitudes towards Personal-sexual Behaviours 
Multilevel Regression. The one-way ANOVA model (Model 1, Equation 1) 
produced an estimated grand mean of 3.63 (SE = 0.14, p < .001). It indicated that on 
average individuals across countries judged these issues in a rather strict way. However, 
they were not as strict in their judgments as towards dishonest-illegal behaviours. The 
ICC (Equation 2) showed that the total variance in personal-sexual attitudes was 
partitioned into 21.9% between-country variance and consequently 78.1% within-
country variance. Hence, there was considerably more cross-country variance in 
personal-sexual issues than in dishonest-illegal ones.  
Model 2 showed that right-wing orientation, religiosity, age and lower income 
were all significantly related to a stricter attitude towards personal-sexual issues. 
Contrary to previous findings (cf. Harding & Phillips, 1986), I found that women were 
more tolerant than men when judging personal-sexual behaviours. The model explained 
12.7% of the within-country variance (Equation 4).  
Model 3, which tested for random slopes across countries (Equation 5), showed 
that the slopes for all individual-level predictors varied significantly across countries 
(political orientation: 
2
(50) = 1205.38, p < .001, religiosity: 
2
(50) = 1647.34, p < .001, 
age: 
2
(50) = 862.11, p < .001, income: 
2
(50) = 455.43, p < .001, and gender: 
2
(50) = 
281.75, p < .001). The model explained 16.1% of the within-country variance and fitted 
the data significantly better than the fixed slope model (
2
(20) = 4189.74, p < .001).  
I included country-level predictors, i.e. Schwartz’ cultural values and HDI, in the 
next model (Model 4, Equation 6). I found my hypothesis confirmed that the cultural 
value orientation Autonomy is related to greater tolerance towards personal-sexual 
behaviours. I also found support for my expectation that individuals in countries with 
higher level of human development tended to exhibit more lenient moral judgments. 
None of the other cultural value dimensions were significant predictors. In order to test 
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whether the cultural value dimension Autonomy/ Embeddedness added unique variance 
to the prediction of personal-sexual attitudes, I ran two additional models and 
statistically compared them. The first model included individual-level predictors and the 
two significant country-level predictors HDI and Autonomy/ Embeddedness. It 
explained 76.8% of the between-country variance (Equation 7). The second model was 
identical except that it contained only HDI as a country-level predictor. It explained 
73.4% of the variance between countries. A chi-square test for these two nested models 
(Equation 9) confirmed that the regression model containing both HDI and Autonomy/ 
Embeddedness was significantly better than the model with HDI only (
2
(1) = 4.41, p < 
.05).  
Model 5 included cross-level interactions to account for the random slopes 
across countries (Equation 8). Both Autonomy/ Embeddedness and HDI were still 
significant predictors and there were eight moderation effects ranging from marginally 
to highly significant (see Table 4.3). I proceeded in the same way as above for 
dishonest-illegal issues, to interpret only those interactions that were significant at an 
alpha level of .01 for the ‘student’ and ‘teacher’ scores. The findings are reported 
below. This final model explained 16.1% of the within country variance and 77% of the 
between country variance.  
Validation with Teachers’ Cultural Values. I obtained very similar results with 
cultural values derived from the teacher dataset, although the HLM dataset was reduced 
to somewhat less respondents and countries concerning the individual-level variables (N 
= 100,621, k = 43). The level-1 predictors, political orientation, religiosity, age, income 
and gender, were all still significant. The country-level predictors HDI and Autonomy/ 
Embeddedness were also replicated.  
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Table 4.3: Multilevel regression analyses for attitudes towards personal-sexual issues. 
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Country-level effects:       
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(γ04)    
0.11 
(0.64)   
 
Cross-level 
interactions:       
 
HDI * political  






HDI * religiosity  






HDI * age  










HDI * income  






HDI * gender 






AU/ EM * political  
orientation (γ12) 








AU/ EM * 
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AU/ EM * age  
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Table 4.3 cont’ 
    
Students' cultural 






















Cross-level interactions:       
 
AU/ EM * income  








AU/ EM * gender  








EG/ HI * political  








EG/ HI * religiosity  










EG/ HI * age  








EG/ HI * income  






EG/ HI * gender  
(γ53) 






HA/ MA * political  






HA/ MA * religiosity  










HA/ MA * age  
(γ34) 










HA/ MA * income  






HA/ MA * gender  





Explained variance:       
 Within countries 
 12.7% 16.1% 16.1% 16.1% 16.6% 
  Between countries 
      76.7% 77% 77% 
 
a
p < .10; 
b
p < .05; 
c
p < .01; 
d
p < .001 
Note. AU/ EM = Autonomy vs. Embeddedness, EG/ HI = Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy, HA/ MA = 
Harmony vs. Mastery, HDI = Human Development Index (UNDP, 2006). Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. All predictors are grand-mean centred, except for 
gender which is dummy coded (1 = female). Coefficients in bold are highly significant moderations at p < 
.01 for both the student-based and teacher-based model. 
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All slopes of the individual-level predictors proved to be significantly different across 
countries (political orientation: (
2
(38) = 524.50, p < .001), religiosity: 
2
(38) = 683.52, 
p < .001, gender: 
2
(38) = 158.72, p < .001, age: 
2
(38) = 401.32, p < .001, and income: 

2
(38) = 392.03, p < .001). There were eight significant moderation effects which 
largely replicated the cross-level interactions found with the student sample (see Table 
4.3). Only one of these interactions met the criterion of p < .01 in both the ‘student’ and 
the ‘teacher’ sample: Egalitarianism/ Hierarchy moderated the relationship between 
religiosity and attitude towards personal-sexual issues (see Figure 4.2). Individuals in 
egalitarian countries exhibited more lenient moral judgments compared to individuals in 
hierarchical countries under the condition of low religiosity. With increasing religiosity 
this relationship was reversed with highly religious individuals being stricter in their 
moral judgments in egalitarian countries than in hierarchical ones.  
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated cultural similarities and differences in 
individuals’ attitudes towards moral issues. The aim was to shed light on the moral 
universalism versus relativism debate in the literature. My position is that both the 
universalist and cultural relativist paradigms are legitimate and contribute to our 
understanding of morality. The main objective of this study was to show empirically 
across a large number of cultural contexts, that whether morality is universal or 
culturally determined depends on the moral issues studied. I showed that moral attitudes 
can be universally differentiated into behaviours that violate the moral code of social 
cooperation and into behaviours that involve individual choices, based on data from the 
EVS and WVS across 84 countries. I conducted multilevel regression analyses which 
allowed me to estimate the effects of cultural values while statistically controlling for 
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the effects of non-cultural variables (cf. Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). There are four 
conclusions that can be drawn based on these results.   
First, consistent with evolutionary theories on the importance of cooperation for 
social cohesion (cf. Axelrod & Hamilton; Broom, 2003; Gouldner, 1960; Krebs, 2008; 
Price, et al., 2002), I found that breaches of social cooperation, in the form of dishonest 
and illegal behaviours, are strongly and rather commonly disapproved. I found evidence 
that there is relatively little between-country variance in attitudes towards these issues. 
Cultural values and the socio-economic context of countries did not significantly 
account for the between-country variation in the full model. Hence, I conclude that 
attitudes towards dishonest-illegal behaviours are not strongly related to cultural values, 
therefore corroborating evolutionary theories on the universality of social cooperation. 
Maintaining the system of cooperation has widely been seen as the root of morality (cf. 
Durkheim, 1893/1984; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Piaget, 1932/1965; Rawls, 1971). People 
are naturally inclined to behave in a socially cooperative way, since it is in everybody’s 
interest to maintain this system and to condemn behaviours that may jeopardize it. 
Hence, selfishness, cheating and free-riding are recognized as undesirable behaviours 
and are rejected or even punished (Wilson, 1993). This is consistent with findings from 
qualitative research in moral psychology in which it has been shown that intentionally 
hitting, or stealing, without any reason are commonly judged as wrong (Turiel, 1983, 
2002).  
Secondly, I also believe that there is more to morality than this very basic moral 
code of social cooperation. I agree with cultural psychologists that a part of morality is 
also socially and culturally constructed (e.g. Haidt, et al., 1993; Miller, 2001; Shweder, 
et al., 1987). I found evidence for my hypothesis that cultural models of the self are 
related to moral judgments. I reasoned that because Schwartz’ cultural value orientation 
of Autonomy emphasizes independence and self-determination, it provides a context in 
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which people focus on the self and on individual rights. Hence, individuals in 
Autonomy-oriented countries should make more lenient judgments towards behaviours 
that concern their self and that are not evidently harming others. The opposite 
relationship applies to countries in which Embeddedness is valued, as this value 
orientation emphasizes duties and social obligations. My analyses showed that this 
hypothesis was confirmed.   
I also found that part of the observed differences could be explained by a 
country’s affluence. Economic development has been shown to influence a number of 
psychological variables, including value orientations (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 2006), 
optimism (Fischer & Chalmers, 2008), achievement motivation (Dekker & Fischer, 
2008; Maehr & Nicholls, 1980), personality (van Hemert, van de Vijver, Poortinga, & 
Georgas, 2002), subjective well-being (Diener, et al., 1995) or organizational 
commitment (Fischer & Mansell, in press). However, the theoretical explanations for 
these consistent relationships are often more difficult to determine. This certainly 
requires more research to understand why affordances, associated with economic 
development, change moral judgments. However, it is noteworthy that values and socio-
economic development together explained almost three-quarter of the between-country 
variance, with the cultural value orientation Autonomy/ Embeddedness adding some 
incremental validity to the prediction of moral attitude.  
Third, the larger part of the total variance (more than 75%) was within countries- 
for both personal-sexual and dishonest-illegal issues. I found that age, religiosity and 
gender were related to stricter moral judgments towards both dishonest-illegal and 
personal-sexual issues. Interestingly, the association between gender and moral attitude 
depended on the moral domain: men were more tolerant towards dishonest-illegal 
issues, whereas women showed more tolerance towards personal-sexual issues. 
Regarding dishonest-illegal issues, the result may reflect sex differences in both 
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tolerance and engagement in deviant behaviour which have been found in past studies 
(see Kaplan & Johnson, 2001). Concerning the personal-sexual domain, it may be that 
some of the items (e.g. abortion) that are specific to female issues are judged in a more 
lenient way by women, since more reasons are accessible to them under which this 
behaviour may be justifiable. A similar asymmetric pattern of association emerged with 
income and moral attitudes: individuals with higher income were more liberal in their 
attitude towards personal-sexual issues supporting past findings in which single items of 
the scale have been analysed (e.g. Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Yet, for dishonest-illegal 
issues, I found that individuals with lower income were more tolerant. Furthermore, I 
found that right-wing political beliefs were only related to a stricter attitude towards 
personal-sexual issues. However, other individual-level predictors might be more 
important since the five individual-level predictors measured in the ESS/ WVS did not 
explain much of the within-country variance (as little as 4.9% for dishonest-illegal 
issues). Future research could considerably add to our understanding of these kinds of 
moral attitudes by identifying more ‘powerful’ individual-level predictors.  
Fourth, the relationship between individual-level predictors and moral attitudes 
was not the same across countries. I tried to account for these varying slopes with the 
country-level variables and found four highly significant interaction effects across both 
student and teacher scores (see Figure 4.2). A common trend was that individuals in 
egalitarian countries were more tolerant towards personal-sexual and dishonest-illegal 
issues than individuals in hierarchical countries, when their level of religiosity and their 
income was low. Yet, with increasing income and religiosity they exhibited stricter 
moral judgments than individuals in hierarchical countries. An explanation could be that 
individuals in egalitarian societies are more free to develop and express lenient personal 
attitudes than individuals in hierarchical countries. However, religiosity seems then to 
compensate for the lenient cultural context. In hierarchical countries, right and wrong 
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may already be prescribed by society so that there is only little scope left for religion to 
have much of an impact on individuals’ attitudes.  
The last cross-level interaction effect concerns income and dishonest-illegal 
issues: Individuals in Mastery-oriented countries showed more tolerance towards these 
behaviours than individuals in Harmony-oriented countries when their income was low. 
With increasing income, however, this relationship reversed. As Mastery values stand 
for ambition and success (Schwartz, 2006), it may be that individuals with low income 
regard minor rule breaking and free-riding as a legitimate way to achieve their goals or 
as a way to compensate for an unjust social system that is to their disadvantage. With 
increasing income they are more likely to be the ones who are negatively affected by 
behaviours that challenge the social system and their position within it (through, for 
example, free-riding), and hence they show less tolerance towards these behaviours. 
Individuals in Harmony cultures, on the contrary, try to accept others as they are, rather 
than to change or direct (Schwartz, 2006) which may also make them more lenient in 
their moral judgments and this is not much affected by their income.  
 
Limitations 
This study also has some limitations that need to be considered when evaluating 
the results. I obtained data from the EVS/ WVS from 1981 to 2004 (except for 1985-
1988 which was not surveyed). Hence, individuals answered the survey during different 
decades which I did not take into account in the analyses. For example, I did not 
examine to what extent there may have been a change in attitudes within countries 
across different time periods. In a similar vein, I aggregated Schwartz’ data on cultural 
values which was gathered from 1988 to 2002. However, in the case of values, 
Schwartz’ stated that they are relatively stable across time (see Schwartz, 2006). A 
similar argument may be used for moral attitudes if they are regarded as influenced by 
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cultural values. Since my focus in this study was on cross-national differences and not 
on attitude change over time, I did not take into account the time factor, but aimed at 
obtaining an extensive cross-national dataset by combining data across different time 
periods. Nevertheless, future research may look more specifically into value change 
over time and how it may affect moral attitudes. Another related limitation is that I 
analyzed the data in a cross-sectional fashion by averaging data points across different 
time periods. Therefore, I cannot draw conclusions on causality. Nevertheless, I have a 
strong theoretical argument to suggest that values as the more general concept influence 
the more specific concept of attitudes. Future research on moral attitudes should 
conduct longitudinal analyses cross-culturally to examine the causal relationships.  
Another limitation is that the distinction between dishonest-illegal and personal-
sexual behaviours may in some cases be an artificial one. Consider the case of 
polygamy in Islam. Similarly to the item ‘divorce’, which I found to belong to the 
‘personal-sexual’ factor, polygamy has something to do with marriage and could fall 
under ‘personal-sexual’ behaviours. Islamic countries, which tend to show an 
Embeddedness value orientation, should exhibit stricter judgments towards polygamy 
than countries emphasizing Autonomy, such as Western countries. However, we know 
that under Islamic law polygamy is allowed, whereas in many Western countries it is 
prohibited which renders it at the same time a behaviour that falls under the ‘dishonest-
illegal’ category in these countries. Hence, counter-examples may be found that 
contradict my results. I would like to emphasize at this point that the findings must be 
understood in the context of the items that have been assessed. Nevertheless, in regard 
to these items I am confident that they are cross-culturally comparable which I 
demonstrated with the test of equivalence.  
Eventually, I would like to point out that I did not use all items of the MDBS as 
they were not constantly employed across all time waves and countries in the EVS/ 
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WVS. It may be interesting to examine whether, besides the issues of fairness and 
matters of life and death, there are also other moral domains. The scale contains, for 
example, items on environmental behaviour and medical ethics such as experiments 
with embryos. Future research may examine whether attitudes towards these issues are 
comparable (or equivalent respectively) across a selection of countries and whether 
there are any cross-cultural similarities or differences.  
 
Conclusion 
The present study has demonstrated that individualistic and collectivistic values 
do predict moral attitudes in the domain of individual choices of life and death issues. 
While cross-cultural theorists have criticised that the value orientation individualism/ 
collectivism (or Autonomy/ Embeddedness respectively) is a ‘catchall’ explanation for 
any observed differences (e.g. Brewer & Chen, 2007; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Poortinga, 
2003), I demonstrated that this dimension has its limits. Here I provided some evidence 
for its discriminant validity, i.e. it does not relate strongly to moral issues concerning 
dishonest and illegal behaviours. I also have shed light on the moral universalism- 
relativism debate by separating morality into the issues of fairness/ social cooperation, 
which I found to be judged in a nearly universal way, and the concept of individual 
rights which I found to be influenced by cultural models of the self. Hence, I showed 
that there are both universal and idiosyncratic aspects of morality across cultures. By 
adopting a multilevel approach, in which I considered both contextual and individual 
variation in moral attitudes, I believe that I contributed to research investigating 
important social and moral issues in a global context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY 3 
 
Identifying Cultural Differences and Similarities through the 
Explicit Measurement of Moral Values  
 
Introduction  
Values are widely seen as one of the core aspects of culture (e.g. Triandis, 2001; 
Schwartz, 1994, 2006). Cultural value priorities can be investigated by examining the  
value hierarchies of cultural groups. A culture’ s value hierarchy reflects the normative 
preference of certain life principles (Wan, Chiu, Peng, et al., 2007). Cultural value 
hierarchies have typically been measured by asking individuals about their personal 
values (self-importance ratings) and statistically aggregating the responses at the 
culture-level (see Schwartz, 1994). In chapter two, I argued that deriving cultural values 
from self-importance ratings leads to important conceptual and methodological issues. 
There are dynamic negotiations among individuals who share a culture, which is not 
reflected in the statistical aggregation of personal values (cf. Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 
2007). There is in particular the issue that the actual self-importance of values does not 
take into account the inherently social function of cultural values. An important social 
function of culture is to guide members of a group in their behaviour and aspirations, so 
that collective life is organized and operates smoothly. From this perspective, culture 
draws boundaries on what is accepted, appropriate and socially desirable. Culture can 
then be regarded as inherently related to what is regarded as right or wrong or to a 
‘prescriptive’ morality which stipulates what one should do. 
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Theorists in moral psychology have already pointed out that culture and morality 
share an intricate and intimate relationship and that it is even difficult to delineate where 
culture ends and morality begins (e.g. Eckensberger, 2007; Miller, 2001). Hence, 
knowing what kind of moral values are prioritized in different cultures can provide an 
important insight into cultural differences.  
The approach taken here regards culture as a product of collective processes 
rather than a mere aggregate of individuals’ personal characteristics (see also Wan, et 
al., 2007). The critique on previous operationalizations of cultural values is not targeted 
at the statistical aggregation of group data as such, as this is a necessary procedure to 
derive macro-level data (cf. Liska, 1990) and will also be employed in the present study. 
Rather, the critique is targeted at what exactly is aggregated to derive cultural variables. 
The point has been made in chapter two that measuring values as personal moral values 
or societal expectations captures what is prescriptive in a certain culture and is therefore 
closer to the definition of culture as exerting a “guidance function” (Baldwin, et al., 
2006, p. 38) to organize collective life (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). Nevertheless, 
Study 2 in this thesis has demonstrated that cultural values based on personal 
importance ratings performed well in the prediction of individuals’ moral attitudes. Any 
new proposed measures of cultural values must then perform equally well within this 
research context or add incremental validity over and above aggregated importance 
ratings. The present study is targeted at answering this question by examining which 
values of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1992) are personal moral values 
and societal expectations across different cultures.  
Furthermore, the aim in this study is to examine values as predictors at the 
individual- and the culture-level. A direct comparison of values at both levels of 
analysis requires using the same value types, i.e., it involves equating the individual- 
and culture-level value types. This practice has commonly been considered as a fallacy 
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(e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Nevertheless, there are a number of cases in 
which Schwartz’ individual-level value types have been used to describe cultures 
theoretically (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997) and empirically (Lönnqvist, et al., 2009; Verkasalo, et 
al., 2009). Since it is not appropriate to apply culture-level constructs to individuals 
(Hofstede, 1980), I will follow previous research and apply individual-level constructs 
at the culture-level. This approach will allow me to investigate the unique contribution 
of values at the culture-level after controlling for values at the individual-level in the 
prediction of the dependent variable. 
In the course of exploring and analyzing new value measures assessing 
prescriptive beliefs at the individual- and culture-level, a number of additional questions 
are answered such as: To what extent do the different value measures yield indeed 
convergent or divergent results? Do the proposed value measures capture cultural 
differences consistent with the most prominent cultural distinctions, i.e. the 
individualism/ collectivism dimension? To the best of my knowledge, this study is the 
first to assess which values from the SVS are regarded as prescriptive in different 
cultures.  
 
An Alternative Value Measure 
Chapter two provided an outline of how values may be measured by capturing 
their prescriptive aspect. It was suggested that there are two classes of prescriptive 
values: (1) those that have been internalized and are highly relevant to the individuals’ 
self-concept, called ‘personal-moral’ values, and (2) those that are perceived as societal 
expectations. These values may be measured through the SVS by simply adapting the 
response scale to the respective content. Hence, societal expectations may be measured 
by asking individuals to what extent they believe they are expected to strive for the 
respective value in their society versus to what extent it is their free choice to strive for 
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it. A similar response format and content has already been proposed for the 
measurement of social norms (cf. Aijzen, 1991; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; Schwartz & 
Tessler, 1972). Societal expectation ratings should elicit cultural variation since they 
assess what is prescriptive in a given society, which varies from society to society (cf. 
Haidt, 2001; Shweder, et al., 1997). In Kohlberg’s (1984) terms, societal expectations 
would belong to the social conventional domain, however, consistent with cultural 
theories in moral psychology (Haidt, 2001; Miller, et al., 1990; Shweder, et al., 1997), 
social conventions are here regarded as part of the moral domain.     
In the case of personal moral values, individuals can be asked to rate each value 
on a response scale indicating to what extent they believe the value is a moral value. 
This item possesses face validity as an assessment of personal moral values. However, 
since the term ‘moral’ is somewhat abstract, ambiguous even among experts (see 
introduction of this thesis) and may be understood differently depending on the 
layperson’s conception of morality, further response scales tapping into the realm of 
moral values are worthwhile to explore. Another possible response scale related to 
morality is the question of how right or wrong it is to strive for a certain value. The 
terms right and wrong are strongly associated with the concept of morality. In the 
literature, they are used in an interchangeable fashion (cf. Wierzbicka, 2007). Hence, if 
individuals are asked about which values are right or wrong, their responses should be a 
reflection of their moral beliefs. Nevertheless, cross-cultural linguists have also pointed 
out the difficulty of translating the English meaning of right and wrong into other 
languages. Wierzbicka (2006), for instance, suggested that right and wrong possesses a 
unique meaning in the English language. She found that only the evaluation of good and 
bad was universal in cross-cultural studies. It seems that in all languages and cultures 
people distinguish between ‘doing something bad’ and ‘doing something good’ (for 
more details, see Wierzbicka, 2001). Because of the controversy whether the widely 
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established term right and wrong in the Anglophone literature on morality would hold 
the same meaning for laypeople in different cultures, an additional response scale 
defined by the poles good and bad is worthwhile to look at when assessing personal 
moral values.  
 
Which Values May Be Moral Values? Examining Value Hierarchies 
Group-based value hierarchies are particularly interesting for cross-cultural 
research, because they indicate the normative preferences of life principles in the 
respective cultures (Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007). A common strategy to identify the 
core values of a cultural group is to measure its member’s personal values and to 
compute the sample means on the surveyed values in order to infer the value importance 
hierarchy of the culture (Wan, Chiu, Peng, et al., 2007). “The values that most members 
of the culture strongly endorse indicate what the culture’s core values are” (Wan, Chiu, 
Peng, et al., 2007, p. 213). An intriguing question in regard to alternative value 
measures is whether they produce similar or different value hierarchies compared to the 
conventional importance ratings. Schwartz and Bardi (2001) found, for instance, that the 
pan-cultural value hierarchy of personal values based on students’ responses from 54 
nations consisted of the following rank order: benevolence, self-direction, universalism, 
achievement, security, conformity, hedonism, stimulation, tradition and power values. 
Hence, any assessment of personal values (importance ratings) should elicit a similar 
rank order of value types. However, the rank order may be different when personal 
moral values or societal expectations are assessed.  
Personal moral values that rank highest may be those that have commonly be 
regarded as related to morality by philosophers, social scientists and laypeople alike 
because they are concerned with actions that affect the welfare of others (e.g. Helkama, 
2004; Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1984). Helkama (2004) recently suggested that the main 
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functions of morality lie in moral problem-solving (resolving value conflicts and issues 
of justice), promotion of prosocial actions and control of antisocial action (resistance to 
temptation). He pointed out that these main functions roughly correspond to Schwartz’ 
(1992) value types of universalism, benevolence and conformity/ tradition. Empirical 
research seems to corroborate the linkage between morality and the endorsement of 
certain value types. For instance, individuals who strongly endorse universalism and 
benevolence values describe themselves as more empathetic (see Helkama, 2004 for a 
review) which is an important individual-level variable for morality (see Eisenberg, 
2000). Further empirical support comes also from a preliminary mono-cultural study 
conducted by Schwartz (2007b). He presented the SVS to 100 Israeli adults and asked 
them to indicate which of the values they consider as moral values. More than 70% of 
them labelled all or most of the values falling into the value types universalism, 
benevolence, conformity, tradition and security as moral values. Hence, when personal 
moral values are assessed, the highest ranking value types may be of the self-
transcendence and conservation kind.  
However, there may also be some cultural variation, which can be even more 
pronounced when values are assessed as societal expectations. Shweder et al. (1997) 
proposed a taxonomy called the big three of morality: the ethics of Autonomy, 
Community, and Divinity. Western societies tend to endorse an ethic of Autonomy with 
a focus on harm, rights and justice, whereas non-Western societies tend to emphasize an 
ethic of Community with a focus on duty, respect, obedience to authority and 
conformity to social role expectations (see also Haidt, et al., 1993). More recently, Haidt 
and colleagues refined this taxonomy by proposing the Moral Foundation Theory (Haidt 
& Graham, 2006; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) which posits that there are five sets of moral 
intuitions: harm/ care, fairness/ reciprocity, ingroup/ loyalty, authority/ respect, and 
purity/ sanctity. The first two moral foundations are referred to as the individualizing 
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foundations, because the source of the moral intuitions is seen in an emphasis on the 
rights and welfare of individuals (Graham, et al., 2009). The latter three are referred to 
as the binding foundations, because the source of the moral intuitions are seen in an 
emphasis on group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control. This individualizing versus 
binding foundation resembles strongly the individualism versus collectivism distinction 
in the cross-cultural literature. Hence, one would expect to find the individualism and 
collectivism distinction mirrored in the moral values of different cultures.  
Graham et al. (2009) drew parallels between their Moral Foundation Theory 
and Schwartz’ (1992) list of ten value types as well as Shweder et al.’s (1997) three 
ethics: the self-transcendence quadrant of Schwartz’ multidimensional plot of values 
relates to the harm and fairness foundations and is also similar to the ethic of 
Autonomy. The adjacent conservation quadrant is related to ingroup, authority, and 
purity and parallels the ethic of Community and Divinity. They also indicate that Moral 
Foundation Theory does not offer an exhaustive taxonomy and that, for example, 
Schwartz’ value types of achievement and hedonism may point to additional 
psychological mechanisms that support some moral systems. It could be that openness-
to-change values, with their focus on independence and autonomy, belong to an 
additional moral value cluster. Hence, self-transcendence and openness-to-change 
values, with their general focus on fairness and justice as well as the individual’s 
autonomy, may be very salient as societal expectations in individualistic cultures. On 
the other hand, conservation values, with their focus on fitting into the community and 
conforming to group-expectations, may be more salient in collectivistic cultures. This 
has not been empirically investigated before and the analysis will therefore be 
exploratory. If cultural differences emerged for these prescriptive values and in line 
with cultural theories on morality and individualism and collectivism, then they would 
support the utility of this value construct as a measure of the cultural context.  
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Cultural Values and Individuals’ Moral Attitudes 
In order to empirically test the proposed value measures as an assessment of the 
cultural context, I examined them in their validity as predictors of individuals’ moral 
attitudes. Study 2 showed that cultural values accounted for individuals’ attitudes 
towards personal-sexual behaviours. Hence, these kinds of attitudes were again 
examined in the present study. The items for assessing individuals’ moral attitudes 
towards personal-sexual behaviour were derived from the Morally Debatable Behaviour 
Scale (MDBS, Harding & Phillips, 1986) which has already been introduced in Study 2. 
The original response scale assesses the justifiability of various behaviours (e.g. 
abortion, divorce, prostitution) ranging from 1 (‘behaviour is never justified’) to 10 
(‘behaviour is always justified’). It may be argued that this kind of response scale 
measures a form of moral reasoning, defined as the “conscious mental activity that 
consists of transforming given information about people in order to reach a moral 
judgment” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). By ‘conscious’, it is meant that the process is 
intentional, effortful and controllable and the person is aware that it is going on. Hence, 
if provided with an item on “abortion”, for instance, and a response scale eliciting to 
what extent this act is justifiable, individuals may start thinking about reasons under 
which the behaviour may indeed be justifiable (e.g. an abortion may be seen as 
justifiable if it posits a health risk for the mother). Since, for almost all items there may 
always be reasons found under which the behaviour in question becomes justifiable, if 
one thinks about it long enough, the answers to the scale become rather a matter of 
competence in moral reasoning than an assessment of moral attitude per se. For the 
present study, it was considered preferable to measure moral attitudes by eliciting 
spontaneous moral judgments (cf. Haidt, 2001). Moral judgments may be defined as 
evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with 
respect to a set of values regarded as prescriptive in a culture or subculture (Haidt, 
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2001). Hence, the opportunity was taken in the present study to change the original 
response scale from asking for the justifiability of behaviours to asking for the 
wrongness of the respective behaviours. Note that degrees of ‘wrongness’ as a response 
scale has already been employed in the Moral Behavior Scale (Crissman, 1942) which is 
a forerunner of the MDBS (see also studies by Bovasso, et al., 1991; Consalvi, 1971).  
Theories regarding how cultural conceptions of the self may influence 
individuals’ attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviours have already been discussed 
in chapter three. A cultural orientation towards the community (Chiu, et al., 1997; 
Shweder, et al., 1997) goes hand in hand with a restriction of personal choices and 
should be expressed in a relatively strict attitude towards personal-sexual behaviours. 
On the other hand a cultural orientation which focuses on the individual is accompanied 
by an emphasis on the individual’s needs and well-being and should be expressed in a 
more lenient attitude towards these issues. Study 2 empirically confirmed these 
predictions using a multi-level model with Schwartz’ cultural value dimension 
Autonomy vs. Embeddedness as a predictor of individuals’ moral attitudes. The central 
research question of the present study was: Do the new measures of values predict 
individuals’ moral attitudes in the same way as personal importance ratings of values? 
And do values at the culture-level still add explained variance when values at the 
individual-level are controlled for?  
Guided by the results in Study 2, the focus is on examining values that assess a 
form of individualistic and collectivistic value orientation such as Autonomy and 
Embeddedness. Kağıtçıbaşı (1997) theoretically equated Schwartz’ higher order value 
orientation openness-to-change versus conservation to Hofstede’s (1980) culture-level 
dimension individualism versus collectivism, which is conceptually very similar to 
Schwartz’ Autonomy-Embeddedness dimension (see e.g., Gouveia & Ros, 2000). 
Hence, I expected that the aggregated personal importance of openness-to-change vs. 
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conservation would also predict individuals’ moral attitudes. A cultural emphasis on 
openness-to-change should be related to a more lenient moral attitude. I also expected 
that openness-to-change vs. conservation rated as personal moral values and societal 
moral values should likewise be related to individuals’ moral attitudes. Moreover, these 
value measures should add explained variance over and above personal value ratings 
since they directly assess the values that are regarded as prescriptive in a certain cultural 
group. Furthermore, the same predictive relationship was expected for values analyzed 
at the individual-level; however, value ratings at the culture-level should add 
incremental validity to the prediction of individuals’ moral attitudes.  
 
Sampling of Cultures 
Since the exploration of cultural differences and similarities was the focus of the 
present study, a ‘systematic sampling’ was aimed for (cf. van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
Cultural groups were selected from different ends along the individualism-collectivism 
continuum (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). This bipolar value orientation is the most 
important of all cultural dimensions and has been widely used for comparing human 
values across cultures (see e.g. Gouveia & Ros, 2000; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Triandis, 
1995; Triandis, 2001). The reason for using the individualism-collectivism dimension as 
a sampling criterium was as follows: If the sampled cultural groups showed the 
expected similarities and differences in the proposed measures of values according to 
the individualism-collectivism distinction, it would indicate that the new measures 
converged with one of the most prominent distinctions of cultures corroborating their 
validity as a measure of culture.   
At the same time, this research relied on collaborators from different countries 
who were willing and able to gather data at their universities. A collaborative network 
was established that allowed selecting four cultures that have been regarded as 
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individualistic-oriented in the cross-cultural literature - namely Germany, Finland, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom - and five cultures that tend to be categorized as more 
collectivistic - namely Brazil, India, Japan, Turkey and the Philippines (Hofstede, 1980; 
Schwartz, 2006b; Triandis, 2001). Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of these cultural 
samples along Schwartz’ (2006) Autonomy-Embeddedness dimension which is 
conceptually related to individualism-collectivism (Inglehart, 2006; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997). 
The selected individualistic samples are more centered at the Autonomy pole of the 
value orientation, whereas the collectivistic samples tend to be more spread along this 
dimension, but still cluster towards the Embeddedness pole.  
A rule of thumb in cross-cultural studies is that the greater the number of 
cultures employed that can be ordered along a dimension, the more rival explanations 
can be ruled out for the phenomenon studied (Campbell, 1986). As a consequence, the 
conclusion that the observed differences between cultures can be explained with the 
theoretical dimension of interest is more convincing (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
Taking this into consideration, the sampling procedure employed in this study should 
fulfill this requirement. For instance, all sampled countries - regardless of whether they 
are characterized as individualistic or collectivistic - are located in geographically very 
different regions (Asia, Europe, Middle East, Oceania, and South America). If 
differences are found between the individualistic and collectivistic countries, that they 
are due to geographical distance can be ruled out, because almost all samples are 
located in very different regions. Furthermore, the collectivistic samples differed in 
terms of the predominant religion in their countries. According to the CIA World 
Factbook
15
, the Philippines and Brazil are predominantly Christian countries. The main 
religion in Turkey is Islam, in India it is Hindu and in Japan it is Shinto and Buddhism. 
The individualistic samples were all from predominantly Christian countries. In terms of 
                                               
15
 Retrieved June 2009, from  https://www.cia.gov/index.html   
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social and economic development, the human development report
16
 indicates that 
among the highest ranking countries on the human development index (HDI) are both 
individualistic and collectivistic countries (Japan, Finland, New Zealand, U.K., 
Germany and Brazil). Turkey, India and the Philippines are classified as countries with 
medium human development.  
 
 
                                               
16
Retrieved June 2009, from  http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/   
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Figure 5.1: Co-plot map of 67 national groups on the value dimension Autonomy-Embeddedness (adapted from Schwartz, 2006). 
Note. Countries in bold and underlined were selected for the present study . 
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Method 
Participants  
Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Victoria University of 
Wellington Human Ethics Committee. The author collected data in New Zealand in 
2007. Collaborators in eight different countries (Brazil, Finland, Germany, India, Japan, 
the Philippines, Turkey and the United Kingdom) collected data at their universities 
between 2007 and 2009. The sample target was a total of at least 100 students 
preferably from the social sciences, with men and women equally balanced if possible. 
The sample from India had an insufficient number of participants, and thus, was 
excluded from the analysis. A total of 1,535 university students, predominantly with a 
major in social sciences, participated in this study. Respondents were only included in 
the analysis if they identified with the country of residence as assessed in the survey, 
reducing the total number of individuals to 1,456 (see Table 5.1 for more details on 
sample characteristics). Total sample size in each cultural group varied from 108 (U.K.) 
to 293 (Brazil). Even though a gender and age balance was aimed for in each cultural 
group, there were significant differences in the percentages of females (² (7) = 24.01, p 
< .001) and the average age (F (7, 1401) = 52.00, p < .001). The Finnish sample showed 
the highest percentage of females (79.6%) and the Turkish sample the lowest (57.0%). 
Females were the majority in all cultural groups and made up 68% of the total sample. 
Respondents’ average age was highest in Brazil (M = 27.35, SD = 8.96) and lowest in 
the Philippines (M = 20.24, SD = 1.41). The mean age of the total sample was 23.62 
(SD = 6.02). 
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Table 5.1: Sample characteristics of Study 3. 
  Total   Version 1   Version 2 
Country N 
Female 




(%)   N 
Female 




(%)   N 
Female 





Brazil  293 71 27.35 (8.96) 66  141 67 27.20 (9.11) 58  152 74 27.50 (8.85) 75 
Finland  147 80 24.93 (5.00) 87  74 81 25.14 (4.74) 86  73 78 24.72 (5.29) 88 
Germany  169 76 26.68 (6.24) 67  68 75 26.92 (6.54) 64  101 76 26.52 (6.06) 69 
Japan  197 63 21.05 (1.68) 100  100 63 21.63 (1.70) 100  97 63 20.45 (1.44) 100 
New Zealand  175 66 23.69 (5.98) 72  88 73 23.13 (5.30) 78  87 59 24.27 (6.60) 66 
The Philippines 186 71 20.24 (1.41) 83  97 73 20.14 (1.22) 81  89 70 20.35 (1.59) 86 
Turkey  181 57 21.28 (1.69) 37  70 50 21.56 (1.74) 42  111 64 21.11 (1.65) 32 
U.K.  108 62 21.28 (2.62) 73  57 45 20.90 (1.46) 45  51 78 21.70 (3.46) 100 
Totals 1,456 68 23.62 (6.02) 73   695 66 23.57 (5.91) 69   761 70 23.66 (6.12)  77 
Note. SD denotes ‘standard deviation’. Version 1 and Version 2 refer to the version of the survey containing different sets of Schwartz’ values.  
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Procedure 
The majority of university students participated in the study to receive credits as 
part of a research participation requirement or an in-class exercise. Collaborators 
ensured that participants completed the survey silently and independently. Respondents 
from the U.K. completed the survey online.  
The survey contained the 45 values that Schwartz recommended for cross-
cultural comparisons (Schwartz, 1994, 2006). The aim was to elicit ratings of each value 
on different response scales assessing the personal, moral and societal relevance of the 
values. A total of five different response scales for each value were constructed for this 
purpose. This means that by using all 45 values, participants would have needed to 
make 225 value ratings. To minimize participants’ fatigue on this rather tedious task, 
the value survey was split into two versions. Versions 1 and 2 contained 22 and 23 
value items respectively. Values were randomly selected from each of Schwartz’ 10 
motivational value types ensuring that all value types were represented in each version 
by an approximately equal number of values. Table 5.2 shows which values were 
included in which version of the questionnaire. Value items were presented in 
alphabetical order in the survey. Translations of the survey into other languages retained 
the value order of the English version.  
The two versions were distributed randomly to the students. Regarding the age 
of participants, there was no significant interaction effect between cultural sample and 
version of the survey (F (7, 1393) = .84, p > .05). There were neither differences 
between the cultural sample and number of respondents per version (² (7) = 13.92, p > 
.05) nor the percentage of females per version (² (7) = 11.42, p > .05). See Table 5.1 
for a summary of participants’ characteristics completing the different versions of the 
survey.  
Chapter five: An explicit measure of moral values 
 - 166 - 
The instruction encouraged participants to answer the value section as quickly as 
possibly to elicit spontaneous and intuitive ratings of the values. It took about 30 
minutes on average to complete the survey. 
 
Table 5.2: Values included in Version 1 and Version 2 of  the Moral Values Survey. 













1. A world of 
beauty 





TR CONS  A world at peace UN STRAN 
3. Ambitious AC SENH  Capable AC SENH 
4. An exciting 
life 
ST OPCH  Creativity SD OPCH 
5. Authority PO SENH  Curious SD OPCH 
6. Broadminded UN STRAN  Devout TR CONS 
7. Choosing 
own goals 
SD OPCH  Enjoying life HE OPCH 
8. Clean SE CONS  Family security SE CONS 
9. Daring ST OPCH  Forgiving BE STRAN 
10. Equality UN STRAN  Freedom SD OPCH 
11. Helpful BE STRAN  Humble TR CONS 
12. Honest BE STRAN  Influential AC SENH 
13. Honouring 
parents 
CO CONS  Loyal BE STRAN 
14. Independent SD OPCH  National security SE CONS 
15. Moderate TR CONS  Obedient CO CONS 
16. Pleasure HE OPCH  Polite CO CONS 
17. Reciprocation 
of favours 
SE CONS  Preserving my 
public image 
PO SENH 
18. Respect for 
tradition 





CO CONS  Responsible BE STRAN 
21. Social justice UN STRAN  Social order SE CONS 
22. Successful AC SENH  Social power PO SENH 
23. Wealth PO SENH  Unity with nature UN STRAN 
24. - - -  Wisdom UN STRAN 
Note. Values are in alphabetical order as they appeared in the English version of the survey. UN = 
Universalism, BE = Benevolence, TR = Tradition, CO = Conformity, SE = Security, ST = Stimulation, 
HE = Hedonism, AC = Achievement, PO = Power, SD = Self-direction. STRAN = Self-transcendence, 
CONS = Conservation, OPCH = Openness to change, SENH = Self-enhancement.  
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Questionnaire 
Individual-level Measures 
Personal values. Schwartz (1992, 2007a) developed a 58 item value measure to 
assess the “personal” importance of values as guiding principles in people’s life. Each 
value is followed by a defining phrase that further clarifies the meaning of the value. 
The personal importance ratings of values are elicited by instructing individuals to 
indicate “What values are important to ME as guiding principles in MY life?” The 
rating scale is composed of a 9-point Likert scale with the following labels: opposed to 
my values (-1), not important (0), (unlabeled; 2, 1), important (3), (unlabeled; 5, 4), 
very important (6) of supreme importance (7). Schwartz chose this asymmetric 
response scale with the reasoning that values are typically viewed as positive entities, 
usually ranging from somewhat to very important.  
In the present study, only those 45 value items were used that Schwartz (1994, 
2006) recommended for cross-cultural comparisons. The original response scale was 
changed into a 7-point bipolar scale defined by opposite poles (cf. Osgood, et al., 1957). 
This was done because values have been described as bipolar (Rokeach, 1973) and in 
order to match it to moral value ratings which were elicited with bipolar response scales 
(e.g. right vs. wrong). The bipolar anchors for the measurement of personal values were 
important to me and unimportant to me (IMP). The range of the scale was not 
numbered, but specified by the following qualitative labels (scale points for 
computation in brackets): extremely (1, 7), quite, (2, 6), slightly (3, 5) and neither one 
nor the other/ both equally (4) (see also Figure 5.2).  
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… important to me        … unimportant to me 
… something that I am 
expected to strive for in my 
society 
       
… something that is my free 
choice to strive for in my 
society 
... a moral value to me         … an immoral value to me 
… something bad to follow        … something good to follow 
… the right thing to strive for        … the wrong thing to strive for 
 
Figure 5.2: Example of bipolar rating scales measuring five different evaluations of 
values. 
Note. For the present analysis all response scales were recoded, except for ‘bad vs. good’ ratings. 
 
In addition to ratings assessing the personal preferences of values, several 
additional 7-point bipolar response scales were constructed to elicit answers on the 
moral relevance of value items. Following the value terminology put forward in chapter 
two of this thesis, the following moral values were operationalized.   
Personal moral values. In order to measure personal moral values, individuals 
were asked to rate each value on a bipolar response scale ranging from extremely 
immoral to me to extremely moral to me (MOR). Because of the ambiguity of the term 
‘moral’ as pointed out in the introduction, two further bipolar response scales were 
constructed: (1) the right thing vs. the wrong thing to strive for (RIGHT), and (2) 
something bad vs. something good to follow (GOOD).  
Societal moral values. These kinds of values were measured by asking 
individuals on a bipolar response scale to what extent they believed that they are 
expected to strive for the value in question in their society, versus to what extent it is 
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their free choice to strive for it (EXP). This can be regarded as a direct measurement of 
the “cultural press” (Smith & Schwartz, 1997, p. 111) to which people feel they are 
exposed.  
 Individuals were asked to rate each value on all five response scales. Figure 5.2 
shows an example of the employed rating scales for the value “helpful” (see also 
Appendix C for the whole questionnaire). For all response scales, contextual cues were 
included where it was appropriate. For instance, the expectation response scale may 
refer to expectations of family, co-workers, friends and whatever relevant social group 
comes to mind. Including the contextual cue of ‘societal expectations’ ensures that 
individuals employ the same ‘frame of reference’ (cf. Lievens, De Corte, & Schollaert, 
2008) when answering the value items. Prior to data collection, the response scales had 
been discussed in individual sessions with respondents from a culturally diverse 
background in regard to their comprehensibility. They were modified in their wording if 
necessary.   
Moral attitudes. Items assessing individuals’ moral attitudes were obtained from 
the Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale (MDBS, Harding & Phillips, 1986). Study 2 in 
chapter three of this thesis has already shown that there are pronounced cultural 
differences in attitudes towards matters of life and death, labelled as personal-sexual 
issues. Hence, the same items that were used in Study 2 to assess these moral attitudes 
were included in the present survey. The response scale assessed the ‘wrongness’ of the 
respective behaviours and ranged from not wrong at all (1) to extremely wrong (5) (see 
also Appendix C).  
Demographic Variables. The questionnaire also included the usual set of 
demographic questions (e.g. age and gender). Respondents were also asked to rate their 
religiosity on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘not important’ to 5 = ‘very 
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important’. Their political orientation was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 = ‘extremely liberal’ to 5 = ‘extremely conservative’. 
 
Translation 
The questionnaire was developed in English. Since the value items came from 
the SVS which has been translated into 47 languages (Schwartz, 2006a), established 
translations were used for them. Translations of the Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale 
were obtained from the World Value Survey webpage
17
. The English version of the 
remaining parts of the questionnaire was translated into German and Portuguese by the 
author and its accuracy was verified with at least one other bilingual colleague. 
Collaborators from Finland, Japan and Turkey translated the survey into the local 
language. For all translations a ‘committee approach’ was employed in which the 
translation was discussed within a group of bilinguals (Harkness, 2003). The Filipino 
sample received the English version, since English is one of the official languages in the 
Philippines.  
 
Culture-level Value Measures 
Personal values (IMP ratings), personal moral values (RIGHT, GOOD, MORal 
ratings) and societal moral values (EXPectation ratings) were aggregated at the culture-
level to obtain a measure of these values from each cultural sample. This was done by 
computing the cultural sample means of each value item rated on the respective 
response scale.  
 
                                               
17
 Retrieved October 2008, from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  
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 Analytical Strategy 
Data Screening 
The value part of the survey was screened first for univariate outliers and then 
for missing values. The value survey contained a relatively large number of items due to 
the fact that each value was rated on five different response scales. Some of the 
response scales were phrased reversely to counteract possible response tendencies to 
rate every item in a similar fashion. It was anticipated that during this cognitively 
demanding task, participants might make mistakes by confusing the poles of the rating 
scales. If so, these responses should be detectable as univariate outliers. Outliers are 
observations that show an unusually high or low value on a variable that make the 
observation stand out from the others (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
They distort statistics and lead to Type I and Type II errors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Univariate outliers defined as exceeding 2.5 standard scores (cf. Hair, et al., p. 
75) were removed from the analysis on a pairwise basis. Across all value items, these 




Schwartz (2007a) highly recommended dropping respondents from the analysis 
who show too many missing values. Hence, participants with more than 30% of value 
responses missing were excluded listwise. They constituted 3.5% of the total sample. 
Loss of cases to an extent of less than 5% due to missing data can be regarded as small 
(cf. Graham, 2009).    
 
                                               
18
 Preliminary analyses using multidimensional scaling on the cultural value type hierarchies (Version 1 
of the survey) showed that the results plotted in a two-dimensional space were very similar with and 
without outliers. Pearson correlations between the two solutions were .98 (for dimension 1) and .86 (for 
dimension 2).  
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Reliabilities  
A preliminary analysis was conducted to examine whether measures assessing 
values and moral attitudes have satisfying psychometric properties in all samples.   
Values. The primary interest lay in examining whether Schwartz’ value items 
possessed adequate internal consistencies across cultural samples and response scales. 
Hence, reliability indices were computed by averaging across value types and value 
orientations respectively. This was done for each version separately.  
Schwartz (1992) reported that country-specific reliabilities averaged across 
value types ranged from .67 (in Australia) to .71 (in Israel). He argues that these 
reliabilities are reasonable considering the small number of items in each index. More 
recently, Schwartz (2003) reported reliabilities of a shortened value survey (21 items: 
the Portrait Values Questionnaire, PVQ) employed in the European Social Survey. The 
PVQ is an alternative to the SVS and includes verbal portraits of 40 different people to 
measure personal values in samples less accustomed to abstract and  context-free 
thinking (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001). Preliminary analyses 
of the short version showed that the alpha reliabilities were low (e.g. .49 for self-
direction in a combined U.K. and Netherlands sample), however, it was still possible to 
show that the value types predicted behavior and attitudes systematically (Schwartz, 
2003).  
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is typically lower for short scales (Cortina, 
1993). In these cases it is more appropriate to report the mean inter-item correlation 
(mean r
ij
). Considering that the two value surveys in the present study contained value 
types that did not consist of more than four items (see Table 5.2.), the mean item-
intercorrelation was regarded as a more adequate gauge for assessing their reliabilities. 
The optimal range for mean r
ij
 has been recommended to be between .20 and .40 
(Briggs & Cheek, 1986). Reliabilities of the four higher order value orientations, 
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containing somewhat more value items than the ten value types, were assessed with the 
commonly employed Cronbach alpha. Relatively low reliabilities were still expected 
due to the small number of items ranging from four (self-enhancement) to seven 
(conservation). Based on Schwartz’ (1992, 2003) findings, alphas greater than .50 were 
regarded as acceptable. 
Moral attitudes. The reliability of the moral attitude measure across cultural 
samples was assessed with a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in AMOS 
6. Despite having already evaluated the factor structure of this scale in Study 2 of this 
thesis, there were considerable differences between the previous and the present study: 
the sample of this study consisted of university students only, the response scale had 
been modified, and the focus lay on examining the cross-cultural reliability of the 
personal-sexual factor only.  
Moral attitude items were the same in Version 1 and Version 2 of the present 
survey, therefore, individuals from the same country were grouped together across 
survey versions. This increased the sample size, so that running a multi-group CFA was 
permissible. Similarly to Study 2, missing values were deleted listwise.  
The first step in conducting the CFA consisted of testing the fit of the one-factor 
model in the pooled within-country data. The pooled within-group covariance matrix 
served as data input. This procedure weighs the correlation matrices of each country 
equally so that they have the same influence on the overall matrix (Fontaine & Fischer, 
in press; Muthén, 1994). The results of the pooled within-group CFA provide a general 
picture of the average solution across all countries in terms of model fit and estimated 
regression weights. Errors were not allowed to be correlated in the model. The second 
step consisted of testing cross-cultural equivalence by conducting a multigroup CFA. 
The final aim was to test metric invariance of the scale, i.e. that the factor loadings are 
similar across cultural samples (Chen, 2008; Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). A well-fitting 
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model across samples would justify the computation of a factor mean and therefore its 
use as a dependent variable in subsequent analyses.  
 
Analysis of Value Type Hierarchies  
Mean ratings of the ten value types were computed for the different response 
scales and for all cultural samples. Mean ratings were also computed across all samples 
to obtain a pan-cultural baseline of value endorsement (cf. Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  
The first analysis focused on the pan-cultural findings. The aim was to assess 
whether there are differences and similarities in value hierarchies derived from different 
response scales. Multidimensional scaling (MDS
19
) was conducted for this purpose. 
MDS is a useful alternative to factor analysis for culture-level data (Chinese Culture 
Connection, 1987), since the latter requires a data point to item ratio of 10:1 (Nunnally, 
1978) which is usually not fulfilled with aggregated datasets. The pan-cultural value-
type hierarchies, obtained with different response scales, served as data input.  
The second analysis focused on the culture-specific value ratings. MDS was 
again performed, this time across response scales and cultural groups. The aim was to 
confirm the similarities and differences in response scales even after taking into account 
culture as a variable. Response scales that are located very closely to each other in the 
map indicate highly similar value type hierarchies and are therefore redundant for 
subsequent analyses. Furthermore, this kind of analysis allows identifying similarities 
and differences between cultural samples. It was expected that samples categorized a 
priori as individualistic or collectivistic would cluster together according to this 
distinction.  
 
                                               
19
 See chapter 2, study 1, for more technical details on MDS. 
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Multilevel Regression Analysis 
A multilevel regression analysis was conducted to examine the effect of 
different values (personal values, personal moral values and perceived societal 
expectations) at the individual- and culture-level on individuals’ moral attitudes. 
Similarly to chapter three (Study 3), the interest lay in examining the impact of broad 
cultural dimensions on moral attitudes. Hence, Schwartz’ higher order value 
orientations were taken for this purpose. Only the value orientations openness-to-
change versus conservation were examined, because hypotheses based on cultural 
theories and previous empirical findings (e.g. Study 2, chapter three) were derived only 
for these kinds of values. Country scores for openness-to-change and conservation were 
computed by aggregating the value items at the culture-level and calculating the mean 
of the scores for the items that index the respective higher order value orientation. A 
single country score was then obtained by subtracting the score for conservation 
(negative pole of the bipolar value dimension) from openness-to-change (positive pole 
of the bipolar value dimension). This procedure reduces the likelihood of 
multicollinearity of opposite value types, which are supposed to correlate highly 
negatively with each other (cf. Schwartz, 2007a). 
Hierarchical linear modelling (HLM, Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) was used in 
chapter three to conduct the multilevel regression analysis. HLM is the method of 
choice for estimating cross-level relationships. It is a sophisticated statistical procedure 
that estimates parameters on the different levels of analysis simultaneously. As such, it 
takes into account the standard error estimates associated with the various levels of 
analysis. The drawback is that a large number of data points are necessary at each level. 
Rules of thumb have been proposed for a two-level model ranging from 30 observations 
at both level 1 and level 2 to a ratio of 50/20 or 100/10 (see Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). 
The data for the present study comprising eight cultural groups do not meet these 
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minimum requirements. A solution is to use a regression method that is conceptually 
identical to HLM, but does not require large scale data input. CLOP (Cross-Level 
OPerator, James & Williams, 2000) is a variant of multiple regression analysis that can 
be used to test cross-level effects in SPSS with small number of units. In a CLOP 
analysis, individual-level scores are substituted by unit-level scores. This was done in 
the present study by assigning all individuals within a given cultural group the group’s 
score on the respective predictor. Hence, individuals from the same cultural group 
obtained the same score for the higher level predictor variable.  
The results of HLM and CLOP analysis are similar in terms of the estimated 
regression coefficients. However, a major difference is that CLOP does not partition 
variance into within- and between-unit components. This has important implications, 
such as higher level predictors typically showing smaller effect sizes than they would 
show with HLM (Klein, et al., 2000). Nevertheless, CLOP is a good alternative if 
sample size is not sufficient for HLM (James & William, 2000). Fischer (2008b), for 
example, used CLOP in an analysis involving four countries to predict the use of the 




All analyses were first conducted with Version 1 of the survey. Data from the 
second version served as a cross-validation sample. Datasets for the two versions 
differed from each other in terms of participants and value items. Nevertheless, 
participants were from the same countries across the two versions and value items 
included in the two versions were from the same value types. Results that are replicated 
across the two versions, despite these differences, would point to robust findings.  
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Results and Discussion 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis on Moral Attitudes 
The one-factor model for the pooled within-sample yielded a significant chi-
square statistic (
2
(5) = 51.35, p < .001) which is common with large sample sizes 
(Bentler, 1992a)
20
. However, other commonly used fit indices suggested that the model 
fitted the data well (see Hu & Bentler, 1999, for cutoff values): CFI was .97 and 
RMSEA was .08. The factor loadings were all significant and sizeable (.54-.72).  
Next, the model was tested across all eight cultural groups, first without any 
cross-country constraints. This is the most basic level of measurement invariance, 
known as configural invariance (Chen, 2008; Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). The results 
showed again a significant chi-square (
2
(40) = 120.49, p < .001). The values for CFI 
and RMSEA (.95 and .04) indicated that the one-factor structure fitted relatively well 
across all eight countries. Next, equality constraints were imposed on the factor 
loadings. This is the second level of measurement invariance, known as metric 
invariance (Chen, 2008). The CFI dropped to .90, but RMSEA still indicated a good fit 
with a value of .04. Considering that the fit criteria were developed for evaluating 
single-group models, it may be acceptable to relax the criterium for CFI somewhat 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1992) and to regard the values here as acceptable. On the basis of 
this analysis, mean scores were computed composed of the moral attitude items.  
                                               
20
 For the sake of consistency in rejecting the chi-square test as indicator of model fit, nested models in 
subsequent analyses were not compared on the basis of their chi-squares as it is usually done.   
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Reliabilities of Value Measures 
Mean inter-item correlations (Mean r
ij
) averaged across value types are 
displayed in Table 5.3 for the pan-cultural and culture-specific samples and for all 
response scales. The indices are shown separately for Version 1 and Version 2 of the 
survey. The mean r
ij,
 were of acceptable size (cf. Briggs & Cheek, 1986) for both the 
pan-cultural and culture-specific samples and for all response scales. The lowest mean r
ij
 
was .21 for ‘importance’ ratings in the Philippines (Version 1) and the highest was .51 
for ‘societal expectation’ ratings in Japan (Version 1). Even though there was some 
variation in mean r
ij ,, 
there was no evidence that a specific cultural sample yielded 
consistently higher or lower mean r
ij
. In order to compare how well the newly 
constructed response scales perform in relation to the original ‘IMPortance rating’ scale, 
the pan-cultural mean r
ij
 can be inspected. It appears that the new scales perform as well 
as the ‘IMPortance rating’ scale or even a bit better, as in the case of the ‘societal 
expectation’ scale.  
Cronbach alphas averaged across higher order value orientations are displayed in 
Table 5.4 for the pan-cultural and culture-specific samples and for all response scales. 
Cronbach alphas for all value orientations were acceptable ranging from .51 (‘good’ 
ratings in Brazil, Version 1) to .77 (‘societal expectation’ ratings in Japan, Version 1). 
Again, there was no evidence that a specific cultural sample yielded consistently higher 
or lower reliabilities or that the ‘moral value’ rating scales performed poorer than the 
‘IMPortance’ scale.  
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Table 5.3: Individual-level mean item-intercorrelation (mean r
ij
) for each sample and response scale averaged across value types. 
  Version 1 
 
Version 2 
Sample IMP EXP MORAL RIGHT GOOD 
 
IMP EXP MORAL RIGHT GOOD 
Pan-cultural .31 .39 .37 .30 .29 
 
.30 .35 .40 .34 .34 
Brazil .24 .29 .26 .22 .24 
 
.27 .35 .35 .30 .32 
Finland .24 .34 .28 .28 .27 
 
.23 .29 .31 .28 .30 
Germany .27 .39 .33 .25 .26 
 
.22 .29 .24 .26 .29 
Japan .30 .51 .30 .24 .27 
 
.29 .27 .32 .31 .26 
New Zealand .27 .42 .32 .32 .22 
 
.24 .35 .31 .30 .30 
The Philippines .21 .32 .31 .33 .33 
 
.27 .35 .40 .34 .34 
Turkey .33 .40 .35 .35 .31 
 
.29 .36 .37 .29 .31 
U.K. .38 .23 .32 .41 .37 
 
.24 .35 .29 .20 .23 
Note. Reliabilities were computed across all value types, except for hedonism in Version 1 and hedonism and stimulation for Version 2, because these value types consisted only of 




Table 5.4: Individual-level Cronbach alphas for each sample and response scale averaged across value orientations. 
  Version 1 
 
Version 2 
Sample IMP EXP MORAL RIGHT GOOD 
 
IMP EXP MORAL RIGHT GOOD 
Pan-cultural .63 .73 .72 .66 .64 
 
.69 .67 .66 .66 .67 
Brazil .54 .65 .60 .58 .51 
 
.58 .57 .56 .56 .57 
Finland .61 .69 .56 .66 .63 
 
.63 .62 .64 .63 .63 
Germany .61 .75 .66 .56 .62 
 
.65 .62 .61 .62 .62 
Japan .61 .77 .64 .66 .69 
 
.69 .67 .67 .68 .68 
New Zealand .59 .69 .64 .61 .56 
 
.62 .61 .60 .60 .61 
The Philippines .57 .70 .65 .69 .67 
 
.68 .67 .67 .67 .67 
Turkey .65 .70 .70 .69 .65 
 
.68 .68 .67 .67 .68 
U.K. .66 .63 .67 .64 .67 
 
.65 .65 .65 .66 .65 
Note. IMP = ‘important vs. unimportant’, EXP = ‘expectation vs. free choice’, MOR = ‘moral vs. immoral’, RIGHT = ‘right vs. wrong’, GOOD = ‘good vs. bad’.  
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Differences and Similarities of Response Scales and Cultural Groups 
The Pan-cultural Value Type Hierarchy 
The differences and similarities of pan-cultural value hierarchies produced by 
different response scales (see rank orders in Appendix D) were graphically displayed 
through MDS. With five elements to display (here the five response scales), there were 
5-1 possible dimensions as solutions (Hair, et al., 2006). A suggested guideline is to 
have more than four times as many objects to display as dimensions desired (cf. Hair, et 
al., 2006, p. 645). Hence, at least five objects are required for a one-dimensional map. 
Therefore, a one-dimensional solution was most appropriate for the present data. 
Tucker’s coefficient of congruence is an indicator of the fit of the solution with higher 
fit measures (to a maximum of 1) indicating better solutions. The fit for the present 
solution was high with a value of .99.  
The perceptual map can be seen in Figure 5.3. A clear feature is that personal 
values (IMP) and perceived societal expectations (EXP) are located opposite to each 
other. In MDS, spatial distance is a measure of association between objects. Hence, the 
further apart two objects, the more dissimilar they are to each other. Inspecting Figure 
5.3 it becomes clear that EXPectation and IMPortance ratings produce different value 
hierarchies whereas judgments of right and wrong and good and bad were more closely 
related to IMPortance ratings. Personal moral value ratings were located in-between 
societal expectations and personal preferences. Spearman correlations with Schwartz 
and Bardi’s (2001) pan-cultural value hierarchies based on students’ personal values 
(see Appendix D) showed that: (1) IMPortance, GOOD, RIGHT and to some extent also 
MORal ratings produced value hierarchies very similar to Schwartz and Bardi’s pan-

















 = .86, p < .01); (2) EXPectation value hierarchies 
were different from Schwartz and Bardi’s pan-cultural value hierarchy (r
s
 (9) = .55, p > 
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Version 1 Version 2 
.05). Therefore, there seems to be some overlap between what people actually desire 







Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Intrinsic
 
Figure 5.3: One-dimensional MDS representation of value hierarchies using five 
different response scales (pan-cultural sample, Version 1 and 2 of the Survey). 
Note. EXP = ‘expectation vs. free choice response scale’, MOR = ‘moral vs immoral response scale’, 
RIGHT = right vs. wrong response scale, GOOD = good vs. bad response scale, IMP = important vs. 
unimportant response scale. 
 
Culture-specific Value Type Hierarchies 
MDS. In order to examine associations of both response scales and cultural 
samples, a MDS was conducted across these variables. The scree plot indicated a two-
dimensional solution. Tucker’s coefficients of congruence for the one- to four-
dimensional solution were .97, .99, .99, and .99. Adding more dimensions than just two 
did not substantially affect the Tucker’s coefficients. Hence, a two-dimensional solution 
was retained. The map is depicted in Figure 5.4. Similarly to the pan-cultural analysis, 
there is a polarization between rating of values as societal expectations and personal 
preferences. ‘GOOD’ and ‘RIGHT’ evaluations are located in the middle of dimension 
1. Furthermore, there is a relatively strong partition of hypothesized individualistic and 
collectivistic samples on dimension 2. Individualistic samples (Germany, Finland, New 
Zealand and the U.K.) tend to be clustered in the upper part of the two-dimensional 
space. Collectivistic samples (Brazil, Japan, the Philippines and Turkey) tend to cluster 
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around the lower part of the map. Hence, dimension 2 appears to reflect the expected 
individualism- collectivism distinction of the cultural samples.   
(extrinsic) (intrinsic)
 
Figure 5.4: Two-dimensional MDS representation of response scales and cultural 
samples. 
Note. Underlined objects denote individualistic cultural samples according to the literature. B = Brazil, F 
= Finland, G = Germany, J = Japan, N = New Zealand, P = the Philippines, T = Turkey, U = United 
Kingdom, EXP = ‘expectation vs. free choice’ response scale, MOR = ‘moral vs. immoral’ response 
scale, RIGHT = right vs. wrong’ response scale, GOOD = ‘good vs. bad’ response scale, IMP = 
‘important vs. unimportant’ response scale.  
 
 
Chapter five: An explicit measure of moral values 
- 183 - 
Follow-up Analyses. This strong partition into individualistic and collectivistic 
samples may be due to the effect of cultural response styles, or response sets. A 
response set is the systematic tendency to respond to a range of items on some basis 
other than the item content (Paulhus, 1991). There are two response styles which have 
caught the attention of cross-cultural psychologists: extreme response style (ERS) and 
acquiescence response style (ARS, Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). ERS is the tendency to 
use the extremes of a rating scale. ARS occurs when individuals from one group 
systematically give higher responses than another group. There is empirical evidence for 
cross-cultural differences in ARS, with consistent evidence now that an ARS tendency 
is more pronounced in collectivistic-oriented cultures (e.g. Fischer, Fontaine, van de 
Vijver, & van Hemert, in press; Johnson, Kulesa, Llc, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Smith, 
2004; Smith & Fischer, 2008). According to van de Vijver and Leung (1997) response 
styles constitute a method bias and are part of measurement error. Hence, they should be 
detected and controlled for. In a similar vein, Schwartz (1992) recommended applying a 
centering procedure in which means are adjusted in order to eliminate national 
differences in the use of the response scale. Schwartz and Bardi’s (2001) pan-cultural 
value hierarchy, for instance, is based on centered means. In order to find out whether 
there is indeed a possible response style, mean ratings across all value items were 
computed for each response scale and for the individualistic sample, the collectivistic 
sample and the combined pan-cultural sample. Figure 5.5 displays the results and it 
appears that the collectivistic samples indeed showed the tendency to score 
systematically higher than the pan-cultural mean and the individualistic sample, which 
can be interpreted as a sign of acquiescence.  
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Figure 5.5: Mean ratings across ten value types displaying acquiescence tendencies in 
the collectivistic sample. 
 
Note. The abscissa represents different response scale conditions. The ordinate represents the value 
ratings pooled for collectivistic samples (Brazil, Japan, the Philippines, Turkey), individualistic samples 
(Finland, Germany, New Zealand, U.K.) and the combined pan-cultural sample.  
 
 
In order to find out how acquiescence may have affected the MDS based on the 
cultural samples, a second MDS was performed; however this time on the rank orders 
of value types. Non-metric data such as rank orders are not affected by response sets 
(Smith & Schwartz, 1997). In order to compare the rank order solution with the 
previous rating solution, they were transformed to maximal similarity with the program 
Generalized Procrustean Analysis (GPA)
21
. The resulting figures for the rating and 
ranking data are displayed in Appendix D. After GPA, the dimensions of the rating and 
ranking MDS solution can be correlated with each other to obtain a quantitative index of 
similarity. Dimension one, which can be interpreted as distinguishing response scales in 
their underlying meaning correlated .74 (p <.001). Dimension two, which may be 
regarded as a distinction of individualistic and collectivistic samples significantly 
                                               
21
 See also chapter three (Study 1) for more technical details and the rationale of this procedure.  
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correlated at .37 (p < .05). Spearman correlations were very similar (r
s dim1
(39) = .63, p 
< .001, r
s dim2
(39) = .44, p < .01). What can be seen from Appendix E is that there is still 
an individualism/ collectivism distinction in dimension one which is especially 
pronounced for IMPortance and EXPectation ratings, but less evident for MORal, 
GOOD and RIGHT ratings. Hence, there is some overlap between the original rating 
and the transformed ranking solution, especially for the distinction of the different 
response scales. However, this overlap is far from being perfect, for dimension two in 
particular. Hence, acquiescence may be a confounding variable in the detection of 
cultural differences between individualistic and collectivistic samples in the present 
study. Therefore, for subsequent analyses, the mean ratings were corrected for scale use 
following Schwartz’ (1992, 2007a) recommended procedure for aggregated culture-
level data: the pan-cultural mean on all values was computed, the cultural sample mean 
was subtracted from the pan-cultural mean, and the result was added to the score of each 
value dimension. This was done separately for each response scale.  
To conclude, regardless of whether the value type ratings or rankings were 
analyzed, the response scales IMPortance and EXPectation yielded different findings. 
The analyses have also shown that the GOOD as well as RIGHT evaluation is relatively 
similar to the IMPortance value assessment. Hence, the former two response scales 
appeared to be redundant and were dropped from subsequent analyses. Yet, the MORal 
ratings were retained because of their ambiguous position in between IMPortance and 
EXPectation ratings (Figure 5.3. and 5.4, Appendix E) as well as the theoretical reason 
that personal values and personal moral values may constitute separate constructs (see 
chapter two).  
The Content of Moral Values. A comparison of individualistic and collectivistic 
samples regarding the content of their personal moral and perceived societal moral 
values can be seen in Figure 5.6. Because of the issue of response sets, the value ratings 
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of the ten value types were transformed into rank orders in order to be able to compare 
them across cultures. What Figure 5.6 shows is that individualistic and collectivistic 
samples are very similar in their value profile in regard to personal moral values. This is 
also reflected in the mean Spearman correlation for personal moral value hierarchies 
across cultural samples which was .90. The values that were mostly rated as personal 
moral values were of the benevolence (1
st









 rank) value type. As least moral were judged values belonging to 
the value types of power (10
th
 rank), hedonism (9
th
 rank in collectivistic sample) and 
tradition (9
th
 rank in individualistic sample) and stimulation (8
th
 rank).  
Societal moral value ratings showed greater variability between individualistic 
and collectivistic samples. This is also reflected in the mean Spearman correlation for 
societal moral value hierarchies across cultural samples which was .69. Individualistic 
samples perceived achievement (1
st
 rank), self-direction (2
nd
 rank), and benevolence (3
rd
 





 rank), and also benevolence (3
rd
 rank) as the most salient values. 





 rank) as well as tradition (8
th
 rank) were at the bottom of the 
rank order. Hence, values associated with a personal focus were more salient as a 
societal expectation in the individualistic sample, whereas values with a social focus 
were more relevant in the collectivistic sample. 
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Figure 5.6: Value ranking profile of individualistic and collectivistic samples for 
societal moral values (societal expectation ratings) and  personal moral values (moral 
value ratings). 
 
Note. SD = self-direction, ST = stimulation, HE = hedonism, AC = achievement, PO = power, SE = 
security, TR = tradition, CO = conformity, BE = benevolence, UN = universalism. 
 
Multilevel Regression Analysis 
A multi-level hierarchical regression analysis using the CLOP (James & 
Williams, 2000) procedure was conducted. Predictors were entered in four different 
blocks. As in Study 2 (chapter three), socio-demographic variables which have 
previously been shown to be related to moral attitudes were entered first to control for 
them (Harding & Phillips, 1986). These variables were gender, age, political orientation 
and religiosity. At Step 2, the individual’s response set across all values was entered as 
a control variable (cf. Schwartz, 2007a). This variable consisted of the individual’s 
mean ratings (MeanRATing) across all values for all three response scales (IMPortance, 
MORal, EXPectation). Including MeanRATing as a covariate in the regression model 
ensured that individual differences in the scale use were controlled for. Step 3 contained 
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values at the individual-level: openness-to-change vs. conservation assessed with the 
IMPortance, MORal and EXPectation response scales. Hence, there were three 
predictors for values at the individual-level. Step 4 consisted of the following culture-
level variables: openness-to-change vs. conservation measured with the IMPortance, 
MORal and EXPectation response scale. Thus, there were three culture-level predictors.  
Table 5.5 shows the correlations of all variables in the model. Some bivariate 
correlations were greater than .70 which may cause problems of multicollinearity when 
included in one and the same regression model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Multicollinearity is the extent to which a variable can be explained by other variables 
included in the regression model (Hair, et al., 2006). It may lead to undesirable 
outcomes in the analysis such as affecting the statistical tests of the predictors or the 
overall model, incorrect estimates of predictors or even reversing the signs of the 
predictors. Running the full model as described above did show some of these statistical 
problems. For instance, the ‘EXPectation’ rating of openness-to-change vs. 
conservation values at the culture-level was negatively correlated with the outcome 
variable (r = -.27, p < .001), but emerged as a positive predictor with a very high 
regression weight in the regression model (ß = .72, p < .001). Multicollinearity can also 
be detected with more direct means, such as the ‘tolerance’ measure. Tolerance is 
defined as “the amount of variability of the selected independent variable not explained 
by the other independent variables” (Hair, et al., p. 227). There are no hard rules to 
determine multicollinearity, but a rule of thumb is that if the tolerance value is low 
(ranging between 0 and 1), it indicates a high degree of multicollinearity. For the 
present model, the tolerance value was fairly low for all three culture-level variables 
(.13, .24, .24) indicating that multicollinearity may be a problem for the model. 
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Table 5.5: Pearson correlations of predictors and criterion variable. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
1. MA  
(outcome variable) 
-            
 2. Gender .03 -           
 3. Age -.05 -.10
b
 -          




 .03 -         




 .05 -        




 .04 .05 -       
Individual- 
level 7. OPCH vs. CONS: IMP 
-.38
c






 -      








 -     
 9. OPCH vs. CONS: MOR -.22
c








 -    
Culture- 
level 10. OPCH vs. CONS: EXP -.27
c














 -   
 11. OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.40
c
















 -  





















 p < .05., 
b
 p < .01, 
c
 p < .001 
MA = Moral attitude towards personal-sexual behaviour; MRAT = individuals’ mean ratings across all values measured with the response scales ‘importance’, ‘moral’ and ‘societal 
expectation; OPCH vs. CONS = bipolar higher order value orientation defined by the poles openness-to-change vs. conservation; IMP = ‘importance’ response scale, EXP = ‘societal 
expectation response scale’, MOR = ‘moral’ response scale.  
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It appeared from the correlation table that the problem was mostly associated with the 
high intercorrelation between the culture-level variables EXPectation and MORal as 
well as EXPectation and IMPortance. Hence, two separate models were conducted, one 
with all individual-level predictors as described above, but only EXPectation as a 
culture-level predictor (Model 1) and another one with all the individual-level predictors 
and IMPortance as well as MORal as culture-level predictors (Model 2). The tolerance 
values for Model 1 were acceptable with a minimum of .74. The tolerance values for 
Model 2 were relatively low with .44 and .49 for the culture-level predictors. However, 
this model did not show the ‘symptoms’ of the previous full model, such as reversed 
signs or very high regression weights. Other multicollinearity indices were also 
acceptable, for instance, the maximum VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), which is the 
reciprocal of the tolerance and should not be greater than 10, was here 2.25. On the 
basis of these criteria, it was decided to retain IMPortance and MORal as culture-level 
predictors in Model 2. 
 Table 5.6 shows the final regression weights for Model 1. On the first step, 
demographic variables alone explained 8% of the variance, with conservative political 
orientation and religiosity making a significant contribution to the prediction of strict 
moral attitudes, corroborating findings of past research (Harding & Phillips, 1986; 
Vauclair & Fischer, 2009, see also chapter three). Age may not have emerged as a 
predictor of moral attitudes, since the sample consisted of students which is a relatively 
homogeneous age group. Gender may also not have been a predictor, because gender 
differences are possibly less pronounced in student samples than they are in more 
heterogeneous samples (see, for example, Study 2 of this thesis). Adding MeanRATing 
in the second step increased the explained variance to 13.1%. This indicates that 
individuals with the tendency to score highly on their value ratings also scored highly 
on their moral attitude ratings, which may be a sign of individual-level acquiescence. 
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The addition of individual-level values to the prediction of moral attitudes increased the 
explained variance to 21.5%. The only significant predictor was the IMPortance rating 
of openness-to-change vs. conservation values, with endorsing conservative values 
(negative pole) being related to a more strict moral attitude which is consistent with 
what was expected. The final step consisted of the culture-level variable openness-to-
change vs. conservation values rated as a societal expectation. The variable was a 
significant predictor and increased the explained variance to 22.7 %. This means that 
conservation values rated as a societal expectation in some cultural samples were 
related to individuals’ strict stance on personal-sexual issues and vice versa for 
openness-to-change values.  
 
Table 5.6: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis predicting individuals’ 
strictness in their attitudes towards personal-sexual issues  
(Survey Version 1, Model 1). 
Variables     B  SE B  β 
Step 1: Sociodemographics    
 Gender   .11  .09  .05 
 Age   .00  .01  .01 
 Political orientation  .15  .04  .15*** 
 Religiosity  .09  .03  .11** 
Step 2: Individual-level response set    
 MRAT   .28  .08  .14*** 
Step 3: Individual-level Values    
 OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.37  .07 -.25*** 
 OPCH vs. CONS: MOR -.01  .03 -.01 
 OPCH vs. CONS: EXP -.06  .06 -.04 
Step 4: Culture-level Variables    
  OPCH vs. CONS: EXP -.34  .12 -.12** 
Note. . *p < .05., **p < .01, ***p < .001. R
2
 = .08, F(4, 561) = 12.12, p < .001 for Step 1; R
2
 = .13, F(1, 560) = 32.90, 
p < .001 for Step 2; R
2
 = .22, F(3, 557) = 20.06, p < .001 for Step 3, R
2
 = .23, F(1, 556) = 8.05, p < .01 for Step 4.  
Gender was coded as 1 = male and 2 = female. Religiosity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 
‘not important’ to 5 = ‘very important’. Political orientation was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 
‘extremely liberal’ to 7 = ‘extremely conservative’. Moral attitudes were measured from 1 = not wrong to 5 = 
extremely wrong. MRAT = individuals’ mean ratings across all values measured with the response scales 
‘importance’, ‘moral’ and ‘societal expectation; OPCH (positive pole) vs. CONS (negative pole) = bipolar higher 
order value orientation defined by the poles openness-to-change vs. conservation; IMP = ‘importance’ response scale, 
EXP = ‘societal expectation response scale’, MOR = ‘moral’ response scale.  
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Model 2, which was based on all individual-level predictors from above, but 
contained IMPortance and MORal as culture-level predictors instead of EXPectation, 
yielded virtually the same results for Step 1, 2 and 3 of the previous model (see Table 
5.7 for the final regression weights) explaining 21.5% of the variance in step 3. At the 
culture-level, IMPortance ratings emerged as a significant cross-level predictor, whereas 
MORal was not significant. This final step increased the explained variance to 27.4%.  
 
Table 5.7: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis predicting individuals’ 
strictness in their attitudes towards personal-sexual issues  
(Survey Version 1, Model 2). 
Variables     B  SE B  β 
Step 1: Sociodemographics    
 Gender   .14  .09  .06 
 Age   .01  .01  .03 
 Political orientation  .15  .04  .15*** 
 Religiosity  .10  .03  .12** 
Step 2: Individual-level response set    
 MRAT   .20  .08   .10*** 
Step 3: Individual-level Values    
 OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.29  .07 -.20*** 
 OPCH vs. CONS: MOR  .02  .03   .02 
 OPCH vs. CONS: EXP -.05  .06 -.04 
Step 4: Culture-level Variables    
 OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.90  .21 -.23*** 
  OPCH vs. CONS: MOR -.40  .30  -.07 
Note. *p < .05., **p < .01, ***p < .001. R
2
 = .08, F(4, 561) = 12.12, p < .001 for Step 1; R
2
 = .13, F(1, 
560) = 32.90, p < .001 for Step 2; R
2
 = .22, F(3, 557) = 20.06, p < .001 for Step 3, R
2
 = .26, F(2, 555) = 
22.45, p < .001 for Step 4.  
Gender was coded as 1 = male and 2 = female. Religiosity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = ‘not important’ to 5 = ‘very important’. Political orientation was measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘extremely liberal’ to 7 = ‘extremely conservative’. Moral attitudes were 
measured from 1 = not wrong to 5 = extremely wrong. MRAT = individuals’ mean ratings across all 
values measured with the response scales ‘importance’, ‘moral’ and ‘societal expectation; OPCH 
(positive pole) vs. CONS (negative pole) = bipolar higher order value orientation defined by the poles 
openness-to-change vs. conservation; IMP = ‘importance’ response scale, EXP = ‘societal expectation 
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To conclude, after controlling for demographic variables, as well as response 
sets in value ratings and individual-level values, ‘EXPectation’ ratings of openness-to-
change vs. conservation values at the culture-level showed the same effect in predicting 
individuals’ moral attitudes as ‘IMPortance’ ratings. Interestingly, ‘EXPectation’ ratings 
were not a predictor at the individual-level.  
 
Follow-up Analyses: Individual-level Mediation Model 
The correlations in Table 5.5. show that EXPectation and MORal ratings of 
openness-to-change versus conservation values at the individual-level were related to 
the outcome variable, however they did not account for unique variance in the outcome 
variable over and above IMPortance ratings. The non-significant result for EXPectation 
and MORal ratings at the individual-level may be due to a mediation effect of 
IMPortance ratings. Testing explicitly the interrelationship between the three variables 
EXPectation, IMPortance and the dependent variable (DV), as well as MORal, 
IMPortance and the DV, can provide some insight in why people hold certain attitudes 
and what the mechanism is that explains it. In the present case, it may be that moral 
attitudes can be explained with the internalization of values assessed through personally 
important values. This would be consistent with Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-
Determination Theory which posits a progressive transformation of external values into 
personally important values. Hence, a mediation model was conducted as a follow-up 
analysis. Two mediation models were run using MedGraph (Jose, 2003). Figure 5.7 
presents the results for the mediation analyses.  
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Figure 5.7: Two mediation models for different value ratings at the individual-level.   
Note. Figures in parentheses denote the indirect effect. 
 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method was used to test for mediation which consists 
in three conditions. Starting with EXPectation ratings of openness-to-change versus 
conservation, they predicted moral attitudes, ß = -.10, p < .05, fulfilling the first 
condition specified by Baron and Kenny (1986). EXPectation ratings also significantly 
predicted IMPortance ratings, ß = .13, p < .001, fulfilling the second condition. When 
moral attitudes were finally regressed simultaneously from EXPectation ratings and 
IMPortance ratings, the regression weight for IMPortance ratings was significant, ß = -
.38, p < .001, while the regression weight for EXPectation ratings became non-
significant, ß = -.05, p > .05. The Sobel test showed a significant drop in the reduction 
of the effect of EXPectation, z = -3.12, p < .001, indicating a full mediation. MORal 
ratings as the independent variable showed virtually the same effect, although the 
regression weights were in general somewhat higher than for the EXPectation rating 
model. To conclude, it appears that personal values (IMPortance) intervene between 
societal expectations (EXPectation) and moral attitudes as well as between personal 
moral values (MORal) and moral attitudes.  
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Cross-validation  
The main findings from above were cross-validated with the second version of 
the survey answered by an independent sample and using somewhat different values 
(see Table 5.2).  
 
MDS on Value Hierarchies 
Similarly to the analysis of the first version of the survey, a MDS was first 
performed on the pan-cultural value hierarchies produced by the different response 
scales. As can be seen in Figure 5.3 the two versions produced virtually the same result: 
Personal values (IMPortance rating scale) and societal moral values (EXPectation 
rating scale) were located opposite to each other. MORal ratings are located in between 
societal expectations and personal preferences.  
Next, a MDS on the cultural value hierarchies produced by the five different 
response scales was performed. In order to statistically compare the similarity of results 
of the two survey versions, the coordinates of the elements in the two-dimensional space 
were correlated with each other. This was done after rotating the two solutions to 
maximal similarity with GPA. Both dimensions correlated very highly with each other. 
Product-moment correlation coefficients for dimension 1 and 2 were .98 (p < .001) and 
.85 (p < .001). Spearman correlations were very similar to Pearson correlation 
coefficients (r
s dim1
(39) = .98, p < .001; r
s dim2
(39) = .87, p < .001).  
This validates two conclusions drawn from the analysis of the first survey 
version. First, values measured as societal expectations and personal preferences yield 
different value hierarchies, whereas personal moral values are somewhat similar to both 
of them. Secondly, cultural samples are ordered along the hypothetical individualism/ 
collectivism dimension in regard to their value hierarchies no matter what kind of 
values are assessed.  
Chapter five: An explicit measure of moral values 
- 196 - 
 
Regression Analyses 
Two multilevel regression analyses using the CLOP method were run on the 
data of the second version of the survey. The two models were again identical except for 
the culture-level predictors. Model 1 contained EXPectation ratings of openness-to-
change vs. conservation values as culture-level variables and Model 2 contained 
IMPortance and MORal ratings of these values. The results showed the same pattern of 
significance as for Version 1 of the survey (see Table 5.8 and 5.9): A conservative 
political orientation, religiosity, acquiescence response set and the personal importance 
of conservation values at the individual-level were related to a stricter attitude towards 
personal-sexual issues. At the culture-level, the perceived societal expectation (Model 
1) and the personal importance of conservation values (Model 2) predicted stricter 
moral judgments.  
 
Chapter five: An explicit measure of moral values 
- 197 - 
Table 5.8: Summary of cross-validating hierarchical regression model predicting 
individuals’ strictness in their attitudes towards personal-sexual issues (Survey Version 
2, Model 1). 
Variables     B  SE B  β 
Step 1: Sociodemographics    
 Gender   .10 .08  .04 
 Age   .01 .01  .06 
 Political orientation  .12 .03  .12*** 
 Religiosity  .08 .02  .12*** 
Step 2: Individual-level response set    
 MRAT   .25 .07  .13*** 
Step 3: Individual-level Values    
 OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.45 .05 -.35*** 
 OPCH vs. CONS: MOR -.06 .04 -.05 
 OPCH vs. CONS: EXP  .01 .03  .02 
Step 4: Culture-level Variables    
  OPCH vs. CONS: EXP -.39 .11 -.13** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. R
2
 = .11, F(4, 670) = 20.50, p < .001 for Step 1; R
2
 = .20, F(1, 
669) = 78.53, p < .001 for Step 2; R
2
 = .33, F(3, 666) = 42.10, p < .001, R
2
 = .34, F(1, 665) = 12.51, p < 
.001 for Step 4.  
Gender was coded as 1 = male and 2 = female. Religiosity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = ‘not important’ to 5 = ‘very important’. Political orientation was measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘extremely liberal’ to 7 = ‘extremely conservative’. Moral attitudes were 
measured from 1 = not wrong to 5 = extremely wrong. MRAT = individuals’ mean ratings across all 
values measured with the response scales ‘importance’, ‘moral’ and ‘societal expectation; OPCH 
(positive pole) vs. CONS (negative pole) = bipolar higher order value orientation defined by the poles 
openness-to-change vs. conservation; IMP = ‘importance’ response scale, EXP = ‘societal expectation 
response scale’, MOR = ‘moral’ response scale.  
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Table 5.9: Summary of cross-validating hierarchical regression model predicting 
individuals’ strictness in their attitudes towards personal-sexual issues (Survey Version 
2, Model 2). 
Variables     B  SE B  β 
Step 1: Sociodemographics    
 Gender   .10 .08  .04 
 Age   .01 .01  .06 
 Political orientation  .12 .03  .12*** 
 Religiosity  .06 .02  .09** 
Step 2: Individual-level response set    
 MRAT   .15 .07  .08* 
Step 3: Individual-level Values    
 OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.38 .06 -.30*** 
 OPCH vs. CONS: MOR -.06 .05 -.06 
 OPCH vs. CONS: EXP  .02 .02  .02 
Step 4: Culture-level Variables    
 OPCH vs. CONS: IMP -.69 .15 -.26*** 
  OPCH vs. CONS: MOR  .10 .16  .03 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. R
2
 = .11, F(4, 670) = 20.50, p < .001 for Step 1; R
2
 = .20, F(1, 
669) = 78.53, p < .001 for Step 2; R
2
 = .33, F(3, 666) = 42.10, p < .001, R
2
 = .37, F(2, 664) = 18.77, p < 
.001 for Step 4.  
Gender was coded as 1 = male and 2 = female. Religiosity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = ‘not important’ to 5 = ‘very important’. Political orientation was measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘extremely liberal’ to 7 = ‘extremely conservative’. Moral attitudes were 
measured from 1 = not wrong to 5 = extremely wrong. MRAT = individuals’ mean ratings across all 
values measured with the response scales ‘importance’, ‘moral’ and ‘societal expectation; OPCH 
(positive pole) vs. CONS (negative pole) = bipolar higher order value orientation defined by the poles 
openness-to-change vs. conservation; IMP = ‘importance’ response scale, EXP = ‘societal expectation 
response scale’, MOR = ‘moral’ response scale.  
 
Individual-level Mediation Model 
Two mediation models were again conducted as a follow-up analyses using 
MedGraph (Jose, 2003). The results for the mediating effect of personal values (IMP) 
on personal moral values (MOR) and moral attitudes were virtually the same as in the 
analysis for Version 1 of the survey. MORal ratings predicted moral attitudes, ß = -.33, 
p < .001 and also significantly predicted IMPortance ratings, ß = .54, p < .001. When 
moral attitudes were regressed simultaneously from MORal ratings and IMPortance 
ratings, the regression weight for IMPortance ratings was significant, ß = -.33, p < .001, 
while the regression weight for MORal ratings became non-significant,  ß = -.07, p > 
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.05. The Sobel test showed a significant drop in the reduction of the effect of MORal, z 
= -10.63, p < .001, indicating a full mediation. The result looked very different for 
EXPectation ratings. EXPectation ratings were not significantly correlated with moral 
attitudes (r = -.01, p > .05) meaning that the first condition for pursuing a mediation 
model as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) was not fulfilled
22
.  
To conclude, the mediating effect of IMPortance ratings on the relationship 
between MORal ratings and moral attitudes was crossvalidated. However, no mediation 
model could be established for EXPectation ratings and moral attitudes, since there was 
no significant relationship between the two variables. Hence, it seems that perceived 
societal moral values are not reliably related to moral attitudes at the individual-level.    
 
General Discussion 
Study 3 confirmed that openness-to-change vs. conservation values at the 
culture-level are related to moral attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviours if rated 
as (1) personal values (IMPortance), (2) personal moral values (MORal), and (3) 
societal moral values (EXPectation). Due to multicollinearity problems between 
IMPortance and EXPectation ratings, it was not possible to test the incremental validity 
of openness-to-change rated as societal expectations over and above these values rated 
                                               
22
 More recently, Preacher and Hayes (2004) suggested that this condition does not need to be fulfilled in 
order to test a mediation model. They distinguish between mediated effects and indirect effects. A 
mediated effect is a special case of indirect effects when there is only one mediating variable and a 
significant relationship between the IV and DV in the first place. There is no such assumption in the 
assessment of indirect effects. It is possible to find a significant indirect effect even when the IV and DV 
are not significantly correlated. The Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) provides a test of an indirect effect by 
comparing the strength of the indirect effect of the IV on the DV to the null hypothesis that it equals zero. 
Preacher and Hayes (2004) provide a macro for SPSS that allows testing the significance of the indirect 
effect both parametrically and non-parametrically (in case of non-normal distributions). Using the macro 
with the present data showed that the Sobel test was not significant ( z = -.19, p > .05), therefore 
suggesting no mediation. The non-parametric test which consists of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect 
effect (here for 1,000 bootstrap iterations) also indicated a non-significant finding. The bias corrected and 
accelerated bootstrapped 95% confidence interval indicated that the true indirect effect was estimated to 
lie between -0.04 and 0.03. Hence, it can be concluded that the mediation model was not replicable with 
Version 2 of the survey.  
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as personally important. Nevertheless, EXPectation ratings at the culture-level 
performed as well as IMPortance ratings in the prediction of moral attitudes after 
controlling for demographics, individuals’ response set in rating value items, and 
individual-level value ratings (IMPortance, MORal, and EXPectation). Personal moral 
values at the culture-level were significantly correlated with the outcome variable, but 
did not add incremental validity over and above the importance ratings.  
Although the incremental validity of EXPectation value ratings at the culture-
level could not be tested (or could not be confirmed in the case of MORal ratings 
respectively) it is an important finding that EXPectation value ratings performed as well 
as IMPortance ratings at the culture-level in the prediction of moral attitudes. It has 
been pointed out in the literature that there is the problem of causal inconsistency if 
micro- and macro-level constructs are not operationalized differently (Liska, 1990). 
This is an important issue if the research focus is, for example, on value change with the 
underlying assumption that cultural values (macro-level variables) influence 
individuals’ values (micro-level variable). It is hard to comprehend how a change in 
cultural values can cause a change in individual values if the change in cultural values is 
measured through the aggregated changes in individual values (Roe & Ester, 1999). 
This methodological flaw can be avoided if macro-level constructs are measured 
independently from micro-level constructs (Liska, 1990). EXPectation ratings of values 
at the culture-level fulfil conceptually and methodologically the requirements of a valid 
macro-level construct: the EXPectation rating scale measures conceptually the 
perceived ‘cultural press’ and I showed that it significantly predicted the criterion 
variable corroborating established theories on the cultural variability of morality. Future 
research is needed in order to investigate whether EXPectation value ratings as a macro-
level variable predict other criterion variables than attitudes towards personal-sexual 
behaviours.  
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Furthermore, value ratings at the individual-level showed that IMPortance 
ratings were relatively strong predictors for moral attitudes and that EXPectation and 
MORal did not add unique variance. Follow-up analysis testing whether personal values 
(IMP) were a mediator for the relationship between societal moral values (EXP) and 
moral attitudes as well as personal moral values (MOR) and moral attitudes showed 
that full mediation occurred only reliably in two different samples in the case of 
personal moral values. This leads to two conclusions: (1) values rated as societal 
expectations seem to be a ‘truly’ culture-level construct, (2) internalization mechanisms, 
here the rating of values as personally important, may explain the overriding of personal 
moral values as a predictor for moral attitudes. Endorsing a value as personally 
important may be one step further in the internalization process than acknowledging a 
value as morally relevant. This would also be in line with Self-Determination Theory 
that proposes how extrinsic values and behaviours can be gradually internalized and 
become part of the self (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The theory specifies that internal rewards 
and punishments come before endorsing a value or behaviour as personally important. 
Internal rewards and punishments may be regarded as conceptually related to personal 
moral values arousing feelings of remorse if they are violated; whereas personal 
importance ratings assess personal values which implies a conscious valuing. This 
theory would also suggest that highly internalized values are more strongly associated 
with other relevant variables such as moral attitudes, since they become part of a 
person’s identity. This is what may have been found in the mediation analysis: 
personally important values override personal moral values in the prediction of 
individuals’ moral attitudes.  
This study also showed that students from very different cultures, differentiated 
a priori into collectivistic and individualistic samples, commonly regarded benevolence, 
universalism and conformity values as personal moral values. These three value types 
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correspond to the three functions of morality proposed by Helkama (2004): benevolence 
relates to prosocial action, universalism to moral problem-solving (issues of justice), 
and conformity to the prevention of antisocial behaviour. These values may provide the 
internalized motivational basis for cooperation and mutually supportive social relations 
which is a basic requirement for every society in order to function smoothly (cf. Krebs, 
2008). The findings are also consistent with research on qualities people value in their 
children: Baer, Curtis, Grabb and Johnston (1996) showed that there was great 
similarity across individuals from 15 countries with the most often mentioned qualities 
being honesty, tolerance and respect for other people, good manners, and the feeling of 
responsibility. These values can be assigned to the value types benevolence, 
universalism, and conformity respectively.  
The findings for societal moral values provided a different picture. There was a 
clear partition between individualistic and collectivistic samples in regard to their 
societal moral value hierarchy (see MDS, Figure 5.4). This partition remained even after 
taking into account that response sets may enhance the differences between the two 
cultural groups (see MDS, Appendix E). The individualistic samples perceived 
achievement, self-direction and benevolence values as the most predominant societal 
expectations. In contrast, the collectivistic samples perceived conformity, security, and 
benevolence as prevalent societal expectations. Except for benevolence, the two cultural 
groups differed by perceiving values with either a personal (individualistic samples) or 
social focus (collectivistic samples) as societal expectations. This is consistent with 
theories on collectivism and individualism suggesting that in individualistic cultures, the 
basic unit of society is the individual with his/her attitudes, values, skills and goals, 
whereas in collectivistic cultures, the basic unit of society is the group (e.g. the family) 
to which people are expected to be very loyal and to be conforming to group norms 
(Hofstede, 1980; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Triandis, 1995). Nevertheless, my finding deviates 
Chapter five: An explicit measure of moral values 
- 203 - 
somewhat from theories on the cultural variability of morality. Shweder, et al. (Miller, 
et al., 1990; Shweder, et al., 1997) proposed that cultures differ in their emphasis on the 
ethics of Autonomy or Community. Furthermore, Graham et al. (2009) suggested that 
cultures differ in the sources of their moral intuitions which can be distinguished into a 
individualizing and binding foundation. Both theories parallel the individualism/ 
collectivism distinction in cross-cultural psychology. While the findings for the 
collectivistic samples are in line with the ethic of Community and the binding 
foundation of moral intuition, the findings for the individualistic samples are less 
evident. Although, Self-direction with its focus on a person’s self-determination and 
autonomy is related to a rights-based morality, and hence in line with the two moral 
theories, the value of achievement is less so.  
Graham et al. (2009) noted that Schwartz’ value type of achievement does not fit 
into their own established moral taxonomies, nor the one Shweder et al. (1997) 
proposed. They suggested that achievement may point to an additional psychological 
mechanism that supports moral systems. Both self-direction and achievement are values 
with a personal focus serving individuals’ interests (Schwartz, 1992). It is interesting 
that individuals from individualistic-oriented countries perceived these values as 
predominant expectations in their societies. One would think that societies would want 
their members to follow values with a social focus, so that social interactions are 
smooth and social life is organized. For example, Benevolence fits into this assumption: 
it is a value with a social focus and emerged as a high ranking perceived societal 
expectation in both individualistic and collectivistic samples.  
How can the personal focus of societal expectations be explained in 
individualistic cultures? Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Tzili, and Harré (2000) have 
pointed out that individuals from individualistic cultures may endorse duties, but 
interpret them in relation to the self and only indirectly to the community. For instance, 
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young Americans completed the sentence ‘My most important duty is . . .’ to ‘do well at 
school’ or to ‘fulfill my potential’ etc. Hence, they focused more on a personal duty than 
on duties in relation to community. The value of achievement fits into this reasoning 
and would indicate that people from individualistic-oriented cultures also experience a 
sense of duty, but it is directed towards themselves and not others, as it is the case in 
collectivistic-oriented cultures. This would mean that a duty-based morality in Western 
cultures is also prevalent besides a rights-based morality. The fundamental difference in 
the Western duty-based morality is that its content refers to the individuals themselves 
in terms of an ‘individual responsibility’, a belief in ‘self-help’ and ‘getting ahead 
personally’ (see also Moghaddam, et al., 2000) which is very different to the duties in 
relation to community which are emphasized in collectivistic-oriented cultures.  
The present study also showed that asking individuals to rate values as good vs. 
bad or right vs. wrong yielded very similar results in these samples (see, for example, 
MDS on response scales, Figure 5.3). This is somewhat contrary to what Wierzbicka 
(2006) has pointed out. She suggested that right and wrong possesses a unique meaning 
in the English language and only the evaluation terms good versus bad are recognized 
universally. In the present study, there were no major differences between the results 
produced by these two response scales. Contrary to my expectations, asking individuals 
to rate values as moral yielded meaningful results. Despite the term being relatively 
ambiguous, it appears that laypeople intuitively associate a certain set of values with 
morality. It is also very meaningful that findings of the MORal ratings were consistently 
located in-between personally important values and societal expectation (see, for 
example, MDS Figure 5.3 and 5.4). There appears to be an underlying continuum 
reflecting different degrees of internalization of values ranging from completely 
extrinsic (societal expectations) to somewhat extrinsic (personal moral values) and 
completely intrinsic (personal values).  
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Last but not least, for cross-cultural research, it is noteworthy that the most clear 
partition into individualistic and collectivistic samples was found with values rated as 
societal expectations and as personal values (see MDS, Figure, 5.5) even after taking 
into account response sets (see Appendix E).  
 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to consider when evaluating the findings of 
this study. First, by recruiting university students, there remains the question whether 
the results are generalizable to the wider cultural population from which the students 
were sampled. It may be, for instance, that achievement was regarded as a societal 
expectation in the individualistic sample, because we are dealing with student 
populations for which success may be more salient than for other samples. Nevertheless, 
it is interesting to note, that the matched collectivistic sample also faces the pressure of 
being successful in regard to academic requirements, but did not rate it as a predominant 
societal expectation. Furthermore, the frame of reference was deliberately chosen as 
referring to the wider society assessing the ‘cultural press’ that applies to everyone in 
society. Future research will need to examine whether the personal focus of 
individualistic samples in regard to perceived societal expectations remains if non-
student samples, for example employees, are surveyed.  
A further limitation concerns the data from the U.K. Data were here collected 
online and hence differed in the administration format compared to the other samples. 
There is an ongoing debate in the literature whether online responses differ from paper 
and pencil responses. Recently, Meade, Michels and Lautenschlager (2007) showed that 
scores in personality scales collected via the internet and via paper and pencil were 
comparable with one another. It emerged as more important to either allow all 
respondents to choose the administration format or to impose it on participants. Since in 
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the present study students were not given a choice between administration formats, 
there was no inconsistency in this regard. Furthermore, responses of the U.K. sample 
showed the expected association with other individualistic and collectivistic samples. In 
regard to the sample from the U.K., it is also noteworthy that it was relatively small. 
Nevertheless, in analyses involving country-level data, there is a substantial benefit 
from adding further data points at the higher level, even if some samples do not contain 
many cases (Smith, et al., 2002).  
Another point to consider is that sample characteristics differed in regard to the 
percentages of females, average age and also religion and economic development of the 
country. Age and gender differences as well as religiosity were taken into account in the 
hierarchical regression models by controlling for demographics in the first step. In 
regard to the value ratings and their analysis through multidimensional scaling, 
differences in these individual- and country-level variables may have confounded with 
cultural differences. There are several reasons which render this very unlikely. First, 
past research has not yielded consistent evidence for the existence of gender differences 
in morality (Walker, 1991). Secondly, the age differences across samples were not very 
big. All samples were, in average, above 20 and below 27 years old. It would have been 
more problematic if some cultural samples were mainly adolescents, who still are in the 
process of defining their identity, which may have influenced what is regarded as 
personally important to them or morally relevant. Third, the observed differences 
between the cultural samples corroborated what was expected in terms of a partition 
into individualistic and collectivistic samples. Hence, age, gender, religion and also 
economic development can be largely ruled out as rival explanations for the findings.  
It is also noteworthy that, although culture-level values added significant 
explained variance in the CLOP regression analysis, the magnitude of this variance was 
not very big, adding only 1.2% unique variance, for example, in Model 1 (Survey 
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Version 1). This can be explained to some extent with the characteristics of CLOP 
analyses which uses both individual-level and unit-level independent variables to 
explain total variance in the dependent variable. Contrary to HLM, CLOP analysis does 
not partition into within- and between-unit components leading to the effect that CLOP 
reports effect sizes much smaller than in HLM (Klein, et al., 2000). Apart from that, it is 
a common finding that contextual variables often explain little variance in individual-
level dependent variables and some researchers have used this as an argument to remain 
on the individual-level only (Liska, 1990). However, as Liska (1990) puts it “even if 
contextual effects are small, they are theoretically significant because they operate over 
a wide range of research areas and dependent variables” (p. 299). Future research could 
examine the effect of societal expectations at the culture-level on other dependent 
variables than moral attitudes.  
Another important point to consider is the fact that I used the same value types 
at the individual- and culture-level. Schwartz (1994, 2006) clearly indicated that the 
individual-level value structure is different from the culture-level value structure. 
Taking individuals’ values to describe cultures means committing the “reverse 
ecological fallacy” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 29) which, it could be argued, I have done here. 
Nevertheless, equating the individual-level value types with culture-level values has 
already been done sporadically in the cross-cultural literature. For instance, Kağıtçıbaşı 
(1997) theoretically compared Schwartz’ value orientation openness-to-change versus 
conservation with Hofstede’s culture-level dimensions individualism versus 
collectivism. Lönnqvist et al. (2009) performed a group-level analysis to relate values to 
self-esteem in 14 cultural samples. They used Schwartz’ ten individual-level value types 
for this purpose and not the seven culture-level values. In a similar vein, Verkasalo et al. 
(2009) used Schwartz’ higher order value orientations at the individual-level to 
investigate cross-cultural differences across 25 European countries.  
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A last point to consider concerns the value survey. Since moral values are a 
multifaceted concept which may be evaluated in different ways (such as something 
good as opposed to bad or right as opposed to wrong), a number of response scales have 
been included in this survey. Each respondent rated each value on five different 
response scales. This task is certainly cognitively demanding, and to some extent, 
tedious. It may also invite mistakes if the direction of the bipolar response scales is 
changed to counteract response sets. The scale may be suitable for university students 
but would need to be simplified for other samples such as children or uneducated adults. 
A possibility would be to take the Portrait Value Survey, which has been developed for 
the purpose of assessing values in a simpler way, and to add response scales that tap 
into the moral evaluation of values. It would not be necessary to provide five different 
response scales, since my research has shown that the evaluation of right/wrong, 
good/bad is largely equivalent to moral/immoral.  
 
Future Prospects 
This study yielded a number of new findings. Two of them are especially 
worthwhile to pursue in future research. First, the perception of prescriptive values 
imposed from society (values as societal expectations) shows a social focus in 
collectivistic samples and a personal focus in individualistic ones. This finding does 
only partially fit into previous theories of morality (Haidt & Graham, 2006; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004, for Moral Foundation Theory; Shweder, et al., 1997, for the three ethics 
of moral discourse). The finding that achievement is perceived as a very salient societal 
expectation in individualistic-oriented societies is surprising and worth further research 
since it points to an additional psychological system overlooked so far that may 
contribute to moral judgments (see Graham, et al., 2009).  
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Secondly, it has been emphasized that potential effects of response bias should 
be acknowledged and addressed in data analysis involving cross-cultural comparisons 
and unpackaging studies (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Smith, 2005). This study has shown 
that cultural samples showed a virtually perfect partition into collectivistic and 
individualistic samples when response sets were not controlled for (see MDS, Figure 
5.4). This is an interesting finding since other studies found the opposite, i.e. only after 
controlling for response sets, the predicted contrast between individualistic and 
collectivistic samples emerged (e.g. Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). The problem 
with removing response sets is that true differences may also be removed from the data. 
It is worthwhile to examine this bias itself, because it may reveal useful information 
about a culture’s influence on psychological processes (Bond, 2002) or communication 
style affecting how people respond to questionnaires (Smith, 2004). Future studies may 
uncover the function and effect of certain response sets associated with culture. More 
systematic research in this area would reveal important insights into values research and 
the role of response sets, as something that needs to be controlled for or that can be 
examined as an expression of culture.  
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CHAPTER SIX: STUDY 4 
 
An Implicit Measure of Moral Values:  
Lay People’s Associations of the Moral Person 
 
Introduction 
In chapter two of this thesis, I pointed out that cultural values can be conceptualized as 
general guidelines that regulate individuals’ behaviour so that a more organized 
collective life is achieved. New members are explicitly and implicitly taught what is 
appropriate or socially desirable in a particular culture. Conventional approaches in 
deriving cultural values (e.g. Schwartz, 1992) do not directly assess this social 
component of values. Instead they are based on the assumption that what is good and 
socially desirable (the cultural ideals respectively) can be inferred from aggregated data 
on what is personally important (cf. Schwartz, 2006b). However, whether this inference 
is justified is not only a conceptual question, but also an empirical one.  
Throughout the present thesis it has been emphasized that one of culture’s 
functions is to regulate collective life by imposing constraints on what is acceptable and 
what is not. These binding normative expectations reflect a conventional kind of 
morality. Hence, the study of morality, and more particularly of moral values, may add 
an important insight into the cultural aspect of values. Similarly to Study 3 in this thesis, 
this chapter is targeted at investigating the moral component of values. What is entirely 
different is the approach that is taken here: instead of measuring values explicitly by 
asking for their moral relevance, the aim is to uncover moral values of different cultural 
groups with the help of an implicit method, i.e. through laypeople’s associations of the 
concept of a moral person.   
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In other words, the aim is to uncover what kind of attributes come into 
laypersons’ mind when thinking of a ‘moral person’. Hence, the methodological 
approach taken here is prototype analysis (see e.g. Fehr & Russell, 1984; Rosch, 1975; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998b).  
Rosch (1975), who developed Prototype Theory, argued that many everyday 
concepts, such as fruits or tools, lack defining attributes. Instead they are organized 
around examples or exemplars which are referred to as a prototype. Rosch (1975) found, 
for instance, that exemplars of the prototype fruit were plum, lemon, cranberry, and 
coconut. Prototype analysis attempts to detect the exemplars of a prototype by 
examining the associations that a group of people has in regard to a concept’s meaning. 
Since a prototype is usually based on group-generated exemplars, it describes the 
normative associative meaning of a term. It reflects a form of “collective wisdom” 
(Horowitz & Turan, 2008, p. 1059) and is therefore especially appropriate for this 
study’s cross-cultural focus.  
In the case of a moral prototype, an exemplar would also mean a conception of 
attributes that an ideal person should have in order to qualify as a moral person (Walker 
& Pitts, 1998b). Recent research has pointed out that there is an important linkage 
between exemplars and the study of culture. Fu and Chiu (2007), for example, stated 
that exemplary persons are “public carriers of culture as well as vehicles of 
intergenerational transmission of cultural values” (p. 650). Hence, detecting the 
associations with a ‘moral person’ in different cultures should provide an important 
insight into what it means to be ‘moral’ in a particular culture, and therefore into the 
most precious cultural values.  
In the next section, the rationale of taking an implicit approach to moral values 
and the study of culture is outlined in more detail.    
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Why Implicit? 
It is widely acknowledged that cultural knowledge consists not only of explicit, 
but also of implicit knowledge (e.g. D'Andrade, 1984; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). 
Triandis (1995), for instance, pointed out that one of culture’s most important aspects is 
its ‘unstated assumptions’. They are so fundamental that we are often unaware of them. 
This may equally apply to the area of morality and cultural variations defining what it 
means to be a good or a moral person respectively. Markus and Hamedani (2007), for 
example, referred to this very issue when saying that the “exposure to meanings and 
practices prevalent in a given context can provide a network of implicit and explicit 
associations to guide what it means to be a good person and competent social actor in 
that context” (pp. 23, italics added).  
Not only cross-cultural psychologists have referred to cultural knowledge as 
consisting of implicit and explicit associations, but researchers in the area of morality 
have also recently emphasized the importance of implicit processes in moral functioning 
(Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, et al., 1993). Haidt and colleagues (e.g. 
Haidt, et al., 1993) found that moral judgments of right and wrong consisted of 
intuitive, reflexive and automatic mechanisms rather than of explicit moral reasoning. 
The request to explicitly articulate why an issue had been judged as right or wrong 
commonly led to a phenomenon that Haidt called ‘moral dumbfounding’ (see Haidt, 
2001). Moral dumbfounding occurs when individuals stutter, laugh and express surprise 
at their inability to find reasons for their moral judgments.  
Since the term implicit is widely used, but rarely defined (De Houwer & Teige-
Mocigemba, 2009), and even within cross-cultural psychology it may be understood in 
different ways - for example, explicit as referring to physical objects of culture and 
implicit as referring to the psychological aspect of culture (cf. Matsumoto, 2007) - I 
shall briefly outline how it is understood in the scope of this thesis. When referring to 
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explicit versus implicit knowledge assessment, what is meant here is the contrast 
between assessing a psychological construct by asking individuals directly about it (e.g. 
through self-reports) versus assessing the construct indirectly by inferring it from a 
person’s automatic responses (cf. De Houwer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2009). An 
automatic response is one that lacks awareness, intention, efficiency and control 
(Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Associations have been commonly regarded as 
automatic responses (De Houwer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2009; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). Furthermore, Smith, et al. (2007) pointed out that feature-listing instructions 
used in prototype analyses evoke individuals’ implicit cognition, since there are no 
external cues as to the specific content of the prototype.   
The benefits of taking an implicit approach to moral values are threefold: First, it 
is in line with the theoretical propositions outlined above that culture and morality 
consist not only of explicit, but also of implicit knowledge and processes. Secondly, 
findings from an implicit measure on moral values that converge with an explicit 
measure, as employed in Study 3 of this thesis, would corroborate the validity of 
measuring moral values. This would be a multi-method validation according to 
Campbell and Fiske (1959). Third, an open-ended approach that detects moral values in 
different cultures provides an opportunity to identify new moral values that are not 
contained in expert-designed explicit self-reports on values. A number of researchers 
have pointed out the advantage of taking a naturalistic approach to morality (Smith, 
Türk Smith, & Christopher, 2007; Walker & Pitts, 1998b). By relying on laypeople’s 
everyday understanding of morality it is possible to understand how morality is 
construed in everyday life. This may provide a new perspective on the construct of 
moral values beyond the predefined value categories used in Study 3.  
Hence, the present study was designed to tackle the implicit cultural knowledge 
of moral values. In the following sections, past research focusing on morality and 
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culture using prototype analyses is briefly summarized. The research questions of the 
present study are embedded in the context of this research.    
 
Prototype Analyses  
One of the general principles of knowledge activation is accessibility. 
Accessibility can be defined as the activation potential of available knowledge (Higgins, 
2000). The activation of knowledge structures can be studied through a prototype 
analysis (cf. Smith, et al., 2007). A prototype of a concept is “an ordered list of features 
that informants judge to be the most important associates for describing some of the 
concept’s associative meaning” (Horowitz & Turan, 2008, p. 1057). When prototypes 
are studied, researchers typically rely on two samples of informants: the ‘nominators’ 
who generate features of the prototype through free-listings, and the ‘raters’ who rate 
the importance of each feature in terms of how well it defines the prototype in question 
(Horowitz & Turan, 2008). From these importance ratings it can be derived which 
features are more central or more peripheral in their association with the prototype (for 
practical examples see e.g. Fehr, 1988; Fehr & Russell, 1984;  Kearns & Fincham, 
2004; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Pitts, 1998b). However, more recently 
prototypes have also been inferred from the first step alone, i.e. from the free-listed 
features produced by nominators (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008; Smith, 
et al., 2007). The underlying assumption hereby is that the group-generated frequencies 
of traits are already an index of everyday accessibility in the particular sample in which 
it has been produced. Hence, a prototype defined in terms of accessibility and 
operationalized through the frequency of output, can also be delivered by a ‘nominator’ 
sample.  
The content of a prototype has been referred to by various names such as 
features, characteristics, exemplars or attributes (Horowitz & Turan, 2008). In this 
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study, the associations with a ‘moral person’ can be understood as traits, for example, 
being honest or helpful (see also Smith, et al., 2007). However, the same examples can 
also be understood as values and have been included as such in a number of value 
surveys (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  
Traits refer to relatively stable characteristics of an individual that guide his/her 
behaviour. Traits can be merely descriptive of a person, but they can also relate more 
closely to values as ‘ought’ and ‘should’ in that a particular trait is good or bad, right or 
wrong, or that someone ought to have such a disposition (Kilmann, 1981). Values and 
traits have usually been researched separately (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Wojciszke, 
1997). Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz and Knafo (2002) pointed out that the same term may 
refer either to a trait or a value. They emphasize, however, that there is a difference in 
their psychological meaning. For instance, ‘competence’ may be a guiding principle in 
people’s life (a value), but not all individuals share the trait of behaving ‘competently’, 
and vice versa. This distinction is important when investigating individual differences in 
traits and their link to personal values in the way Roccas and colleagues have done. 
However, for the present study the distinction of traits and values becomes trivial. What 
is studied here are the group-generated associations with a ‘moral person’ and not the 
differential characteristics of participants. Hence, the output may as well be considered 
as a set of values, and more specifically as moral values since the associations refer to 
attributes of a ‘moral person’. In this sense, the present study can be regarded as an 
implicit measure of moral values. 
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Research in Moral Psychology 
Walker and colleagues (Walker & Frimer, 2007; Walker & Hennig, 2004; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998b) were the pioneers in the analyses of prototypes in the area of 
morality. Walker and Pitts (1998) used the two-step approach of ‘nominators’ and 
‘raters’ to generate attributes of a highly ‘moral person’. In a subsequent study, they 
employed a similarity sorting task and applied multidimensional scaling techniques to 
uncover people’s conception of a moral exemplar. They found that moral attributes 
were arranged along two dimensions: the first dimension characterized attributes that 
refer to the ‘self’ or ‘others’; the second dimension showed attributes of ‘internal’ 
versus ‘external’ moral standards. Hence, individuals’ knowledge of a moral person 
could be distinguished along these two dimensions. Since their study explored 
individuals’ conceptions of a moral person in a Western cultural context (Canada), the 
authors called for additional research to uncover moral prototypes in different cultures.  
 
Research in Cross-cultural Psychology 
Smith et al. (2007) followed Walker and Pitt’s (1998) call for cross-cultural 
research on moral prototypes. They employed a feature-listing procedure in seven 
different cultures (Chamorro, Filipino, Taiwanese, Turkish, US-American, Venezuelan, 
and Palauan). Their choice of countries consisted of individualistic (e.g. Anglo-
Americans) and collectivistic-oriented samples (e.g. Filipinos) as well as samples from 
urban and rural areas and those belonging to multiple religious traditions (e.g. Catholics 
and Muslims). Instead of using the ‘moral person’ as a target to elicit free-listings 
(Walker & Pitts, 1998), they used the ‘good person’ as a target. Their results showed 
that attributes of the ‘good’ person overlapped to some extent across cultures. However, 
a cross-cultural comparison of the rank orders of the trait frequencies showed 
considerable variation. In an attempt to interpret the meaning of the ‘good person’ 
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prototype, they matched the free-listed attributes with experts’ traits and values 
classifications and conducted a content analysis. Their results showed that (1) 
interpersonal benevolence (caring, humanity) dominated as the most accessible attribute 
of a ‘good person’ across all cultural samples, (2) qualities of the competence-kind 
category (e.g. achievement, confidence, drive) varied widely across cultures in terms of 
accessibility. They also correlated the trait frequencies with Walker and Pitt’s (1998) 
two-dimensional coordinates on attributes of a moral person. They found that the 
‘other’- and ‘internal’-relevant pole significantly correlated with the frequencies of free-
listed attributes of their ‘good person’ target. Hence, interpersonal qualities, as well as 
those not referring to others, seem to be related to the trait accessibility of a ‘good’ 
person.   
Despite their great effort and approach in studying moral prototypes across 
cultures, there still remain questions, some of which I will address in the present study.  
 
The Present Study 
The present study aims to investigate moral prototypes across cultures and to 
address some of the limitations of Smith, et al.’s (2007) research. Smith and colleagues 
used the ‘good person’ as a target to elicit a moral prototype. However, one may argue 
that a moral prototype should relate to the specific concept of a ‘moral person’. Hence, 
the present study aimed to answer the following questions:  
RQ1: What kinds of attributes are associated with a ‘moral person’?  
RQ2: Are there cultural differences and similarities in associations of a ‘moral 
person’?  
In regard to RQ2, it was expected that cultural groups that can be classified as 
individualistic or collectivistic based on prior research (e.g. Hofstede, 1980) would 
show qualitatively different moral prototypes. If morality is closely related to culture - 
Chapter six: An Implicit Measure of Moral Values 
- 218 - 
which is an underlying assumption in this thesis (see chapter one for more details) - then 
there should be a difference between moral prototypes produced by individualistic and 
by collectivistic samples. However, what kind of differences are to be expected? 
Shweder and colleagues’ (1997) theory on moral discourse across cultures may provide 
an indication. They proposed, and showed empirically, that moral discourses can be 
distinguished cross-culturally into the ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity
23
. 
The former is more strongly endorsed in individualistic countries, and is based on moral 
reasoning in terms of individual rights and subjective well-being. The latter two, on the 
other hand, are more endorsed in collectivistic countries and represent a moral 
reasoning with reference to duties/ social obligations and spirituality/ purity 
respectively. Hence, it was expected that the most accessible moral attributes produced 
by individualistic and collectivistic cultural groups would differ in regard to these three 
categories.  
Since the prototype analysis of a ‘moral person’ is regarded as an implicit 
measure of moral values, there is the unique opportunity to study its relationship with an 
explicit measure of moral values from study three of this thesis (obtained through self-
reported ratings on the moral relevance of values). Hence, the research question was:  
RQ3: Are implicit and explicit measures of moral values related to each other? 
It was expected that the group-generated frequencies of the implicitly assessed 
moral values would correlate positively with the sample-based societal moral value 
hierarchy, as assessed in Study 3. If implicit moral values reflect a form of ‘collective 
wisdom’ about right and wrong which is presumably subject to cultural variation, then 
they should also be related to societal expectations in the respective cultural sample. 
Personal values should not be correlated with the frequencies of moral attributes since 
they are conceptually unrelated to morality (see introduction of this thesis for more 
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 See chapter one and three for more details on Shweder et al’s (1997) theory.  
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details). Initially, there were no specific expectations in regard to personal moral 
values. However, since the personal moral value hierarchy proved to be very similar 
across cultures in Study 3, it was not expected that these values would be related to 
implicit moral values which are supposed to assess a form of ‘collective’ or ‘cultural 
wisdom’.  
The last research question of this study concerned the question whether the 
‘good person’ and the ‘moral person’ are interchangeable targets to elicit moral 
attributes.   
RQ4: Does the ‘good person’ elicit the same characteristics as the ‘moral 
person’? 
Smith, et al. (2007) used the ‘good person’ as a target to elicit moral prototypes 
across cultures. Their rationale for this target choice was that ‘good’ is a fundamental 
concept in all cultures and that attributes that are central to meeting the challenges of 
life within a particular culture are likely to be the ones that discriminate between good 
and less good persons. However, a legitimate and important question is whether targets 
are interchangeable. Smith, et al. (2007), for example, found only partial overlap 
between their list of attributes and Walker and Pitts’ moral attributes. The discrepancy 
between the ‘good person’ and ‘the moral’ person as targets was even more accentuated 
in a study conducted by Lapsley and Lasky (2001). The authors compared their free-
listings of the ‘good character’ to Walker and Pitts’ (1998) moral attributes and found 
that the two lists shared only the feature of honest. They concluded that it may not be 
justified to equate the target of a ‘moral person’ with the target of a ‘good person’. It is 
possible that the ‘good person’ is a more general concept whereas the ‘moral person’ 
elicits more specific concepts related to issues of morality. The good-bad distinction as 
a cue may, for example, elicit not only what is socially good-bad (morality-related), but 
also what is intellectually good-bad (competence-related) (see Rosenberg & Sedlak, 
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1972). A limitation of Smith, et al.’s (2007) cross-target comparison with Walker and 
Pitts’ findings is that the two datasets are based on different cultural groups. Hence, the 
mere partial overlap between the two datasets cannot only be explained with the use of 
different targets, but also with the use of different cultural samples. In order to rule out 
culture as a competing explanation for identified difference in target use, free-listings of 
the ‘good’ and the ‘moral’ target were compared between samples from the same 
cultural background.   
To summarize, the goals of this research were:  
(1) to describe and compare cross-culturally laypersons’ concepts of the moral 
person in terms of the features that are accessible to them; 
(2) to compare the group-generated traits of a ‘moral person’ to explicit measures 
assessing personal and moral values.  
(3) to compare features of the ‘good’ and the ‘moral’ target.  





Ethics approval for this study was granted by the Victoria University of 
Wellington Human Ethics Committee. Participants were recruited from four different 
countries. The choice of countries was determined by sampling individuals from 
collectivistic countries (Brazil and the Philippines) and individualistic countries 
(Germany and New Zealand; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 2006b) belonging to different 
parts of the world. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, geographical distance 
may be a rival explanation for cultural differences (cf. van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
However, if differences identified between individualistic and collectivistic countries 
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generalize across samples from different parts of the world, it can be ruled out that they 
are solely due to geographical distance. Instead the conclusion can be drawn with more 
confidence that the differences are attributable to the underlying cultural dimension 
individualism-collectivism.   
A total of 540 university students from the social sciences participated in this 
study. Respondents were only included in the analysis if they identified with the country 
of residence as assessed in the survey. Hence, responses were analyzed from 98 
Brazilians, 119 Germans, 108 Filipinos and 172 students from New Zealand (see Table 
6.1 for more details about the samples). There were significant age differences across 
the five samples, F(4, 497) = 56.18, p < .001, and also differences in the proportion of 
females, ²(4) = 24.01, p < .001. Respondents’ average age was highest in Brazil and 
Germany (M
Brazil
 = 23.62, SD = 4.77; M
Germany
 = 23.61, SD = 4.94) and lowest in the 
Philippines (M = 17.32, SD = 1.15). These age groups correspond roughly to differences 
in student profiles as a result of different university entry requirements in each country. 
The New Zealand sample that received the moral target showed the highest percentage 
of females (71%) and the Brazilian sample the lowest (49%). The samples reflect the 
typical gender composition in the social sciences with females being often in the 
majority. It was surprising that one of the New Zealand sample was composed of almost 
three-quarter of females, whereas the other New Zealand sample which was recruited 
simultaneously exhibited a considerably lower proportion of females (59%). Since the 
questionnaire was distributed randomly to these participants, the most likely explanation 
for the differences in gender composition is chance alone.  
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Table 6.1: Sample characteristics of Study 4. 
  



















Female % 49 56 63 71 59 
Note. SD denotes ‘standard deviation’.  
 
Materials 
Participants were first asked to provide demographic information. They were 
then given the moral person as the target concept and asked to write down what kind of 
characteristics they associate with it. New Zealand students received randomly either 
the ‘moral’ or the ‘good person’ as a target in their survey. The following instruction 
was given to the respondents and was adapted from Lapsley and Lasky (2001).  
The following question has to do with the sort of things we have in mind when 
we hear and use words. For example, if you heard the word “fruit” you might 
think of such things as apples and pears. If you heard the word “furniture,” you 
might think of sofa, couch, or table. If you heard the word “extrovert,” you 
might think of outgoing, friendly, and sociable. What comes to mind when you 




The instruction was translated into German and Portuguese by the author, and its 
accuracy was verified with at least one bilingual colleague in both cases. The Filipino 
sample received the English version, since English is one of the official languages in the 
Philippines. Participants in New Zealand were asked to write down as many attributes 
they could think of within 10 minutes and were provided with a maximum of 20 lines 
for their open-ended answers (cf. Walker & Pitts, 1998). This response format yielded 
in some cases very long and essay-like statements which rendered the answers more 
difficult to analyze. Hence, in the remaining three samples the response format was 
structured by providing six bullet points which could be completed with moral features. 
                                               
24
 In the New Zealand sample about half of the students received the same instruction in which ‘moral 
character’ was replaced with ‘good character’.  
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The number of chosen bullet points corresponded to the average number of traits 




Participants in New Zealand completed the feature-listing task within a mass 
testing session. Students in Brazil and in the Philippines responded to the survey in a 
class setting. For the data collection in Germany, the feature-listing was part of a survey 
not related to morality or moral attributes. For all samples it was ensured by the 
collaborators that participants listed the features silently and independently.  
 
Analytical Strategy 
An example of all original responses from one sample can be seen in Appendix 
F. Traits listed by German and Brazilian participants were translated into English by the 
author and bilingual consultants. Judgments rules (see also Fehr, 1988; Walker & Pitts, 
1998b) were developed in order to facilitate the final cross-cultural frequency analysis 
of moral attributes. Judgments rules were used in two different stages: the first stage 
consisted of an intra-cultural analysis; and the second stage of a pan-cultural analysis of 
free-listings. In the intra-cultural stage, frequencies of moral attributes were analyzed 
separately in each culture. The pan-cultural analysis consisted of pooling all free-listed 
features regardless of the respective cultural group in which they have been listed to 
identify universal categories that may underlie the data.  
Figure 6.1 depicts the process for both stages. The aim during the whole 
procedure was to (1) reduce the list of descriptors as much as possible, while at the 
same time remaining as conservative as necessary to preserve culture-specific features, 
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and (2) to fit the specific traits into more general attributes, so that a computerized 
frequency analysis could detect and count these attributes.  
 
Whole sentences? Divide into linguistic units
Compound phrases?
Modifiers? Drop
Nouns? Convert into adjectives
Direct antonym pair? Identify underlying attribute
Idiosyncratic features/ attributes 
not related to question?
Drop
Identification of synonyms and 
summarizing in moral trait 
categories
Moral category mentioned by 

















































































List of original responses





























































Figure 6.1: Judgment rules for the content analysis of moral attributes. 
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The intra-cultural analysis consisted of the following steps: Dividing whole free-
listed sentences into linguistic units; separating compound phrases into separate 
descriptors if they could stand alone (e.g. just and open-minded became just and open-
minded); dropping modifiers (e.g. very loving became loving); converting nouns into 
adjectives whenever possible (e.g. courage became courageous); and summarizing 
direct antonym pairs (e.g. fair and unfair were both counted under the attribute of fair 
since they belong to the same underlying meaning of fairness; decision about the 
polarity of this attribute was determined by the most frequently mentioned pole). The 
remaining attributes were then analyzed with the software program MAXQDA 2007 
(Kuckartz, 2007) in terms of how frequently they occurred. Idiosyncratic features (i.e. 
those that were mentioned by only one person) and also attributes not directly related to 
the target were dropped. This was done separately for each sample.  
The responses were then pooled across samples and further analyzed in a pan-
cultural fashion. The main aim herein was to identify synonyms of moral attributes. 
These synonyms were then summarized under a moral trait category. Pooling the 
attributes across samples ensured that this could be done without ‘cultural bias’, i.e. 
without treating an attribute as culture-specific when in fact it was synonymous to a 
similar attribute mentioned in other cultural samples. For instance, stable was only 
mentioned in the Brazilian sample; however, well-balanced was identified as a synonym 
occurring in the German and Filipino sample. Hence, the moral trait category was 
labeled well-balanced (because well-balanced occurred more frequently than stable) 
and Brazilian responses which yielded the trait stable were counted as falling under the 
category of well-balanced. The categorization of all moral traits was discussed with 
another colleague until agreement was achieved. The frequencies of the final moral trait 
categories were eventually added up. Only categories that were mentioned by at least 
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five percent of the respondents in any one of the samples were retained and further 
analyzed cross-culturally.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Comparing Moral Attributes across Cultural Groups 
The number of elicited traits were 512 in the Brazilian sample (M = 5.68, SD = 
0.84), 608 in the German sample (M = 5.79, SD = 0.64), and 590 in the Filipino sample 
(M = 5.94, SD = 0.31). The differences in the number of free-listed traits was significant 
(F(2, 335) = 5.25, p < .01). In the New Zealand sample in which the unstructured 
response format encouraged participants to write as much as they wanted, there were 
581 single attributes (M = 6.50, SD = 3.97) and 157 sentences for the ‘moral target’ (M 
= 2.71, SD = 1.69) and 888 features for the ‘good target’ (M = 10.83, SD = 5.01). 
Interestingly, the ‘good’ target survey yielded more single attributes than the ‘moral’ 
target and there were no whole sentences free-listed despite the same response format. It 
may be that the ‘moral person’ is a more complex concept than the ‘good person’ which 
stimulates individuals to provide more information on their associations and the 
underlying meaning. In contrast, the ‘good person’ as a stimulus seems to be more 
readily defined in terms of single uncontested meanings. For the sake of consistency in 
regard to the other cultural samples, only the first six traits were analyzed in the New 
Zealand sample, which yielded 496 attributes with the ‘moral target’ and 504 attributes 
with the ‘good target’.  
After applying the judgment rules described above, the descriptors were reduced 
to 49 distinct moral trait categories. Table 6.2 shows the features for all four cultural 
groups and the associated frequencies. Since there were significant differences in the 
number of free-listed traits, the frequencies were adjusted by the respective sample size 
and then expressed in percentages.  
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Table 6.2: Attributes of a moral person in four cultures. 
  Brazilian % German  % New Zealand % Filipino % 
1 honest 99 honest 53 honest 67 religious 66 
2 just 39 just 45 good 24 good 54 
3 respectful 33 helpful 24 kind 24 honest 40 
4 educated 22 has standards 23 ethical 22 kind 35 
5 correct 20 open 20 trustworthy 22 respectful 33 
6 ethical 20 considerate 19 caring 21 right 21 
7 responsible 18 religious 18 has standards 20 well-mannered 21 
8 serious 18 critical 17 helpful 19 just 19 
9 good 16 obedient 16 friendly 18 friendly 17 
10 loyal 15 friendly 13 right 18 generous 13 
11 sociable 15 reliable 13 strong 18 obedient 13 
12 trustworthy 14 unselfish 11 considerate 17 ethical 12 
13 dignified 12 conservative 10 compassionate 11 has standards 12 
14 reasonable 10 tolerant 9 respectful 11 humble 11 
15 determined 9 well-mannered 9 proud 10 loving 9 
16 has standards 9 respectful 8 reliable 10 virtuous 9 
17 kind 8 sociable 8 firm 9 disciplined 8 
18 firm 7 conscientious 8 generous 9 exemplary 8 
19 humble 7 ethical 8 just 8 considerate 7 
20 personality* 7 kind 8 loyal 8 helpful 7 
21 conscientious 6 determined 7 obedient 8 trustworthy 7 
22 rigid 6 loyal 7 unselfish 8 caring 6 
23 disciplined 5 self-confident 7 respected 7 responsible 6 
24 obedient 5 firm 6 tolerant 7 determined 6 
25 self-confident 5 good 6 intelligent 6 unselfish 6 
26 helpful 4 intelligent 6 religious 6 wise 6 
27 loving 4 trustworthy 6 well-mannered 6 compassionate 5 
28 respected 4 correct 5 reasonable 4 dignified 5 
29 considerate 3 easy-going 5 responsible 4 loyal 5 
30 critical 3 reasonable 5 self-confident 4 conscientious 4 
31 friendly 3 responsible 5 virtuous 4 educated 4 
32 intelligent 3 exemplary 4 determined 3 self-confident 4 
33 religious 3 right 4 correct 2 sociable 4 
34 strong 3 rigid 4 dignified 2 respected 3 
35 open 2 disciplined 3 exemplary 2 intelligent 2 
36 virtuous 2 loving 3 rigid 2 open 2 
37 exemplary 1 strong 3 sociable 2 correct 1 
38 right 1 compassionate 2 wise 2 critical 1 
39 wise 1 respected 2 educated 1 easy-going 1 
40 caring 0 serious 2 humble 1 firm 1 
41 compassionate 0 caring 1 loving 1 reasonable 1 
42 conservative 0 generous 1 conscientious 0 reliable 1 
43 easy-going 0 humble 1 conservative 0 rigid 1 
44 generous 0 dignified 0 critical 0 strong 1 
45 proud 0 educated 0 disciplined 0 tolerant 1 
46 reliable 0 personality* 0 easy-going 0 conservative 0 
47 tolerant 0 proud 0 open 0 personality* 0 
48 unselfish 0 virtuous 0 personality* 0 proud 0 
49 well-mannered 0 wise 0 serious 0 serious 0 
Note. Features in boldface refer to those that were determined to be central moral attributes. Percentages 
are rounded to the nearest full percent. The percentages do not sum to 100% as respondents were 
encouraged to list more than one attribute. * ‘personality’ in the sense of backbone or fortitude.  
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Central and Peripheral Moral Attributes 
To obtain a quantitative measure of similarity for the 49 moral trait categories 
across cultural groups, the sample profiles were correlated with each other. Significance 
tests for product-moment correlation coefficients assume that the population is normally 
distributed. However, the frequency counts of moral attributes were skewed (combined 
sample: skewness = 3.7, range = 1-65, Mdn = 6.1). Therefore, Spearman correlation 
coefficients were computed. The results are summarized in Table 6.3. The coefficients 
show that all cultural profiles are different from each other, except for the Filipino and 
New Zealand sample. In line with Smith and colleagues’ (2007) study on ‘good’ 
character traits across cultural groups, the correlations in this study were also 
consistently fairly low and tend to indicate cultural differences rather than similarities. 
The moral attribute profile of the two individualistic cultures New Zealand and 
Germany was marginally correlated with each other. The finding that the frequencies of 
the free-listed features from the New Zealand and Filipino sample were significantly 
similar to each other was surprising, even though the correlation was only of moderate 
size (r
s
 = .40,  p < .05). Positive correlations of frequencies were expected between 
individualistic or collectivistic samples, but not across them.  
It may be that the individualism and collectivism distinction of samples is more 
pronounced when examining central moral features as opposed to all moral features. 
Central moral features were operationalized as those that are highly accessible and 
therefore occur with a relatively high frequency compared to non-central traits (cf. 
Gregg, et al., 2008; Smith, et al., 2007). Hence, central moral trait categories were 
examined next and compared cross-culturally.  
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Table 6.3: Correlations between percentages of free-listed moral features across four 
cultures. 
Sample 1 2 3 4 
1. Brazilian -    
2. German .09 -   
3. New Zealand .11   .29
†
 -  
4. Filipino .12 .21    .40* - 
Mean r
s
 .11 .20 .27 .24 
Note. 
†
p < .10, *p < .05, two-tailed. Correlations are Spearman coefficients. Features having zero 
frequency in either of the given two samples were excluded from the analysis. Hence, degrees of freedom 
and critical values for coefficients vary depending on the number of features with nonzero frequencies (N 
= 33-45). Correlations based on all features including (0,0) data pairs (N = 49) were very similar to the 
correlations in the table above.  
 
Central Moral Attributes  
Past research has usually identified central features by asking an independent 
sample to rate the features that the so-called ‘nominator’ sample
25
 has produced 
(Horowitz & Turan, 2008). However, even within this approach there is little agreement 
about how many attributes can be considered as making up central features of a 
prototype (cf. Fehr, 1988; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Furthermore, there is no established 
approach in the literature that determines centrality of features purely based on 
frequency data.  
Researchers using the Natural Semantic Network technique employ the scree 
test to determine the network core in order to investigate the psychological meaning of a 
given concept (Milfont, personal communication, July 16, 2008). Although semantic 
networks and free associations are products of different processes (Figueroa, González, 
& Solís, 1976), a scree test may be useful for the latter in order to differentiate between 
central (frequent) and peripheral (non-frequent) trait categories.  
A scree test (Cattell, 1966) is usually employed in factor analysis in which 
eigenvalues are plotted against factors. Factors are arranged in descending order along 
the abscissa and eigenvalues on the ordinate. This forms a descending curve. The 
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 The ‘nominator’ sample is the sample that free-lists characteristics of a specific target.  
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number of factors to interpret is the point where this curve shows an ‘elbow’ (change in 
gradient). A similar approach can be used to determine the centrality of free-listed 
features. Here, the relative frequencies can be arranged in descending order along the 
ordinate and the features along the abscissa.  
An example of a scree plot for two cultural groups is depicted in Figure 6.2. The 
figure shows a somewhat different pattern for the sample from New Zealand compared 
to the sample from the Philippines. In New Zealand, the first moral category yielded a 
very high relative frequency compared to subsequent categories. Hence, the ‘elbow’ 
would indicate that only one moral feature is central. For the Filipino sample on the 
other hand, the ‘elbow’ appears after about six moral trait categories. The figure also 
shows clearly that when moving to the end of the ordinate, there are practically no 
bigger drops in relative frequencies. Hence, it appears that the ‘conventional’ use of the 
scree plot would suppress a great deal of additional information, especially in the case 
of the New Zealand sample.  
Another point to consider is that information processing theory suggests that we 
can process 5-9 chunks of information (Miller, 1956). Hence, it is likely that the number 
of moral features that are distinct from each other, but central to people’s perception of 
a moral person is close to seven plus or minus two; and in fact, the average number of 
traits mentioned in the New Zealand sample, i.e. under the non-structured condition, 
was around six traits. On the other hand, central features should also occur with 
considerable higher frequencies than peripheral features. Therefore, the following 
judgment rule were developed to identify centrality of free-listed moral categories: (1) 
the category needed to be mentioned by at least ten percent of the sample, (2) after this 
ten percent threshold and following the increasing frequencies along the ordinate, the 
next largest increase in frequencies was identified with the aid of the scree plot, (3) the 
number of central traits should be not much less than five and not substantively more 
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than nine. This procedure yielded eleven central categories in the Brazilian and German 
sample, twelve in the New Zealand and nine in the Filipino sample (see Table 6.2.).  
The results show that honest was a ‘universal’ central moral trait category 
(occurring in all four countries), followed by friendly, good and just (central in three 
countries). Culturally idiosyncratic central moral categories were open, critical, reliable 
and obedient in the German sample and correct, serious, educated, responsible, loyal 
and sociable in the Brazilian sample. Well-mannered was an idiosyncratic central moral 
category in the Filipino sample and caring, strong, and trustworthy were central and 
specific to the New Zealand sample.  
Spearman correlations of central moral attributes yielded a similar picture to the 
correlations of all 49 moral trait categories (see Table 6.4). Correlations did not reach 
significance in any of the samples, except for the New Zealand and Filipino sample 
which showed a marginally significant correlation of .41 (p = .05). Hence, in regard to 
the research question whether there are cultural differences in associations of the ‘moral 
person’, it seems that there are indeed pronounced cultural differences.  
 
Table 6.4: Correlations between percentages of free-listed ‘central’ moral features 
across four cultures. 
Sample 1 2 3 4 
1. Brazilian -    
2. German -.03 -   
3. New Zealand -.12 .01 -  





 .00 .06 .10 .26 
Note. 
†
p < .10, two-tailed. Moral attributes may be central in one culture, but peripheral in another. In any 
case, all frequencies associated with the traits in question were taken into account. Frequencies of features 
having zero frequency in either of the given two samples were excluded from the analysis.  Hence, 
degrees of freedom and critical values for coefficients vary depending on the number of features with 
nonzero frequencies (N = 20-25). Correlations based on all features including (0,0) data pairs (N = 26) 
were very similar to the correlations in the table above.  
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Figure 6.2: Examples of frequency scree plots of free-listed moral attributes in two samples 
Note. The triangle symbol indicates the limit between moral trait categories determined to be central or peripheral. Relative frequencies are expressed in percentages. They do not 
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In order to understand what kind of attributes are associated with a ‘moral 
person’ which may facilitate the interpretation of cultural differences, a correspondence 
analysis on central moral features was conducted.  
 
Interpreting Central Moral Attributes Cross-culturally 
The Use of Correspondence Analysis 
Correspondence analysis is a multidimensional scaling technique that creates a 
perceptual map. Variables and objects are simultaneously plotted in the map based on 
the association between them (for technical details on this technique, see Greenacre, 
1984;  Hair, et al., 2006). Similarly to traditional multidimensional scaling techniques, it 
has only a few assumptions. Since it is a compositional technique, i.e. it combines 
separate attribute evaluations into an overall evaluation, the attributes should be as 
complete as possible (Hair, et al, 2006). This means that the analyzed attributes should 
be a good approximation of all attributes which would fully describe the construct. This 
assumption should be fulfilled when data is based on open-ended responses as it is the 
case in this study.  
The underlying principle is similar to factor analysis in the sense that it allows 
factoring variables and determining the amount of explained variance for individual 
dimensions and the solution as a whole. However, in contrast to factor analysis, non-
metric data such as cross-tabulated frequencies can be used. Correspondence analysis is 
particularly useful when the two-way contingency table contains many rows and 
columns which may render it difficult to detect dependencies. These dependencies can 
be more easily detected by examining the perceptual map which displays patterns of 
association between objects and variables in a joint space: objects (here cultural 
samples) that are highly associated with certain variables (here moral trait categories) 
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are located closer to them and farther away from variables with which they are not or 
not as much associated.   
The perceptual map is produced by using chi-square distances between row and 
column profiles. The maximum possible number of dimensions is one less than the 
smaller of the number of rows or columns. A perfect representation can be obtained 
with the maximum number of dimensions possible. However, there is a trade-off 
between incremental explanation gained and interpretability of the solution. It is much 
easier to interpret the plot in a low- or preferably two-dimensional space. Whether a 
low-dimensional solution is appropriate can be examined by the proportion of total 
‘inertia’ explained by the dimensions. In SPSS, the total ‘inertia’ is the variance and 
reflects the spread of points around the centroid, i.e. the origin of the correspondence 
map. Additional dimensions that do not add substantially to the explanation of the total 
inertia may be dropped. A rule of thumb is that dimensions with inertia lower than .20 
may be excluded from the analysis (Hair, et al., 2006, p. 671). The dimensions are best 
interpreted by the points which contribute the most to the inertia of the respective 
dimensions. This is similar to interpreting factor loadings in conventional factor 
analysis. It is also worth pointing out that points that are close to the centroid have the 
least inertia. This means that they do not play a great role in defining the dimension. 
Applied to this study it means, that moral trait categories located close to the centroid 
represent attributes which occur with similar frequencies across the four samples.   
A biplot is commonly used as a visual representation of the data. It displays both 
row and column points in a single multidimensional map. In order to directly compare 
frequencies of column and row profiles they need to be standardized which is called 
symmetrical normalization. Yet, it is important to note that even under this 
standardization procedure, one cannot precisely interpret the distance between a row 
point and a column point. It is preferable to make rather general interpretations, for 
Chapter six: An Implicit Measure of Moral Values 
- 235 - 
instance, whether row and column points (or objects and variables respectively) appear 
in the same quadrant of the multidimensional space.  
 
The Resulting Biplot 
A correspondence analysis in SPSS 14 on the central moral trait categories 
(variables) across four cultural samples (objects) was conducted. In some cases, moral 
trait categories were central in some cultural groups, but peripheral in others. In these 
cases, the associated frequencies of culture-specific peripheral trait categories were also 
included in the analysis. The correspondence analysis produced a significant chi-square 
(²(75) = 745.23, p < .001) indicating that the total inertia was significantly different 
from zero. This means that there was a significant relationship between the samples and 
moral trait categories. Hence, it was justified to interpret the perceptual map in order to 
identify the nature of these dependencies. The total inertia was high indicating that the 
three dimensions explained 50.7% of the variance in the original correspondence table. 
The first dimension explained 45% of the 50.7%, the second 30.9% of it and the third 
dimension 24%. Even though the third dimension added a considerable amount of 
explained variance, the first two dimensions already allowed explaining about three-
quarters of the total inertia. Hence, to facilitate the interpretation of the perceptual map, 
it was decided to retain only two dimensions. The resulting two-dimensional biplot is 
depicted in Figure 6.3.  
A striking feature of the map is its triangular shape. The samples from Germany, 
the Philippines and Brazil form the endpoints of this triangle. Points further from the 
origin play a greater role in defining the dimension, whereas points located close to the 
origin represent shared variance. The latter seems to be the case for the New Zealand 
sample which is located closely to the centroid. The position of the New Zealand 
sample may be interpreted as sharing common variance with all other samples. This is a 
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somewhat different interpretation than the previous one based on Spearman correlations 
between moral trait frequency profiles in which the conclusion was drawn that the New 
Zealand sample is only similar to the Filipino sample. The similarity between these two 
samples is also replicated in the biplot in which they are relatively close to each other. 
However, it seems that the Spearman correlations which only consider the rank-ordering 
of moral trait categories did not detect the various dependencies that exist between the 
New Zealand sample and all other samples.   
All samples exhibited some culture-specific central moral trait categories. 
However, the triangular shape of the biplot appears to be due to the responses of the 
German, Filipino and Brazilian sample. It may be explained by the fact that culturally 
idiosyncratic traits from these three samples occurred with very high frequencies in the 
respective samples and very low frequencies in all the other samples; this tendency was 
somewhat less accentuated in the case of New Zealand. Note that trustworthy, for 
example, emerged as an idiosyncratic central trait in New Zealand and occurred with a 
lower frequency in all other samples, however not as low as 0, 1 or 2 as, for instance, 
the Brazilian-specific trait serious (cf. Table 6.2).   
Taking the attributes in the triangle of the biplot as an anchor for interpretation 
of dimensions, dimension one may be interpreted as a ‘self’ versus ‘other’ dimension. 
Dimension two can be regarded as a ‘liberal’ versus ‘traditional’ orientation. There is a 
general tendency that the traits cluster on the ‘other’-oriented side of the map which is 
associated with the German, New Zealand and Filipino sample. The ‘self’-oriented 
elements were more specific to the Brazilian sample. Moral attributes also tended to 
cluster around the ‘traditional’ pole of the map which shows associations with the 
Filipino and Brazilian sample. Their perception of a moral person seem to reflect a more 
conservative kind of morality targeted at maintaining already existing moral standards. 
The German sample defined the opposite pole of dimension two labelled as ‘liberal’. It 
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is characterized by items such as being open and critical which may indicate a more 



















Figure 6.3: Biplot of relative frequencies of moral trait categories across four cultural 
samples.  
 
Note. BR, GE, NZ and PH denote samples from Brazil, Germany, New Zealand and the Philippines 
respectively.   
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A conclusion that can be drawn is that moral attributes tend to belong to the 
traditional kind of traits focused on the welfare of ‘others’. Cultural differences and 
similarities on the two dimensions may be interpreted in line with Shweder et al.’s 
(1997) distinction of an ethic of Autonomy and Community/ Divinity. Traditional kinds 
of attributes that are oriented towards the individual fitting into the social group, i.e. an 
ethic of Community, can be regarded as widely shared across all samples (attributes are 
located close to the centroid in the biplot). The German sample, representing an 
individualistic culture, shows a culture-specific tendency that may indicate a form of 
ethic of Autonomy. However, autonomy is here not so much about the acknowledgment 
of individual rights as in Shweder and colleagues (1997) theory and findings, but about 
the person’s ability to critically reflect about what is right and wrong in a self-
determined way (e.g. critical, open). It also appears from the biplot that an ethic of 
Community goes hand-in-hand with an ethic of Divinity (represented by the moral trait 
category religious).  
There was also an interesting culture-specific orientation that cannot be 
explained within Shweder, et al.’s (1997) typology. The Brazilian sample associated 
‘self-related’ concepts with a moral person, such as being serious. Despite these traits 
being related to the ‘self’ they share little similarity with Shweder’s ethic of Autonomy. 
They are better understood as personality traits related to the very ‘self’ of moral 
exemplars which differentiate them from others. Even though Walker and Pitts (1998) 
reported also a self-other dimension in their data, the content of their dimension differs 
from the present study. Walker and Pitts’ (1998) self-focused attributes are more 
directly related to moral values (e.g. being righteous, having high standards, p. 414). 
The self-focused associations of the Brazilian sample (e.g. being educated, serious) are 
distantly related to the concept of a ‘moral person’ and could in fact be applied to a 
number of other persons, too.  
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The findings from the correspondence analysis provide an intriguing insight into 
the associations between cultural samples and the underlying dimensions on which they 
are similar and different respectively. However, before a finding can be regarded as 
established evidence, it needs to be replicated (Amir & Sharon, 1990). The aim of the 
following analyses is to validate the triangular shape of the biplot. This was done by 
examining whether the result is dependent on the attributes to be included in the 
analysis (cf. Hair, et al., 2006).  
 
Replicating the Biplot 
There are two possible reasons why the perceptual map displays a triangular 
shape. First, correspondence analysis is sensitive to outliers. The prevalence of culture-
specific moral trait categories in the Brazilian, German and Filipino sample may have 
distorted the graphical association of objects. Even if ‘outliers’ provide valuable 
information regarding the prevalence of cultural differences and idiosyncrasies they 
may also lead to an overestimation of cultural dissimilarities in the perceptual map. 
Hence, consideration of a correspondence analysis without ‘outliers’ is highly 
worthwhile. Secondly, one of the few assumptions of correspondence analysis is that 
attributes should be complete, i.e. a good approximation of the items that would fully 
describe the construct. Adding or deleting categories may change the results (Hair, et 
al., 2006). In the analysis above, only central moral traits had been examined. An 
analysis that includes all 49 moral trait categories may produce another picture of 
cultural similarities and differences. Hence, these two analyses were also conducted in 
an attempt to validate the results.  
The first analysis excluded all 14 culturally idiosyncratic moral trait categories. 
The chi-square was still significant (²(33) = 336.02, p < .001), but the inertia (variance) 
of .32 was somewhat less than in the previous analysis. Dimension 1 accounted for 
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54.7% of the inertia, dimension 2 for 27.5% and dimension 3 for 17.9% which is 
consistent with the first correspondence analysis. The perceptual map can be seen in 
Appendix G. There was still a triangular shape indicating that the German and New 
Zealand sample are similar to each other,whereas the Brazilian and Filipino sample are 
located opposite to each other. Even though with this reduced number of items it is 
more difficult to interpret the dimensions, there is still a ‘traditional-liberal’ dimension 
and arguably also a less well-defined ‘self-other’ dimension. The location of the cultural 
samples in the map was replicated.  
The second analysis was conducted using all 49 moral categories. The chi-
square was significant (²(144) = 1018.32, p < .001) and the inertia was .55. Dimension 
1 accounted for 41.9% of the inertia, dimension 2 for 33% and dimension 3 for 25.1% 
suggesting that a three-dimensional solution may be more adequate for the data. Note 
that including all moral categories only explained an additional 4% of variance 
compared to the correspondence analysis based on central moral categories. This 
supports the importance of the central moral trait categories.  
For ease of interpretation and comparison, the perceptual map was created in a 
two-dimensional space and can be seen in Appendix G. The same triangular shape 
emerged as in previous analyses. The cultural groups were arranged in the same fashion 
as in the correspondence analysis on central trait categories. The interpretation of the 
underlying dimension is here facilitated through the higher number of items. In single 
cases items seem to be misplaced such as conservative which is associated with the 
German sample and located on the liberal pole of the underlying dimension. Yet, the 
general picture is relatively clear and confirms the very first interpretation. For instance, 
the ‘self’-orientation pole which is associated with the Brazilian sample includes here 
compatible attributes such as having a personality (to be understood in the sense of 
‘backbone’ or fortitude in English) and being dignified.  
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To conclude, the relative association of the four cultural samples and the 
underlying dimensions on which they seem to differ or to be similar respectively can be 
regarded as replicated with different sets of moral trait categories (i.e. central traits 
without culture-specific attributes as well as all trait categories).  
 
Comparing Implicit Moral Attributes with Explicit Measures of Values 
In the following analysis, the findings of the implicit method for deriving moral 
trait categories were compared to an expert-designed explicit method of measuring 
values. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1992) was taken for this purpose 
and moral trait categories were matched to the values from the SVS. Appendix H shows 
that 36 of all trait categories
26
 corresponded to Schwartz’ values. Of the 49 moral trait 
categories, there were 18 that could not be matched with specific Schwartz’ values, 
which were: critical, easy-going, educated, ethical, exemplary, firm, friendly, generous, 
good, has standards, kind, has personality, reasonable, right, rigid, self-confident, 
serious, and sociable. When examining the matches between moral trait categories and 
value types, it was found that central moral attributes were predominantly from the 
value type benevolence and conformity (see Appendix H). Peripheral moral features 
were mostly from the universalism, tradition, and achievement value types. Hedonism 
did not occur at all. Hence, traits associated with power, security and stimulation as well 
as hedonism were not very salient characteristics of a person with moral character. 
Table 6.5 provides an overview of reported frequencies of moral trait categories falling 
under Schwartz’ value types. 
                                               
26
 To enhance the number of matches between moral trait categories and the SVS, traits that occurred with 
a frequency of less than five percent in all samples and which were excluded from the correspondence 
analysis earlier were here included.  
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Table 6.5: Adjusted frequencies of matches between moral trait categories and Schwartz’ value types. 
  
Pan-
cultural   Brazil   Germany   
New 










Schwartz’ Value Types ΣΣf/n ΣΣf/nk Σf/n Σf/nk Σf/n Σf/nk Σf/n Σf/nk Σf/n Σf/nk 
Mean rank 
Benevolence 405 82 136 28 102 21 108 22 59 11 
1 
Conformity 181 44 43 10 36 9 25 6 77 19 
6 
Universalism 180 22 45 5 83 11 21 3 31 3 
3 
Tradition 129 24 11 2 31 6 8 1 79 15 
9 
X 65 5 15 <1 11 1 24 3 15 1 
- 
Achievement 38 9 10 2 10 2 7 3 11 2 
4 
Self-direction 17 3 1 <1 7 1 4 1 5 1 
2 
Stimulation 8 3 0 0 3 1 3 1 2 1 
8 
Security 3 <1 0 0 0 0 1 <1 2 <1 
5 
Power 3 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 
Note. The three highest rankings are in boldface. Cells in Σf/n columns list the frequencies of matches between Schwartz’ value types and free-listed features of a moral person, 
adjusted by the number of participants in the sample. Cells in Σf/nk columns list the frequencies of matches adjusted by both the number of participants in the sample and the number 
of values in the respective value type. Cell entries are rounded to the nearest whole number. X denotes values that are usually excluded from cross-cultural comparison due to their 
unstable meaning (Schwartz, 1992; 2007a).  
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The mean Spearman correlation between cultural samples was relatively high with a 
value of .88 (for frequencies adjusted for the number of participants in the respective 
sample, Σf/n) and .80 (for frequencies adjusted by both number of participants and 
number of values in the respective value type, Σf/nk). Therefore, matching moral 
attributes with Schwartz’ expert-designed value categories, shows that cultural groups 
are very similar in terms of the accessibility of moral values.  
In order to examine whether accessibility of moral trait categories is indeed 
related to an expert-designed explicit theory, a procedure utilized by Smith, et al. (2007) 
was adopted. Multidimensional coordinates for Schwartz’ personal value priorities were 
taken and correlated with the relative frequencies of moral attributes. For this purpose, 
Schwartz’ data on value priorities from 26,024 students residing in 66 different 
countries were used. A two-dimensional solution was imposed on the pooled-within 
correlation matrix which weighs the correlation matrices of each country equally so that 
they have the same influence on the overall matrix (Fontaine & Fischer, in press; 
Muthén, 1994)
27
. This pooled-within value structure has been found to be fairly stable 
(Fontaine, et al., 2008). Table 6.6 shows the results of the analysis. Dimension one of 
the SVS significantly correlated with the relative frequencies of moral trait categories, 
except for the New Zealand sample which could be due to the smaller sample size. This 
dimension is characterized by a personal vs. social value orientation (see also Fontaine, 
et al., 2008; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 2005). Hence, moral trait categories were 
related to values with a social orientation. Dimension two of the SVS on the other hand 
did not correlate with moral trait frequencies in any of the samples. This dimension has 
been labelled as ‘self-expansion and growth’ versus ‘self-protection against threat’ 
value orientation (Schwartz, 2005). The results indicate that moral attributes that were 
matched with the SVS are not related to these kinds of self-focused values.  
                                               
27
 See also chapter two for more details on sample characteristics of Schwartz’ dataset as well as the 
multidimensional and pooled-within analyses.  
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Table 6.6: SVS dimensions correlated with frequencies of moral trait categories. 
                                       Sample 
 
Pan-
cultural Brazilian German 
New 
Zealand Filipino 
SVS dim 1       
(personal vs. social)     .36*** .36* .46* .21     .45** 
 
SVS dim 2       
(growth vs. protection)      .05 .23    -.02 .11 .33 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed.  
Degrees of freedom = (1, 126) for pan-cultural analysis and (1, 30) for intra-cultural analyses.    
 
A content analysis demonstrated that participants from all cultural samples 
accessed some of the value type categories more frequently than others (pan-cultural 
sample: χ
2
(8) = 266.09, p < .001; Germany: χ
2
(7) = 53.54, p < .001; New Zealand: χ
2
(7) 
= 70.00, p < .001; Brazil: χ
2
(5) = 66.75, p < .001; The Philippines: χ
2
(7) = 56.13, p < 
.001)
28
. Benevolence was assessed more frequently than other value types followed by 
conformity and universalism. One exception is the Filipino sample for which tradition 
and conformity value type categories were assessed most frequently.  
In order to compare the implicit with the explicit measure of values, value type 
hierarchies based on frequencies (implicit measure) were correlated with value type 
hierarchies based on explicit ratings. There were five datasets of explicit value 
hierarchies with which the implicit measure could be compared to: (1) Schwartz and 
Bardi’s (2001) pan-cultural value hierarchy based on students’ importance ratings of 
values from 54 different nations (see also Table 6.5); and from study three of this thesis 
(2) personal importance ratings, (3) personal moral value ratings, and (4) societal moral 
value ratings derived from the cultural samples Brazil, Germany, New Zealand and the 
                                               
28
 Chi-square statistics were computed on frequencies corrected for number of values in a value type.  
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Philippines
29
. The correlations for the pan-cultural sample as well as for the four 
culture-specific samples are displayed in Table 6.7.  
The Spearman correlations between the value type hierarchies produced by 
implicit and explicit measure of values showed that the implicit moral value measure 
was not related to personal importance ratings or perceived societal expectations. 
However, the implicit moral value measure was related to self-reported personal moral 
values. This correlation pattern was prevalent in both the pan-cultural sample as well as 
the four culture-specific samples. Two conclusions can be drawn: First, there is a 
relationship between implicit and explicit measures of moral values. This can be 
regarded as a validation of the measurement of moral values in the sense that different 
methods, that were supposed to assess moral values, converged (cf. Campbell & Fiske, 
1959). Secondly, the relationship between implicit and explicit moral values was only 
established for personal moral values, but not for perceived societal expectations. This 
finding sheds further light on the meaning of moral prototypes. A culture-specific moral 
prototype seems to measure what individuals in a culture regard as being morally 
relevant to themselves. Societal expectations on the other hand seem to measure 
something else than just the ‘collective wisdom’ about moral  values. It may be that 
moral prototypes and personal moral values reflect an ideal conception of what is right 
and wrong. Benevolence, universalism and conformity were here the value types that 
ranked highest. They relate to the welfare of close and distant others and to self-restraint 
(Schwartz, 1992). They can be interpreted as typical ideal moral values that facilitate 
coordinated social interactions. Societal expectations on the other hand may reflect the 
actual normative pressure about how to behave and what to value, which is considerably 
different to the ideal conception of morality as often described in the literature.  
                                               
29
 For the actual rank orders of values see Appendix D.  
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Measure  Implicit Value Measure 
    
Pan-









(2001)  .33     
Pan-cultural  IMP  .36     
 MOR   .60
†
     
 EXP  .17     
Brazil IMP    .40    
 MOR     .61
†
    
 EXP   -.10      
Germany IMP     .59   
 MOR       .74*   
 EXP     -.29    
New Zealand IMP     .54  
 MOR       .78*  
 EXP     .38  
The 
Philippines IMP      .50 
 MOR        .64
†
 
  EXP          .57 
Note. 
†
p < .10, *p < .05, two-tailed, N = 9 value types. IMP = value hierarchy based on the personal 
importance rating scale , MOR = value hierarchy based on the personal moral relevance rating scale, EXP 
= value hierarchy based on the societal expectation rating scale.  
 
Personally important value hierarchies differ from personal moral value hierarchies in 
the way that self-focused values, such as self-direction, seem to play a subordinate role 
in the latter. 
 
Comparing Features of the ‘Moral Person’ and the ‘Good Person’  
Finally, whether the target for studying moral prototypes is interchangeable with 
the concept of a ‘good person’ was examined. Responses by New Zealand students on 
the ‘good’ and ‘moral’ target were compared with each other. Furthermore, Filipino 
responses from this study using the ‘moral’ target were compared to data from Smith, et 
al. (2007) in which Filipino students were presented the ‘good’ target. There was an 
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overlap of 23 trait categories produced by the two Filipino samples. The trait categories 
that emerged only in Smith, et al.’s (2007) Filipino sample were: active, sense of 
humour, athletic and attractive. A total of 13 moral traits were unique to the ‘moral 
character’ target in my Filipino sample (see Table 6.9): good, right, just, obedient, 
ethical, has standards, humble, disciplined, virtuous, exemplary, determined, unselfish 
and wise. The Spearman correlation, including zero frequencies, between both lists of 
attributes was not significant (r
s
(39) = -.14, p > .05), but became marginally significant 
when zero frequencies were excluded (r
s
(22) = .42, p = .05).  
In the New Zealand sample, the ‘good character’ descriptors were reduced to 25 
trait categories using the judgment rules as described above. There were three attributes 
of the ‘good person’ that did not emerge in the moral trait sample: easy-going, fun and 
open. A total of six moral trait categories were idiosyncratic to the moral target sample: 
firm, obedient, proud, religious, respected and right. Table 6.8 displays all attributes 
and their relative frequencies adjusted by sample size. A Spearman correlation between 
both targets including all zero frequencies showed that there was no significant 
correlation (r
s
(33) = .28, p > .05) between the two rank orderings when zero frequencies 
were included. However, the correlation was significant when zero frequencies were 
excluded (r
s
 (24) = .47, p < .05). 
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Table 6.8: Attributes of a ‘good’ and a ‘moral’ person free-listed by two New Zealand 
samples. 
  
New Zealand ‘good’ 
target  % 
New Zealand ‘moral’ 
target % 
1 friendly 67 honest 67 
2 honest 56 good 24 
3 kind 46 kind 24 
4 fun 28 ethical 22 
5 caring 27 trustworthy 22 
6 reliable 26 caring 21 
7 helpful 21 has standards 20 
8 loyal 20 helpful 19 
9 trustworthy 18 friendly 18 
10 considerate 17 right 18 
11 generous 17 strong 18 
12 sociable 16 considerate 17 
13 ethical 12 compassionate 11 
14 just 11 respectful 11 
15 happy 10 proud 10 
16 open 10 reliable 10 
17 easy-going 9 firm 9 
18 good 7 generous 9 
19 strong 7 just 8 
20 unselfish 7 loyal 8 
21 determined 6 obedient 8 
22 respectful 6 unselfish 8 
23 warm-hearted 6 respected 7 
24 well-mannered 6 tolerant 7 
25 compassionate 5 intelligent 6 
26 tolerant 4 religious 6 
27 has standards 2 well-mannered 6 
28 intelligent 2 determined 3 
29 firm 0 sociable 2 
30 obedient 0 happy 1 
31 proud 0 warm-hearted 1 
32 religious 0 easy-going 0 
33 respected 0 fun 0 
34 right 0 open 0 
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Table 6.9: Attributes of a ‘good’ and a ‘moral’ person in two Filipino samples. 
  Filipino ‘moral’ target % 
Filipino ‘good’ target  
(Smith, et al., 2007) 
% 
1 religious 66 honest 46 
2 good 54 kind
a
 44 
3 honest 40 caring 38 
4 kind 35 sense of humour 34 
5 respectful 33 understanding 32 
6 right 21 loving 26 
7 well-mannered 21 considerate 26 
8 just 19 helpful 25 
9 friendly 17 friendly 21 
10 generous 13 generous 21 
11 obedient 13 sociable 21 
12 ethical 12 educated
b
 20 
13 Has standards 12 intelligent 18 
14 humble 11 responsible 15 
15 disciplined 10 athletic 15 
16 loving 9 respectful 14 
17 virtuous 9 attractive 14 
18 exemplary 8 well-mannered
c
 12 
19 considerate 7 religious 11 
20 helpful 7 trustworthy 11 
21 trustworthy 7 active 11 
22 caring 6 patient 10 
23 responsible 6 compassionate 9 
24 determined 6 loyal 9 
25 unselfish 6 positive 9 
26 wise 6 hardworking 9 
27 compassionate 5 self-confident
d
 8 
28 loyal 5 good 0 
29 understanding 4 right 0 
30 sociable 4 just 0 
31 educated 4 obedient 0 
32 positive 4 ethical 0 
33 self-confident 4 has standards 0 
34 intelligent 2 humble 0 
35 patient 1 disciplined 0 
36 hardworking 1 virtuous 0 
37 sense of humour 0 exemplary 0 
38 athletic 0 determined 0 
39 attractive 0 unselfish 0 
40 active 0 wise 0 
Note. Smith, et al. (2007) counted some of the features separately which fall here under one and the same 
trait category: 
a 
is the sum of frequencies for kind and nice, 
b
 is the sum of frequencies for educated and 
knowledgeable, 
c
 is the sum of frequencies for courteous and well-mannered, 
d
 is the sum of frequencies 
for assertive and confident.  
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To facilitate again the interpretation of features associated with specific samples 
as well as the comparison of the relative similarity of the samples, a correspondence 
analysis on all four samples was conducted. The two-dimensional biplot is depicted in 





Figure 6.4: Two-dimensional representation of correspondence analysis results for  










 denote samples from the Philippines or New Zealand 
respectively which received either the ‘moral’ or ‘good’ character target. PH
good
 is based on data from 
Smith, et al. (2007).  
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The summary statistics produced a significant chi-square (²(150) = 1550.43, p 
< .001). The total inertia was high with all dimensions explaining 81.4% of the variance 
in the original correspondence table. The first dimension explained 44.1% of the 81.4%, 
the second 38% of it and the third dimension 17.9% which is lower than the 20% cutoff 
recommended by Hair, et al. (2006). Hence, only two dimensions were retained.  
An immediately striking feature is that the shape of the points in the map form 
once more a triangle. The endpoints of this triangle are characterized by the New 
Zealand ‘good target’ sample, the Filipino ‘good target’ sample and the Filipino ‘moral 
target’ sample. The New Zealand ‘moral target’ sample is located close to the origin of 
the map. Inspection of the sample-specific traits shows that there is again a ‘liberal-
traditional’ distinction characterized by features such as being open-minded, tolerant 
versus being disciplined and religious. The New Zealand ‘good’ and ‘moral’ target 
samples are both more closely located to the liberal pole (dimension two) whereas the 
Filipino samples tend to be closer to the traditional pole. In this analysis, it became 
evident that there were only minor differences between the New Zealand ‘good’ and 
‘moral character’ target. 
The two Filipino samples show a different picture. Their location in the 
perceptual map shows that they are differently arranged along the first dimension. The 
interpretation of this dimension is more difficult. Yet, one pole seems to be  made up of 
items that are more about personally desired characteristics (e.g. being attractive and 
athletic) and the other of socially desirable characteristics (e.g. being just and ethical). 
Hence, the poles of this dimension may be labelled ‘personally desired’ versus ‘socially 
desirable’. Interestingly, it appears then that the New Zealand sample yielded traits that 
are more of the ‘liberal’ and ‘socially desirable’ kind regardless of the target.  
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Does it matter whether the ‘good’ or the ‘moral’ person is used as a target to 
elicit moral prototypes? The answer seems to be - ‘it depends’. It depends whether the 
samples studied belong to collectivistic or individualistic cultures. The findings suggest 
that the target does not matter that much when individualistic cultures are studied. 
However, there may be a considerable difference between the two targets when 
collectivistic cultures are sampled. The Filipino sample associated with a ‘moral person’ 
more traditional traits and values. The Filipino sample with he ‘good person’ as a target 
yielded not only what is socially good as opposed to bad, but also what is intellectually 
good (e.g. being intelligent) and interestingly also a number of characteristics which 
refer to what is physically good (e.g. being attractive). Hence, in the collectivistic 
sample the target ‘good’ yielded a broader category of associations, including what is 




The present study was designed to answer four central research questions: What 
kinds of attributes are associated with a ‘moral person’ (RQ1)? Are there cultural 
differences and similarities in associations of a ‘moral person’ (RQ2)? Are implicit and 
explicit measures of moral values related to each other (RQ3)? Does the ‘good person’ 
elicit the same characteristics as the ‘moral person’ (RQ4)? 
In regard to the first research question, I found that the concept of a ‘moral 
person’ evokes characteristics which can be arranged along two dimensions in a 
perceptual map: other- vs. self-focused attributes and traditional vs. liberal attributes. 
Most of the attributes tended to be located on the ‘other-’pole and to imply a 
‘traditional’ connotation.  
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Research question two can be answered in the affirmative. There were clear 
cultural differences in associations regarding a ‘moral person’. The Brazilian sample 
defined the ‘traditional’ and ‘self-focused’ dimension in the perceptual map, the Filipino 
sample the ‘traditional’ and ‘other-focused’ dimension, and the German sample the 
‘other-focused’ and ‘liberal’ dimension. The New Zealand sample was located close to 
the centroid which means that it shared variance with all the other samples and did not 
contribute to the definition of any of the dimensions through culturally idiosyncratic 
attributes. The location of the samples in the map corroborated the expected 
individualism-collectivism distinction: the Filipino and Brazilian sample were both 
located at the ‘traditional’ pole, the German sample at the opposite ‘liberal’ pole, and 
the New Zealand sample somewhat in-between.  
Regarding research question three, I matched the moral attributes with values 
from the SVS (Schwartz, 1992). There were a number of trait categories that did not fit 
with Schwartz’ values, such as being friendly, generous, and kind which constitute a set 
of moral values that is not assessed through the SVS. Furthermore, I found that moral 
attributes were related to Schwartz’ social dimension of his circumplex model. The 
value types that were most frequently accessed in the free-listing task were benevolence, 
conformity and universalism which belong to the higher order value orientations of self-
transcendence and conservation. I correlated the frequencies of the implicit moral 
values with explicit ratings of Schwartz’ value types from Study 3. I found that only 
ratings of personal moral values were correlated with frequencies of implicit moral 
values. This is an interesting finding since it was expected that implicit moral values are 
a kind of ‘collective wisdom’ about what is right or wrong and would be related to 
societal expectation ratings, because the latter reflects culturally determined ‘oughts’ 
and ‘shoulds’. It seems that what is measured with the implicit method is related to what 
individuals regard as personally right and wrong. It is not related to what they 
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personally regard as important in their lives corroborating the distinction of values as 
the ‘desired’ (personal values) and the ‘desirable’ (moral values). And there is not much 
cultural variability in the accessibility of moral attributes when they are matched with 
an expert-designed value inventory. Hence, there is a ‘widespread’ consensus that a 
personal morality emphasizes values of benevolence, conformity and universalism.  
In regard to research question four whether the targets are interchangeable, it 
seems that it depends on the cultural sample. In the more collectivistic sample (Filipino 
sample) the ‘moral’ target elicited attributes that are defined by “socially desirable” 
features related to morality. However, the ‘good’ target elicited attributes that can be 
described as “personally desired” (e.g. being intelligent, attractive) and that are related 
to competence and sociability. Hence, the two targets provoked a distinction between 
‘morality’ on the one hand and ‘competence’ and ‘sociability’ on the other hand (see 
also Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007, for a distinction of these three concepts). In the 
more individualistic sample (New Zealand), this distinction did not occur. The ‘moral’ 
target was conflated with the ‘good’ target. It appears that the concept of a good person 
comprises here the concept of a moral person.  
   
Limitations 
The series of analyses in this study have produced insightful findings in what it 
means to be a ‘moral’ or ‘good’ person in different cultures. When drawing conclusions 
from the findings, there are also limitations to consider. One of them is the different 
proportion of females in the samples. The New Zealand sample showed the highest 
proportion of females which leads to the question whether the responses may not exhibit 
a gender effect as opposed to a cultural effect. Gender differences in morality have been 
discussed in moral psychology since Gilligan (1982) argued that women adopt the 
principle of care in their moral reasoning. However, a careful analysis of the literature 
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by Walker (1991) revealed that studies of moral reasoning have generally failed to find 
gender differences. Nevertheless, it may be that men and women differ in their 
conception of a ‘moral person’. Yet, Walker and Pitts (1998) found that men and 
women were very similar in their moral prototypicality ratings and concluded that they 
share a common conception of the ‘moral person’. Furthermore, if there was a gender 
bias in the New Zealand sample, one would expect that certain attributes, such as 
caring, occurred with a relatively high frequency in the female dominated sample. 
However, by comparing the two New Zealand samples (moral vs. good target) which 
differ in their proportion of females (71% versus 59%), we can see that the presumably 
‘female’ attribute caring occurs almost with the same frequency. Even though, it is not 
possible to fully exclude gender as an explanation for the emerging New Zealand moral 
prototype, it seems very unlikely that it has induced a bias.  
Another point of consideration is that the cross-cultural comparison of the 
‘good’ and the ‘moral’ target involves primary data analysis of two New Zealand and a 
Filipino sample and a secondary data analysis of another Filipino sample provided by 
Smith, et al. (2007). It is noteworthy that responses of all three samples collected in my 
study did not differ along the ‘personally desired’ vs. ‘socially desirable’ dimension. 
They only differed in terms of their ‘liberal’ or ‘traditional’ orientation. The only 
sample that defined the ‘personally desired’ dimension is the one that stems from a 
secondary data source, i.e. the Filipino sample responding to the ‘good person’ target. 
The question is whether this is a genuine result or due to different analytical strategies 
adopted by the different researchers. A comparison of the content of ‘good’ and ‘moral’ 
Filipino attributes shows that there are indeed very different pattern of responses. What 
is frequently mentioned in regard to a ‘good person’ (e.g. sense of humour) is not at all, 
or not as frequently mentioned in regard to a ‘moral person’. Even though Smith et al. 
(2007) may have used a different categorization scheme, there are such pronounced 
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differences in the content of associated attributes that it is unlikely that they are due to 
analytical differences for deriving the trait categories. 
 A last point to consider is that no inter-rater reliabilities were obtained for the 
qualitative analysis. However, the moral trait categories were discussed with another 
colleague until agreement was achieved. Both approaches have their advantages and 
disadvantages and they parallel somewhat procedures frequently employed for the 
translation of surveys: translation-backtranslation and committee approach (cf. 
Harkness, 2003). Inter-rater reliabilities and translation-backtranslation provide a more 
objective measure of agreement. At the same time they are also very time consuming 
and tedious since they need to be conducted by at least two persons separately and the 
solutions can then be discussed. A group-based analysis, and the committee approach 
for translating surveys, have the advantage that the problem can be discussed from 
different perspectives and a good solution can be obtained by critically taking into 
account the different points of view right from the beginning. Considering that this 
study produced 692 traits to categorize (after the computerized frequency analysis in 
Stage 1), it was regarded as more efficient to adopt a group-based analytical approach.   
 
Conclusion 
This study is the first to report a cross-cultural comparison on moral prototypes, 
using different analytical techniques such as correspondence, content and correlational 
analysis. The main contributions to the literature are threefold. First, the study offers a 
detailed account of how qualitative responses can be analyzed to obtain a list of trait 
categories that are central and peripheral to a prototype. I also presented a more 
objective criterium (scree plot) to decide which trait categories in a prototype analysis 
are rather central than peripheral. Since qualitative data analysis is not as structured as 
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quantitative analysis, this may be an important step forward for a consistent prototype 
analysis.  
Secondly, the study shows that there are pronounced cultural differences in 
moral prototypes when laypeople are given the opportunity to free-list their associations 
of a ‘moral person’. It is noteworthy that ‘forcing’ the free-listed moral attributes into 
expert-designed categories (here the Schwartz’ value types) diminished the differences 
and rendered the samples more similar to each other. Hence, if cultural differences are 
the research focus, it is worthwhile to examine laypeople’s opinions and beliefs through 
open-ended responses. This is also consistent with the indigenous psychology 
movement which often uses qualitative methods (see Kim & Berry, 1993; Kim, Yang, 
& Hwang, 2006, for an introduction into indigenous psychology). Studies examining 
indigenous notions conceptualized as personality traits, social norms or values are 
regarded as the most fruitful studies when it comes to the detection of cross-cultural 
differences (Berry, et al., 2002). Future research in cross-cultural psychology could 
employ prototype analyses using other concepts than the ‘moral person’ to uncover 
cultural differences.  
The third main contribution is that the study investigated whether the ‘moral 
person’ and the ‘good person’ produce indeed similar attributes as it has been implicitly 
claimed in past research (e.g. Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Smith, et al., 2007). The findings 
showed that when the sample is individualistic, it may not make a big difference if the 
‘good’ or the ‘moral person’ target is used. However, if the research objective is to 
investigate the moral prototype and the sample is collectivistic-oriented, the ‘moral 
person’ should be taken as a target since it produces different attributes compared to the 
‘good person’. Although this finding warrants further research to confirm its 
generalizability, it may be an important aspect to consider when conducting cross-
cultural research on the moral prototype. So far, only one cross-cultural study has been 
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conducted with this aim - and this study used the ‘good person’ as a target (Smith, et al., 
2007).  
Numerous other researchers used moral traits in their investigation of morality, 
but did not conduct cultural comparative research so far (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Leach, et al., 2007; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Aquino and Reed (2002; 
Reed & Aquino, 2003), for instance, developed the moral identity scale which assesses 
the participants’ self-importance of some moral traits. Most of their traits have been 
identified as central and widely shared among the cultural samples in my research. 
Nevertheless, some of Aquino and Reed’s moral traits (e.g. hardworking) did not 
emerge as central and shared moral traits in my research. If a cross-cultural study is 
conducted with this moral identity scale, it would be important to include traits that are 
‘universal’ moral traits to ensure cross-cultural equivalence of this psychometric 
measure. My research can provide a first indication in this regard. For example, 
attributes related to Schwartz’ (1992) benevolence, conformity and universalism value 
type would fulfil this requirement.  
My results are also highly relevant for future research on moral chronicity. 
Moral chronicity is defined as the chronic availability of moral knowledge structures 
(Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Narvaez, et al. (2006), for example, argued that the moral 
personality can be conceptualized in terms of moral chronicity. In order to decide what 
qualifies as moral knowledge structures, a prototype analysis is conducted beforehand. 
Lapsley and Lasky (2001) conducted a prototype analysis using the ‘good person’ as a 
target in a regional university in the American Midwest. My research showed that the 
‘good person’ and ‘moral person’ target yield similar attributes in an individualistic-
oriented sample, but considerably different ones in a collectivistic-oriented sample. 
Hence, if non-Western samples are studied using the moral chronicity paradigm, I 
would recommend using the ‘moral person’ as a target in the prototype analysis to 
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distinguish moral chronics from non-chronics in subsequent studies. Future research 
should be conducted in order to ensure that the differences in targets found across 
cultural samples show a generalizable trend.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
This final chapter draws a thread through the results of the four empirical studies which 
aimed to critically examine Schwartz’ cultural values concept, and to investigate its 
relationship to morality. Three of the four studies (Study 2, 3 and 4) were designed to 
bridge the gap between research on morality on the one hand and values research on the 
other hand. I have pointed out in the introduction and in chapter two that values are a 
central concept to the definition and measurement of culture. The common approach in 
cross-cultural psychology is to ask individuals from different cultures about their 
personal values and to statistically aggregate the responses at the culture-level, which 
can be further analyzed with structure-oriented techniques (e.g. factor analysis, MDS). 
This practice has been criticized as neglecting the external constraints and norms (see 
e.g. Gelfand, et al., 2006), such as prescriptive beliefs about what people should do or 
ought to do in a certain culture. Moral psychologists, on the other hand, have not paid 
much attention to the content of morality, i.e. the moral values that guide people in their 
lives (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983). The study of cultural differences in moral 
values has been hindered by the normative epistemological approach to define a priori 
what belongs in- and outside any definition of morality. Yet, theories proposed by 
cultural psychologists provide a justification for defining ‘moral’ in terms of what 
laypeople judge as moral (Haidt, 2001), and for allocating the cultural variation in these 
judgments to the domain of morality (Shweder, et al., 1997). These theories also fit with 
another theoretical perspective in the study of morality (Walker & Pitts, 1998b): the 
naturalistic approach focusing on the analysis of laypeople’s notions of morality, 
embedded in common understanding and ordinary language, without imposing 
philosophical constraints.  
Chapter seven: General discussion 
- 261 - 
This thesis touches upon these different research frameworks, and I will outline the 
contribution made to the literature in these areas, after briefly summarizing the main 
findings of my studies and pointing out their strengths and limitations. I will finish with 
some general ideas for future research and practical implications.  
 
Summary of Main Findings 
A schematic overview of the main findings from each study is depicted in Figure 
7.1. A common feature of all four studies is that they assessed values at the culture-
level. In culture-level analyses, each nation or ethnic/ cultural group is treated as a 
single case by aggregating responses from individuals, usually through means (see 
Study 1, 2, and 3). Study 4, which is based on a prototype analysis, also operates at the 
culture-level, since the prototype is based on the frequency counts reported in a sample. 
The main findings of all studies are primarily based on correlational and regression 
analysis. Three of the four studies have been interconnected with each other: Study 3 
includes a replication of the main findings from Study 2; and Study 4 has been used to 
validate some of the results from Study 3 using a multimethod approach (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959) 
. 
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Figure 7.1: Schematic overview of main findings and linkages between studies. 
Note. IA/ AA = Intellectual Autonomy/ Affective Autonomy, MA= Mastery, EM = Embeddedness, EG/ HA = Egalitarianism/ Harmony, SFC = Self-fulfilled Connectedness, AUT 
(+) vs. EMB (-) = value dimension: Autonomy (positive pole) vs. Embeddedness (negative pole), OPCH (+) vs. CONS (-) = Openness-to-change (positive pole) vs. Conservation 
(negative pole), + signifies a positive correlation (double arrow) or positive prediction (simple arrow). Tolerance towards personal-sexual behaviours was rated on a 10 pt Likert 
scale ranging from never justifiable (1) to always justifiable (10) in Study 2 and on a 5 pt Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all wrong to (5) extremely wrong in Study 3. The 
coding of Study 3 has been reversed for the schematic overview so that higher scores represent higher tolerance towards the moral issues.  
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The focus in Study 1 was to examine whether Schwartz’ (1994, 2006) Culture-
level Value Theory is replicable using different samples and a different value inventory. 
The Rokeach Value Survey (RVS, Rokeach, 1968, 1973, a forerunner of the SVS) was 
used for this purpose. The RVS is based on a ranking procedure and contains values 
which match conceptually with half of the items (28 out of 56) of the SVS. A meta-
analysis was conducted on the RVS to gather data from samples all around the world. 
The data were aggregated at the culture-level and value rank orders of 37 cultural 
groups were analyzed using a multidimensional scaling technique. Qualitative and 
quantitative comparisons with the SVS value structure corroborated the existence of the 
main conflicting value types, i.e. Embeddedness vs. Affective/ Intellectual Autonomy 
and Mastery vs. Egalitarianism/ Harmony, as predicted by Schwartz (1994). 
Furthermore, some of the Rokeach value items, which were not included in Schwartz’ 
culture-level analysis, were found to form a new value type labelled Self-fulfilled 
Connectedness (SFC). I proposed that SFC may be an individualistic value orientation 
that shares some similarity with Autonomy values. However, unlike Autonomy it 
emphasizes the importance of relationships. Correlations with country indices of 
happiness, post-materialism and socio-economic development supported the idea that 
SFC is related to the pursuit of non-material goals and endorsed in countries in which 
basic needs are fulfilled.  
The finding of an additional value cluster is intriguing and it would have been 
desirable to examine the meaning of the SFC values at the individual-level as well as 
their link to morality. Time and space constraints made it impossible to do so in this 
thesis. Nevertheless, there are indications in the literature that SFC, with its self- and 
other-related value items, is a meaningful value type at the individual-level (see, e.g., 
Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997, for a theoretical review on the compatibility of autonomy and 
relatedness). Pohjanheimo (1997), for instance, found an almost identical value type 
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when examining the structure of Schwartz’ values at the individual-level in a Finnish 
sample (Helkama, personal communication, November 9, 2009). Furthermore, the 
literature suggests that the kind of values found in SFC may indeed be related to 
morality. For example, Waterman (1981) pointed out that the value system of 
individualism is not necessarily a selfish orientation. He argues that individualism can 
also be conceptualized as ethical individualism containing a sense of flourishing 
(eudamonia) and relatedness to others, which parallels the values of SFC. Waterman 
(1981) suggested that some aspects of ethical individualism underlie what Kohlberg 
(1969) regards as the highest stage of moral reasoning. Furthermore, it seems that 
individuals who endorse an ethical kind of individualism are those who can stand up in 
defiance of the group to defend their principles and engage in political protest activities 
if necessary (Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968). Hence, there may be a close relationship 
between endorsing SFC values and moral reasoning in terms of Kohlberg’s principle of 
justice. There is at least one real-life example that underscores the link between 
endorsement of SFC values (e.g. happiness, love and harmony) in a subculture and 
political protests in the name of a universal justice: the hippie movement in the late 
1960’s.  
Study 2 examined whether cultural values, based on the statistical aggregation of 
personal values, account for individuals’ moral attitudes. The main objective was to test 
the predictive validity of Schwartz’ cultural values in the moral realm and to shed light 
on the universalism and relativism debate in moral psychology by showing that the 
answer depends on the moral issues studied. I first conducted a multigroup confirmatory 
factor analysis on ten items of the Morally Debatable Behaviour Scale (MDBS) 
supposed to measure different moral attitudes. The data were obtained from the 
European/ World Value Survey (EVS/ WVS). Metric invariance was confirmed for a 
two-factor solution (dishonest-illegal and personal-sexual issues) across 80 countries. 
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Drawing upon evolutionary and cultural psychological theories, I expected attitudes 
towards dishonest-illegal behaviours to be independent of cultural values, whereas 
attitudes towards personal-sexual behaviours would depend on cultural conceptions of 
the self as either independent or interdependent with others. In two multilevel regression 
models, Schwartz’ cultural values were the independent variables and the dishonest-
illegal and personal-sexual factor served as dependent variables. After controlling for 
individual-level differences in moral attitudes as well as the socio-economic 
development of countries, the findings corroborated that (1) breaches of social 
cooperation (i.e. dishonest-illegal behaviours) were not related to cultural values, 
whereas (2) matters of individuals’ choices (i.e. personal-sexual behaviours) were 
judged more strictly in Embeddedness cultures and more leniently in Autonomy-oriented 
cultures. This study sheds not only light on the universalism and relativism debate, but 
also on the discriminant validity of cultural values.  
Study 1 and 2 showed that Schwartz’ cultural values are generalizable and 
possess predictive validity in the moral realm. The latter contradicts, to some extent, 
what I have originally argued in my theoretical chapter (chapter two). I scrutinized 
Schwartz’ (1994) measurement of cultural values and argued that it measures what is 
personally desired instead of what is desirable, the latter consisting of moral beliefs in 
terms of what is right or wrong and which is intrinsically related to culture (see also 
Eckensberger, 2007; Miller, 2001). Nevertheless, Study 2 showed that Schwartz’ 
cultural values are consistent with theories of culture and morality concerning the 
prediction of moral attitudes (Graham, et al., 2009; Shweder, et al., 1997). Hence, it 
appears that Schwartz’ cultural values do assess the general guidelines of what is 
regarded as right or wrong in a particular culture. Although the finding contradicts my 
previous argument, it is still explicable. Internalization processes may transform some 
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values that are culturally promoted as moral into values that are personally important 
(cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
Nevertheless, at this point, I could have turned away from investigating moral 
values as an alternative measure of culture. However, there were two reasons why I 
found it worthwhile to proceed studying moral values as a separate construct. The first 
reason is conceptual in nature: as with the confusion between values and attitudes which 
impedes a deeper understanding of the relationship between these two concepts (Rohan, 
2000), the failure to distinguish between personal values and moral values may hinder 
an understanding of how they are related to each other. The second reason is 
methodological in nature and addresses the common practice in cross-cultural research 
of measuring cultural values through the statistical aggregation of personal values. 
There is the problem of causal inconsistency if personal and cultural values are not 
operationalized differently (Roe & Ester, 1999): if the assumption is that cultural values 
influence individuals’ values and the aim is to study value change, it becomes difficult 
to comprehend how a change in cultural values can cause a change in individual values 
if the change in cultural values is measured through the aggregated changes in 
individual values. In order to avoid such problems of circularity, it would be necessary 
to conceptualize and operationalize macro-level constructs differently from micro-level 
constructs (Liska, 1990). Hence, I designed Study 3 and 4 to measure moral values as a 
separate construct from personal values and as a valid alternative to Schwartz’ cultural 
values.   
In Study 3, I developed a measure of moral values based on my value taxonomy 
previously put forward in chapter two, in which I distinguished between personal moral 
values and societal moral values. I expected them to be a valid alternative for the 
measurement of culture. I constructed a value survey using the SVS in which I modified 
the response scale in order to measure personal moral values, societal moral values and 
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personal values. Data were gathered from more than 1,400 university students from 
eight countries. I tested the validity of the moral value measures as a macro-level 
variable for culture by replicating the multi-level regression model from Study 2. Two 
multilevel regression models using CLOP analyses (James & Williams, 2000) showed 
that the following values predicted individuals’ moral attitudes after controlling for 
socio-demographics (age, gender, political orientation, and religiosity) and individual-
level response sets in value ratings: (1) the personal importance of openness-to-change 
(vs. conservation) at both the individual- and aggregated culture-level was related to a 
more lenient attitude towards personal-sexual issues, replicating conceptually the cross-
level effect from Study 2; personal moral values did not add incremental validity to this 
prediction; and (2) the societal expectation of openness-to-change (vs. conservation) at 
the culture-level was likewise related to a more lenient attitude. However, societal 
expectation ratings at the individual-level were not reliably related to individuals’ moral 
attitudes, suggesting that it may be a ‘true’ macro-level concept which operates 
independently from the micro-level. It seems that a person’s (subjective) perception of 
the societal expectation is not sufficient to have an effect on her moral attitude. Only if 
there is an (objective) ‘agreement’ that certain values are expected in the respective 
society, does it have an effect on a person’s attitude towards personal-sexual issues.  
Finally, Study 4 was aimed at deriving moral values with an entirely different 
method. Instead of relying on an ‘expert-designed’ list of values, the objective was to 
provide laypeople the opportunity to freely generate moral values by asking them what 
kind of attributes they associate with a ‘moral person’. This is consistent with the 
naturalistic position in moral psychology. I proposed that these automatic associations 
could be regarded as an implicit method for deriving moral values. Prototype analysis 
was used based on counting the occurring frequencies of reported moral attributes, with 
high frequencies indicating high accessibility and centrality to the prototype. A 
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correspondence analysis on the free-listed moral attributes from four cultural samples 
showed a partition of collectivistic samples reporting more ‘traditional’ attributes and 
individualistic samples listing more ‘liberal’ attributes. When matching the moral trait 
categories with values from the Schwartz’ Value Survey, it became evident that 
attributes falling into the value types benevolence, conformity and universalism were 
accessed most in all samples. The moral trait hierarchies were highly correlated across 
cultural samples when forced into Schwartz’ categorization scheme of value types, and 
were also positively correlated with the value hierarchy produced by personal moral 
value ratings from Study 3. The latter findings suggest that the moral prototype is 
associated with a kind of personal morality. This kind of morality tends to be more 
similar than different across different cultures when matched with the values of the 
SVS. Hence, Studies 2 and 3 suggest that my theoretical proposition from chapter two 
needs to be revised: Values assessed as societal expectations exhibit pronounced 
cultural differences, however, values as assessed as personal moral values tend to be 
shared across cultures. These studies have provided an important insight into alternative 
measures of cultural values.  
 
Strengths of this Research 
This thesis has a number of methodological and theoretical strengths. In terms of 
methodology, very large samples have been used in Study 1 and 2 (minimum of 44,047 
respondents and 37 cultural groups), made possible through the use of archival data, 
meta-analysis and secondary data analyses. Large scale surveys such as the SVS and 
EVS/ WVS offer a unique opportunity for cross-cultural researchers to test their 
hypotheses of cultural differences on a more valid basis than a two or three cultural 
sample approach (cf. van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Cross-cultural meta-analyses are 
hugely beneficial for circumventing large scale primary data collections (cf. 
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Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; van Hemert, 2003) and have already been employed 
sporadically in cross-cultural research (e.g. Bond & Smith, 1996; Fischer & Mansell, in 
press; Oyserman, et al., 2002; van Hemert, Poortinga, & van de Vijver, 2007).  
Even though primary data collection in a short amount of time is more limited in 
terms of sampling, a decent sample size was achieved in both Study 3 (1,456 
respondents from eight cultures) and Study 4 (560 respondents from four cultures). This 
is in particular notable for Study 4, which is based on a qualitative method involving 
open-ended questions that are more time-consuming in their analysis than quantitative 
data. Nevertheless, the relative big sample size in this study renders the findings more 
‘trustworthy’ - a term used to refer to reliability in qualitative research (Seale, 1999). 
Another strength concerns the use of multi-level regression methods in Study 2 
and 3. It has been suggested that multilevel modelling is part of a new generation of 
cross-cultural research methods (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). It comes closer to the 
reality of culture by taking into account that individuals are nested within cultures. If 
culture is ‘unpackaged’ at the societal-level, i.e. decomposed into measurable 
antecedents (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), multilevel modelling is needed to take into 
account the dependencies that exist between individuals from the same culture. At the 
same time, this kind of regression modelling also allows testing the effects of culture 
while statistically controlling for the effect of other non-cultural variables (cf. 
Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). Study 2, for instance, controlled for socio-economic 
development of countries and socio-demographic characteristics of individuals (see also 
Study 3) to examine the unique effect of cultural values on the outcome variable 
(attitudes towards personal-sexual issues). The major strength of this multilevel 
approach is also that both a micro- and macro-level morality can be simultaneously 
assessed (here moral values at the individual- and culture-level). This offers a more 
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holistic picture, since human morality is commonly seen as a meeting point between the 
individual and the society.  
A further strength of this thesis is the focus on replicating findings. Replication 
is generally regarded as an important goal for the scientific advancement of psychology 
(Amir & Sharon, 1990). Study 1 successfully replicated Schwartz’ (1994, 2006) culture-
level theory. In Study 2, I replicated (or cross-validated respectively) the effect of 
cultural values on individuals’ moral attitudes with values derived from a different 
sample (Schwartz’ teacher data). In Study 3, I replicated a main finding from Study 2, 
i.e. that certain cultural values predict personal-sexual attitudes. In this study all main 
findings were cross-validated with different individuals and a different set of values 
(Version 2 of the survey). In Study 4, I successfully triangulated the qualitative findings 
on an implicit assessment of moral values, with the quantitative findings from Study 3 
on an explicit assessment of moral values. I found that implicit moral values from Study 
4 correlated only with explicit personal moral value ratings from Study 3. This 
multimethod validation (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) clarified that a personal morality is 
different from a societal morality, and that priming people with the concept of a ‘moral 
person’ (Study 4) triggers associations of their personal morality. 
At this point, I would also like to emphasize my approach to operationalizing 
moral values as positive constructs, and not in terms of immoral behaviours or 
transgressions, as has often been done in the past (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003). 
This approach is also consistent with the recent flourishing of Positive Psychology, and 
the emphasis that virtues and character strengths are equally important for the 
understanding of human psychology as the study of psychopathologies (Seligman, 
Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). The concept of happiness, for example, has been 
attributed an outstanding role in positive psychology. Happiness is a value that is not 
contained in the SVS, but that emerged as part of the new individualistic-oriented value 
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type SFC in Study 1. From a Positive Psychology perspective, it may be intriguing to 
further examine SFC as a cultural variable. The cultural emphasis on SFC and happiness 
values may, for example, have the effect that specific positive and happy aspects in 
people’s life (e.g. a satisfying marital relationship) provide a stronger buffer against 
depression and suffering in individualistic than in collectivistic countries.  
 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to consider when drawing conclusions from 
this research. One of the major limitations for Study 3 and Study 4 is the use of student 
samples which are limited in allowing inferences to be drawn about the whole cultural 
population. Most cross-cultural research relies on university student samples, because it 
has the advantage that sampling is convenient and somewhat equivalent across cultures 
(Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). Nevertheless, university entry requirements do vary across 
cultures- for example, in terms of age and also socio-economic status. An age difference 
across cultural samples was also noticeable in Study 3 and 4. The Filipino sample 
contained students that were in average relatively young, whereas the German and 
Brazilian sample were consistently six to seven years older, on average. I paid attention 
to these issues and controlled for them wherever possible to ensure that between-sample 
differences were not confounded with non-cultural variables. As it happened age, for 
example, was not a predictor of moral attitudes in Study 3, contrary to what was found 
in Study 2 with representative national samples. It appears that the age differences 
across samples in Study 3 were not big enough to have an effect on the criterion 
variable. It was not possible to control for all possible variables which may have an 
effect on the observed cultural differences. For instance, socio-economic status was not 
assessed in Study 3 and could not be taken into account as a covariate in the regression 
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model. Nonetheless, the between-sample effects that were found support the theory and 
hypotheses, so that the effect of any confounding variables appears to be negligible.  
Another point to consider is that, except for Study 1, cultures were treated as 
equivalent to nations which is a common practice in cross-cultural research (Smith, et 
al., 2002). This is certainly an oversimplification and it would be desirable to pay more 
attention to the diversity of cultural and ethnic groups within nations. On the other hand, 
individuals live in a cultural environment in which the national culture provides a 
shared source of socialisation and social control (Smith, et al., 2002). Since members of 
a nation tend to share the same legal and institutional system, it is commonly regarded 
as justifiable to use nation as a proxy for culture in cross-cultural research. Especially, 
in Study 3 and 4 the sampled cultural groups are geographically very different, so that 
between-sample differences are more likely to be due to cultural differences between 
nations. Relying on nations instead of ethnic groups also helps reducing the complexity 
of cross-cultural research. For instance, the broad theoretical cultural frameworks and 
‘maps’ that exist so far (e.g. Schwartz, 1993, 2006) mostly focus on nations which make 
it difficult to employ a theoretical sampling based on ethnic groups. Future research 
should pay more attention to the issue of ethnic groups within cultures. It would be 
fascinating to examine whether there are differences between ethnic groups embedded 
in the same nation. A multilevel modelling could be employed to take into account that 
ethnic groups are nested within nations. A three-level model is then imaginable in the 
sense that nation is at the highest level (Level 3), ethnic group at the intermediate level 
(Level 2) and individuals at the lowest level (Level 1) of analysis. The effects of value 
orientations on the criterion variable could then be examined at each level. Such a study 
would also reveal how much variance is explained through values if they are used as 
predictors at the ethnic group-level or country-level. This would provide some insight 
into the arguments around whether it is justified to treat nation as a proxy for culture. 
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This is certainly a difficult endeavour that may open up even more questions than 
answers, for example, how to classify and define ethnic groups. To start with, archival 
data may be very useful, such as data from the EVS/ WVS in which respondents have 
already been classified into different ethnicities.   
Another limitation is that I have committed the reverse ecological fallacy 
(Hofstede, 1980) in Study 3 by using individual-level concepts (openness-to-change 
versus conservation values) to describe cultures. This was done on purpose and can be 
justified on two grounds. First, recent research in which the degree of isomorphism 
between Schwartz’ individual- and culture-level structure has been examined, indicates 
that the cross-level structural differences are not very big (Fischer, Vauclair, et al., in 
press). Fischer, et al.’s study did not allow drawing clear conclusions whether the 
structures are similar enough so that they can be used in an interchangeable way. 
However, further analyses by Fischer and Poortinga (2009) on isomorphism of value 
structures using personal, social and cultural value systems (assessed with the SVS) led 
to the conclusion that a single value structure is most parsimonious. There was little 
empirical evidence that would suggest that individual- and culture-level value structures 
are different from each other, to the extent that they needed to be treated as distinct. 
Fischer and Poortinga (2009) concluded that using the same ten value types at both the 
individual and culture-level would simplify value research without a substantive loss of 
information. Recent empirical studies have already employed this practice (Lönnqvist, 
et al., 2009; Verkasalo, et al., 2009).  
The second reason for committing the reverse ecological fallacy lay in the 
opportunity to use the same value types at the individual- and culture-level. In this way 
it was possible to test and directly compare the influence of values at both levels of 
analysis. Study 3 has shown that the effects of personal importance ratings for the value 
orientation openness-to-change versus conservation were the same at the individual- 
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and culture-level. What Study 3 then empirically suggests for the first time is that the 
individual- and culture-level structure may indeed be so similar that they do not have a 
different effect when it comes to the prediction of other variables. However, this finding 
would need to be replicated in future research using other criterion variables, so that it 
can be claimed as generalizable to psychological domains other than morality. The 
distinction of levels of analysis is still vexing and hard to comprehend, but my research 
may stimulate future studies to empirically shed light on the usefulness of this 
distinction. 
A last point to consider is that I focused mainly on the Schwartz’ value theory in 
order to investigate moral values in this thesis. Even though Schwartz’ theory is one of 
the most important and widely used in contemporary values research, there are a 
number of other value taxonomies and theories that are worthwhile to explore in terms 
of their relation to morality. Depending on the aims and goals of the research, 
indigenous  value theories (e.g., Enriquez, 1990), domain-specific value taxonomies 
(see e.g., De Clercq, Fontaine, & Anseel, 2008, for the organizational context) or even 
classification of character strengths and virtues (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004) can 
be used for this purpose.  
 
Contribution to the Literature 
Cross-cultural Psychology 
Value orientations are commonly regarded as crucial variables for the 
comparison of cultures (Zavalloni, 1980). It is not surprising that most of the current 
models of cultural variation in cross-cultural psychology are based on analyses of value 
differences (cf. Smith & Schwartz, 1997). How values have been measured in the past 
can be distinguished into two approaches (see also Harding & Phillips, 1986): the 
measurement of (1) values as expressions of personal goals or ideals, preferred or 
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desired by the individual, and (2) values as an expression of the preferable, or what 
‘ought’ to be desired, as a matter of conscience. The first approach has a strong tradition 
and has been employed, for example, by Rokeach (1973) and continued by Schwartz 
(1992). The second approach has often been acknowledged in value definitions but, as I 
discussed in the introduction, has rarely been implemented in empirical value research. 
Some researchers investigating moral values have tended to take the first approach, and 
claimed that some values are moral values without conceptual justification (e.g. Shen & 
Yuan, 1999; Sikula & Costa, 1994). Hence, moral evaluations of values and personal 
preferences have not been differentiated in the past, possibly because researchers 
assumed that what is personally important is also morally relevant. However, whether 
this is the case is an empirical question to which there has been so far no satisfactory 
answer (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991).  
Another related controversy in cross-cultural psychology is that, with survey 
methods, cultural values are determined by the use of aggregated responses on personal 
values obtained from a sample of individuals and expressed through average statistics. 
The underlying assumption is that the individual is an informant who can provide 
information about a group’s values when speaking about his own (Zavalloni, 1980), but 
this alleged conceptual isomorphism between the individual and the group is an 
oversimplification. It may be misleading to assume that general cultural values are also 
the personal values held by an individual (Smith, 1969).  
 
Value Measurement 
In her review on definitions of values, Rohan (2000) warned against the 
inconsistencies in the way values have been defined in the social sciences. The aim of 
my research was not to add a ‘new construct’ under the definition of values. In fact, 
what I have examined here (values as the desirable) and the way I have examined it, is 
Chapter seven: General discussion 
- 276 - 
new empirically, but long established theoretically (e.g. Kluckhohn, 1952; Parsons & 
Shils, 1952). My aim has rather been to use the theoretical evidence and to develop a 
way of measuring moral values in order to test the utility of this construct as an 
alternative to conventional measures of cultural values. The contribution of this research 
to cross-cultural psychology lies in the operationalization of culture as an intrapsychic 
construct by using the concept of moral values. The collective nature of culture was 
obtained by combining the responses of individuals from a cultural sample. The 
difference to previous approaches lies in the fact that ‘culture’ as an external constraint 
is already assessed at the individual-level (here as a perceived societal expectation). 
Correlational and MDS analyses on cultural value hierarchies showed that there were 
stronger cultural differences when assessing societal moral values as opposed to 
personal moral values (Study 3). Hence, I would not recommend studying personal 
moral values if the focus is on examining cultural differences. Personal moral values 
may be examined in future research if the focus is on individual differences in moral 
values and their link to other individual-level variables such as moral attitudes or moral 
behaviour. I showed, for instance, in Study 3 that personal values mediate the 
relationship between personal moral values and moral attitudes at the individual-level. 
Future research is needed to confirm that this phenomenon is generalizable to other 
criterion variables than moral attitudes, such as moral behaviour. I would recommend 
using Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) which is as a promising 
framework for this kind of research, since it proposes different stages of value 
internalization which may explain conceptual differences between personal values and 
personal moral values.  
My analyses in Study 3 also showed that personal values were a significant 
predictor at both the individual- and culture-level. In contrast, societal moral values 
were a significant predictor of individuals’ moral attitudes at the culture-level, but not 
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reliably at the individual-level, which suggests that it might be a purely culture-level 
construct. What this study can suggest for future research is that societal moral values at 
the culture-level seem to be a valid macro-level alternative to personal importance 
ratings. This may be beneficial if the distinction of micro- and macro-level variables is a 
desirable one, as for example in the study of value change.  
 
Individualism-Collectivism and Values 
The cultural construct of individualism-collectivism, or autonomy-
embeddedness respectively, plays an important role in my research. I used it to 
theoretically sample cultural groups, so that differences between individualistic and 
collectivistic samples were hypothesized and could be examined. My findings 
corroborated this distinction: Studies 3 and 4 showed a partition of individualistic and 
collectivistic samples in a perceptual map. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated that only 
values tapping into the individualism-collectivism distinction were significant predictors 
of individuals’ moral attitudes towards personal-sexual issues. This effect was 
replicated in Study 3 with conceptually related values (openness to change-
conservation). Last not least, Autonomy-Embeddedness emerged as a very robust 
culture-level dimension in Study 1.  
In sum, individualism and collectivism seems to be a very strong cultural 
construct and it is not surprising that it has dominated cross-cultural theory and research 
over the past 15 years (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). Nevertheless, it has also been heavily 
criticized for being defined too broadly and inclusively so that it loses its explanatory 
power. A concept that explains everything can be said to explain nothing (cf. 
Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Poortinga & Van Hemert, 2001). I have purposely examined the 
discriminant validity of Autonomy/ Embeddedness in Study 2. Based on evolutionary 
and cultural theory, I expected that Autonomy/ Embeddedness would not be related to 
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moral attitudes towards cheating behaviours, but only to attitudes towards personal-
sexual matters. The results corroborated the expectation and is an important contribution 
to the literature showing that the cultural construct of individualism-collectivism cannot 
explain everything, but has its limitations at least in the moral realm with the items used 
in this study.  
 
Individualism-Collectivism and Morality 
The individualism-collectivism distinction is also very salient in cultural theories 
of morality. Shweder, et al. (1997) proposed the ethics of Autonomy and Community 
which parallels the individualism-collectivism, or Autonomy-Embeddedness, distinction. 
Although they suggest an additional ethic of Divinity, it seems that it falls under the 
ethics of Community, since they are both based on obligations, duties, obedience and 
respect for authorities (Haidt, et al., 1993). Recently, Haidt (2008; see also Graham, et 
al., 2009) proposed that there are two different kinds of moral systems that suppress 
selfishness: the individualizing and the binding system. In the individualizing system, 
cultures try to suppress selfishness by protecting individuals directly (e.g. through the 
legal system). This approach focuses on the ‘individual’ as the locus of moral value. 
Other cultures try to suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions and 
by binding individuals into roles, duties, and social obligations. Here, the ‘group’ is the 
locus of moral value. Even though Haidt does not explicitly refer to individualism-
collectivism, by grounding his theory on the individualizing-binding dichotomy he 
implicitly acknowledges the importance of the individualism-collectivism distinction in 
morality. My studies (Study 2 and 3) support Haidt’s (2008) and Shweder, et al.’s 
(1997) theories showing that a cultural emphasis on Autonomy (the individualizing 
system) is related to more tolerance towards behaviours that concern individuals’ 
choices, whereas Embeddedness (the binding system) is related to a stricter attitude 
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towards these behaviours because individuals may take into account the consequences 
of their choices in the context of social obligations and duties to others. These studies 
contribute to the literature by empirically relating culture and morality. Although 
theorists have already pointed out that culture and morality are inextricably related to 
each other (e.g. Miller, 2001), only a few studies have shown this link using quantitative 
methods. One of them is recent research conducted by Guerra (2008; Guerra & Giner-
Sorolla, submitted). Guerra developed a survey on the basis of Shweder, et al.’s (1997) 
ethnographic theory. Future research could relate moral discourses, as measured by 
Guerra, to moral values. It would be insightful to find out what explains moral 
behaviour across cultures - a person’s moral values or her moral reasoning or both?  
 
Beyond Individualism-Collectivism? 
Although individualism-collectivism played an important role in my research, I 
also discovered something new that may add to our understanding of this cultural 
construct. I found that individualism, in the way Schwartz (1994, 2006) defined and 
operationalized it, may lack a relational component. An additional culture-level value 
type Self-fulfilled Connectedness (SFC) emerged in Study 1, which is closely related to 
Autonomy and may therefore be regarded as an additional facet to Schwartz’ Affective 
and Intellectual Autonomy. Although this does not suggest a value dimension that is 
entirely different from the Autonomy-Embeddedness dimension, it is still a promising 
discovery for our understanding of individualism as it indicates a transcending of 
selfishness and the relatedness to others (see also Waterman, 1981). Individualism and 
collectivism are regarded as multidimensional constructs (Berry, et al., 2002) and SFC 
broadens the concept of individualism by including relationships and the pursuit of non-
material goals. It also integrates aspects of another important societal value orientation 
which is postmaterialism (Inglehart, 2006). Hence, SFC is not a new value orientation 
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beyond individualism-collectivism, but it adds an important aspect to individualism as a 
cultural value orientation, which has so far been neglected. Therefore, it provides a 
more holistic picture of individualism.  
 
Moral Psychology 
Kohlberg’s (1984) stage theory of moral reasoning dominated research in moral 
psychology for more than two decades. He doubted the usefulness of studying the 
content of morality in the form of moral values or moral traits and virtues, since one 
person’s integrity is another person’s stubbornness and one person’s honesty is another 
person’s insensitivity to the feelings of others (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 479). 
Nevertheless, more recently researchers have pointed out that moral reasoning and the 
exclusive focus on structure and not content of morality is not sufficient for a 
comprehensive understanding of moral functioning (e.g. Frimer & Walker, 2008; Krebs 
& Denton, 2005; Walker & Pitts, 1998b). There is a call for an integrated, multi-level 
model of moral functioning that includes not only a ‘micro-level morality’, i.e. face-to-
face relations or individual differences in morality (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 
1999), but also a macro-level morality including important elements such as culture (cf. 
Reed & Stoermer, 2008). It is an ambitious endeavour and this thesis can only 
contribute pieces to it. Nonetheless, by envisaging a multi-level model through which 
morality can be explained with individual- and culture-level variables, this research has 
contributed to a more integrated understanding of morality and its content in form of 
values.  
 
Investigating Morality from a Descriptive Approach 
A number of theorists in moral psychology have pointed out that moral values 
may have an important influence on moral functioning and moral behaviour (Blasi, 
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1980; Rest, 1984). What is missing so far is a more detailed account of this concrete 
content (Biel, et al., 1997), especially when it comes to values as defined in the social 
psychological literature in terms of a conception of the desirable (e.g. Kluckhohn, 1952; 
Schwartz, 1992) represented by instrumental and terminal values (Rokeach, 1973). The 
gap in the literature in regard to moral values may be due to the controversy of how to 
define morality. In the normative approach, moral values are predefined by deriving 
them from philosophical reasoning, and hence there is only a limited class of values that 
justify to be called moral values (for instance, justice, fairness; e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; 
Turiel, 1983). However, philosophically-driven notions of what is morality lead to a 
conceptual skew in the field, which can be circumvented by focusing on laypeople’s 
conceptions and understanding (Walker & Hennig, 2004). Hence, in the descriptive 
approach to morality, moral values can be inferred from laypeople’s understanding of 
right and wrong which allows broadening the concept of moral values from issues of 
justice to social conventions and expectations (e.g. Haidt, 2001; Shweder, et al., 1997; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998b).  
I adopted the descriptive approach in my thesis and used the social intuitionism 
model (Haidt, 2001) as a suitable theoretical framework for the study of moral values. 
This framework suggests that studying laypeople’s intuitive evaluations of right and 
wrong is a valid approach in investigating morality and moral functioning. I applied this 
framework in Study 3 by asking individuals to intuitively evaluate which values are 
morally relevant. The social intuitionism model also corresponds to recent propositions 
in the literature suggesting the adoption of a more naturalistic conception of morality 
rooted in everyday language and common understandings. Within this approach, 
morality can be studied through moral traits and prototype analyses which I 
implemented in Study 4 (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Hennig, 2004; Walker & 
Pitts, 1998a). My research has contributed to these recent theoretical developments in 
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moral psychology by studying moral values as a special group of values which 
laypeople experience as prescriptive.  
 
Moral Values 
I examined two kinds of prescriptive values: (1) personal moral values, which 
may reflect an individual’s personal morality as well as the internalized moral values of 
society, and (2) societal moral values which are the culturally based ideals and 
expectations set for oneself or for others about how people should live their lives. To the 
best of my knowledge, this distinction has empirically not been made before. I reasoned 
that personal moral values can theoretically be in accordance with the moral values of 
the wider society; however, in individual cases personal moral values may also be 
distinct from the shared moral values of the collective, because society is not the only 
source of moral value education (cf. Bandura, 1991). What I empirically found in Study 
3 was that personal moral values tended to reflect cultural similarities rather than 
differences. There was a consensus between individualistic and collectivistic samples, 
showing that the top ranking personal moral values were benevolence, universalism and 
conformity. In contrast, there were pronounced cultural differences in terms of societal 
moral values. The top ranking societal moral values implied a focus on the self (e.g. 
achievement) in individualistic-oriented samples, whereas in collectivistic samples they 
tended to be focused on others (e.g. conformity). Furthermore, societal moral value 
ratings were not correlated with implicit moral values from Study 4, but personal moral 
value ratings were. This corroborates that personal moral values and societal moral 
values are different constructs.  
To the best of my knowledge, these two studies take a novel approach in 
examining which of the Schwartz’ values are moral values in a variety of different 
cultures. Furthermore, Study 4 is the first to investigate cross-culturally a moral 
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prototype using the ‘moral person’ as a target for eliciting associations. The finding that 
achievement is a societal moral value is especially intriguing. Graham, et al. (2009) 
pointed out that the Schwartz’ value type of achievement does neither fit with their 
Moral Foundation Theory nor with Shweder et al.’s (1997) big three theory on morality. 
Nevertheless, they suggested that achievement may point to an additional psychological 
mechanism that supports a moral system. There is also theoretical support for that from 
a model proposed very recently by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Baldacci (2008). They 
crossed the approach-avoidance distinction from motivation theory with a self- versus 
other-focus resulting in four moral motives, of which one is the self-reliance motive. 
This motive is an approach-based orientation that involves providing for the self. The 
focus is on activation for one’s own advancement and it entails industriousness and 
independence. The authors point out that this motive may not appear to be related to 
morality, yet it is akin to a highly valued moral conception in Western culture, the 
Protestant ethic, with its emphasis on autonomy and hardwork. Further research is 
needed to examine the link between achievement in individualistic cultures and morality 
in more detail. Janoff-Bulman et al.’s moral motive of self-reliance, and even 
McClelland’s (1961) research into achievement orientation, may be helpful.     
Moral Universalism versus Relativism. It appears that the findings for personal 
moral values and societal moral values are related to the controversy of whether 
morality is universal or relative. Evolutionary psychologists and cultural psychologists 
studying human morality have long suggested that people’s moral values are dictated 
partly by universal moral laws and in part by culturally specific processes (e.g. Haidt, 
2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Krebs, 2008). Boyd and Richerson (1985), for instance, 
proposed the Dual Inheritance Theory which suggests that human behaviour is shaped 
by both biological and socio-cultural inheritance systems with their own selective 
mechanisms and forms of transmissions. Biological evolution operates under the 
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premise of natural selection through which a certain genetic trait enhances the 
probability of survival. Therefore, it is more likely to be transmitted to successive 
generations through reproduction. This can eventually change the population’s genetic 
makeup regarding this specific trait. It has been proposed that social cooperation has 
significantly enhanced human survival and hence transmission of genes. In the cultural 
inheritance paradigm it is argued that values, beliefs and practices of cultures develop in 
response to environmental needs, and fulfil important social functions such as group 
stability. Cultural information per se is not transmitted genetically, but through social 
learning, based on the principles of observation and imitation and with consequences for 
the whole social group. Therefore, universal values, which prevent any form of harm 
doing and enhance social cooperation, have been crucial for human survival in the 
ancestral environment (cf. Krebs, 2008). Culturally specific values on the other hand 
fulfil the function to adapt to the respective social and physical environments. This may 
have produced a wide array of different norms and values depending on the demands of 
the respective ecological context (cf. Krebs, 2004).  
The findings from Study 3 (and to some extent also from Study 4) showed that 
personal moral values are more ‘universal’ than culturally different, which may be 
explained with the universal code of cooperation requiring taking care for close others 
(i.e. prosocial action, benevolence), resolving value conflicts (i.e. exerting justice, 
universalism) as well as respecting the social order (i.e. controlling antisocial action, 
conformity, cf. Helkama, 2004). Nevertheless, individualistic and collectivistic cultures 
may also have developed their own values as an adaptation to the respective 
environment producing different societal moral values with a greater focus on the 
individual in individualistic cultures and the social group in collectivistic cultures. 
Study 2 showed a similar finding: moral attitudes related to breaches of social 
cooperation were not predicted by cultural values and were therefore judged as wrong 
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independently of the cultural context as measured through Schwartz’ cultural values. On 
the other hand, moral attitudes related to personal choices in regard to life and death 
matters (personal-sexual issues) were predicted by cultural values with a focus on the 
self (Autonomy) versus others (Embeddedness). In sum, this shows that notions of right 
and wrong do indeed tell us something about culture, but it depends on (1) the issues 
studied (personal-sexual issues), and (2) the kind of values measured (societal moral 
values).  
Tentative Explanations. An examination of human history would be desirable 
at this point to arrive at an explanation for the development of different societal moral 
values. Yet, such an endeavour is often speculative and leaves some questions 
unanswered - such as the exact mechanisms underlying cultural differences that persist 
for centuries or even millennia (Mesoudi, 2007). A tentative explanation may be that 
societies are characterized by different social structures in which individuals may be 
tightly linked with one another or alternatively see themselves as independent from each 
other (see Berry's, 1976, ecocultural model; cf. Moghaddam, et al., 2000; Triandis, 
1989). Agricultural societies where the whole family is involved in the production 
process can be taken as an example of a social group with strong interdependencies 
between their members. This may have led to the development of a societal moral code 
that is more based on focusing towards others than on focusing towards the self. The 
industrial revolution in Western countries may have played an important role in 
changing the social structure from interdependencies to independence.  
Moghaddam et al. (2000) argue that individuals in modern industrial societies 
still have a sense of duty. Duty may just have another meaning to them by reinterpreting 
duties towards others into duties towards themselves. Hence, my finding that 
‘achievement’ (i.e. being successful) is a salient societal moral value in the 
individualistic sample may be explained in terms of a personal duty in individualistic-
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oriented cultures. Being successful is possibly part of a general ‘social contract’ to 
participate and contribute to society when individuals are rather independent from each 
other, and social control is not achieved through the interconnectedness with others as in 
collectivistic-oriented cultures.  
 
Suggestions  for Future Research 
Since morality refers ultimately to moral action (cf. Blasi, 1980), future research 
could examine moral behaviour and the role of moral values as the motivational 
component (see also Rest, 1984). It has been suggested that individuals may not act 
according to the moral principles they claim to value, because of a lack of integrity or 
self-control (e.g. Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; see also 
Baumeister & Exline, 2000). Consider, for example, people who claim to value the 
environment and who consider ‘protection of the environment’ to be a moral value. 
Many people would still take their cars to go to work, even if they could take the bus, 
their bikes or even just walk. Self-control, i.e. the ability to overcome selfish goals 
(Baumeister & Exline, 2000), may be a mediator between evaluating a value as morally 
relevant and acting according to it. This research would have great practical 
implications in terms of how to achieve behavioural change such as saving energy. The 
appeal that protecting the environment is a moral obligation may not be sufficient, but 
would need to be complemented with an appeal on selfish concerns, for example, that 
taking the stairs instead of the lift is a good daily exercise to keep oneself fit.  
Another valuable area of research would be the study of value fit between the 
individual and the cultural environment. By operationalizing different values for the 
macro- and micro-level, as it has been done in this thesis, insight can be gained into 
individuals’ difficulties in adapting to new cultures or into the phenomenon of cultural 
estrangement. For instance, Bernard, Gebauer and Maio (2006) measured personal 
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values and perceived social values (important to British society’s values) and found that 
discrepancies in these values predicted estrangement, but were not related to subjective 
well-being. Discrepancies between personal and societal values may be more 
pronounced when the latter is operationalized in moral terms, such as the perceived 
societal expectation. Societal expectations are more prescriptive and assess more 
directly the ‘cultural press’ a person is exposed to. Since morality regulates what is 
regarded as right or wrong in a society, violations of prescriptive beliefs may result in 
sanctions ranging from a raised eyebrow to overt hostility. An applied example can be 
provided with research conducted by Cortazzi and Jin (1997), who noted that Chinese 
and British students have different expectations about student and teacher roles. British 
students and teachers regard the teacher as a facilitator who promotes autonomy. To 
Chinese students, however, the teacher is a transmitter of knowledge and a role model. 
Hence, Chinese students tend to participate passively in the classroom, whereas British 
teachers would expect them to participate actively and to think critically and 
independently. This mismatch of expectations may be expressed in sanctions in the 
sense that Chinese students in Britain could receive worse grades because they are 
perceived as ‘lacking’ active participation or showing insufficient independent thinking 
in their coursework. Differences in expectations are especially difficult to deal with if a 
person’s own moral values and those of society are very different. It may finally result 
in cultural estrangement or marginalization in the case of sojourners. Bernard et al. 
(2006) called for research investigating the cross-cultural effects of value discrepancies. 
I believe that assessing the societal expectations herein would be beneficial and could 
possibly also show that there is indeed a relationship between value discrepancies and 
subjective well-being. 
The investigation of moral values in rhetorics would also be worthwhile. Bain, 
Kashima and Haslam (2006) pointed out that values are a common tool of mass 
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influence in the public domain, but there is surprisingly little research in social 
psychology that has investigated the role of values in rhetorics. For example, ‘moral 
values’ have been regarded as people’s main motivation to vote for President Bush in 
the 2004 presidential election in the United States (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). It would 
be interesting to see whether political conservatives use the term ‘moral values’ more 
often in political speeches than liberals. Graham et al. (2009) found that there were 
important differences in the understanding of morality between political liberals and 
conservatives. Liberals showed greater endorsement of the principles harm/ care and 
fairness/ reciprocity when it came to moral issues. In contrast, conservatives endorsed 
additionally the principles of ingroup/ loyalty, authority/ respect and purity/ sanctity. It 
is possible that conservatives, whose understanding of morality is apparently broader, 
use the term ‘moral’ or ‘moral values’ more often in political speeches than liberals.  
It would also be interesting to look at the effect of current economic factors and 
the relation to moral attitudes. I showed in Study 2 that low human development 
significantly predicted a stricter attitude towards issues such as abortion and 
homosexuality. It would be insightful to find out whether the current global economic 
crisis is reflected in a greater rejection of these kinds of issues. This would help 
explaining the dynamic underpinnings in the formation of such attitudes. 
Last but not least, what should or could be studied in order to understand culture 
depends on how culture is defined (Toomela, 2003). If culture is defined as a rule 
system organizing social life which posits boundaries on what is accepted and tolerated, 
then Kluckhohn’s (1952) suggestion could be implemented which would also provide 
an insight into the moral values of a culture. He stated that social approval and 
disapproval is manifested in the form of gossip: “Where gossip is most current is where 
that culture is most heavily laden with values” (p. 404). Such a study could be 
implemented through qualitative interviews or diaries in order to collect detailed 
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information about events that triggered gossip in people’s daily lives. Alternatively, 
educational material could be analyzed for moral values such as school books or even 
soap operas on TV (see also Kilby, 1993). Based on my findings, I would expect that 
self-direction and achievement are more emphasized in soap operas in individualistic 
countries, whereas conformity is more salient in collectivistic ones. There are many 
research opportunities in this area which have not been fully exhausted yet and it would 
be insightful to examine whether the findings converge. If so, a more generalizable 
picture of culture and macro-morality could be obtained.  
 
Practical Implications  
I believe that we have to […] treat values and moral obligations as a […] 
human problem – the most important of all human problems.  
 
- Albert Einstein 
Morality is about organizing social life and getting along with each other. I will 
not make normative claims on the basis of my research findings, since this would mean 
committing the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1903) which occurs when what ‘is’ is 
equated with what ‘should be’. Hence, I will not claim that striving for certain values is 
better than others. Nevertheless, I see some important practical implications in my 
findings. There were clear cultural differences in societal expectations. Individualistic-
oriented samples yielded that their society is perceived as achievement-oriented. On the 
other hand, collectivistic-oriented samples showed that they perceived their society to 
be more conformity-oriented. Knowing about these kinds of fundamental differences 
can be very important in intercultural encounters, especially when it is in situations in 
which performance is central such as at the workplace or at school or university.  
I also found that people from different cultures agree on certain moral values. 
People seem to commonly acknowledge that being nice to others (benevolence), being 
just (universalism) and maintaining the social order (conformity) are important moral 
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values. This may provide a foundation upon which moral dialogue can be based on. 
Schwartz and Bardi (2000) have already drawn parallels between values and moral 
discourse. They found that benevolence, self-direction and universalism were the most 
widely shared personal values, and they argued that these values may provide a 
common moral ground. I agree with Schwartz and Bardi (2000) that shared values may 
enable a worldwide moral dialogue. Nevertheless, my findings suggest that conformity 
may be more accepted as a shared moral value than self-direction. My findings would 
also support the universality of Habermas’ (2005) Theory of Communicative 
Rationality specifying how to engage in moral discourse. He proposes that there are 
conditions under which the discourse must take place, meaning that people need to 
accept certain ground rules (the value of conformity): all men are to be treated equal (the 
value of universalism) and participants must be truthful and try to mutually understand 
each other (the value of benevolence). Only if these requirements are fulfilled, ethical 
truth can be achieved. Emphasizing this common understanding of right and wrong may 




The task of developing research on values that may capture the dialectical 
relationship between the individual and the environment remains 
formidable.  
- Marisa Zavalloni (1980, p. 76) 
 
I have investigated morality as a mental phenomenon that consists of values and 
attributes that can be judged as right or wrong. I expected that people from different 
cultures and societies prioritize these traits and values in different ways. My final goal 
was to show that moral values can be taken as an alternative to the conventional 
measurement of cultural values derived from aggregated personal values. It has been a 
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difficult endeavour which is certainly related to the abstract nature of the moral values 
concept, but also to the interface of individual and society that is implied in morality. 
Nevertheless, there are two main conclusions that can be pointed out. First, my research 
has shown that cultural variability in moral values can be measured by asking for 
societal expectations. Secondly, I also found that one of the challenges in the study of 
morality, which lies in the central question whether morality is universal or relative 
(Miller, 2001), cannot be answered in absolute terms. I found that whether the answer to 
the question What is right? What is wrong? tells something about culture depends (1) 
on the issue (personal-sexual issues), and (2) on the kind of values studied (societal 
moral values). Hence, the moral universalism/ relativism debate is not black or white, 
and warrants further research in order to understand the grey area. There are still a 
number of open questions such as: How do individuals negotiate their personal morality 
with the perceived societal expectations? How can cultures with different societal moral 
principles (e.g. self-direction versus tradition) come to a common ground? These 
exemplary questions are intriguing to research and of great societal importance. It 
would be of great value to see more studies in cross-cultural psychology that devote 
their focus on a micro- and macro-morality to answer these kinds of questions.  
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APPENDIX B: Figure illustrating the distribution of countries regarding their socio-

































Note. SFC refers to Self-fulfilled Connectedness values. BNFI is a composite score consisting of: Human 
Development Index, GDP per capita, Gender Empowerment Measure, Political Rights, and Civil 
Liberties. The indices were first standardized and then averaged to combine them into the BNF Index. A 
higher score means higher basic need fulfillment. Higher relative ranking for SFC (Self-fulfilled 
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APPENDIX C: Cross-cultural Moral Values Survey (Version 1) 
Information Sheet  
 
 
Melanie Vauclair Ronald Fischer, PhD Marc Wilson, PhD 











The following survey is part of a cross-cultural research project on values.  
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
Cross-cultural psychologists think that values can explain much of the differences that exist 
between cultures. There are many different types of values and we are especially interested in 
personal and moral values. This research will allow us to examine which values are regarded as 
moral values and which ones are seen as personal values. The final interest of this research lies 
in the question whether people from different cultures make a similar distinction between moral 
and personal values.  
 
Who is conducting the research? 
 Melanie Vauclair is a PhD student. Dr Ronald Fischer and Dr Marc Wilson are supervising 
this project. This research has been approved by the University ethics committee. 
 
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
 If you agree to participate in this study you will be given a questionnaire that takes about 30 
minutes to complete.  
 During the research you are free to withdraw, without any penalty, at any point before your 
data have been collected. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
 We will keep your data for at least five years after publication. 
 You will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or 
publication. The information you provide will be coded by number only. 
 In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your 
coded data may be shared with other competent researchers. 
 Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
 A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Melanie Vauclair and Dr Ronald 
Fischer.  
 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
 The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or 
presented at scientific conferences. 
 The overall findings will form part of a PhD thesis, Masters thesis, or Honours research 
project that will be submitted for assessment.  
 
If you would like to know the results of this study, they will be available approximately in 
December 2007 from the following sources: 
 posted on the CACR webpage: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/cacr/  
 Emailed to you (please write an email to Melanie.Vauclair@vuw.ac.nz to request a 
summary of the results). 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above. 
 
Thank you. 
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Section 1: Values 
 
Values play an important part in our lives. However, different people may hold different 
values and not every value may have the same meaning to everybody.  
In the following section, you will be given 23 values that represent possible “guiding 
principles in someone’s life”. Next to each value you will find a short description in 
brackets that should clarify what this value means. For each of the 23 values, you will 
be given always the same five statements and you are asked to indicate to what extent 
you think this statement (e.g. … important to me) or its opposite (e.g. …unimportant 
to me) is true. Please note, that each statement or its opposite can be “extremely”, 
“quite” or “slightly” true. If you choose the middle category it means that neither one 
nor the other alternative is true, OR both are equally true OR you do not know what to 
decide for.  
If it says “in my society” it refers to the country in which you have been living for most 
of the time or the country you identify with.  
Please write down which country this would be:  
___________________________________ 
 
Try to answer the value section as quickly as possible.  
Here is an example: 
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Please cross out the appropriate bubble for each value characteristic to indicate to 
what extent this characteristic or its opposite is true for you.  
 




























































































… important to 
me 
       
… unimportant 
to me 
… something that 
I am expected to 
strive for in my 
society 
       
… something 
that is my free 
choice to strive 
for in my society 
... a moral value 
to me  
       
… an immoral 
value to me 
… something bad 
to follow 
       
… something 
good to follow 
… the right thing 
to strive for 
       
… the wrong 
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15. INTEGRITY
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30
 This value was added to the SVS in order to provide an equal number of items in the two versions of 
the survey. It was not included in the analysis.  
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Section 2: Debatable issues 
 
What is your opinion regarding the following issues?  
In the following section you will be presented some acts that some people may regard as 
wrong to do. We would like to know how wrong YOU think these acts are.  
 
Please cross the appropriate bubble to indicate to which degree you think the following 
acts are wrong. The higher the number you use, the more wrong you judge this act; use 










































































1 2 3 4 5 
1. Claiming state benefits that you are not 
entitled to 
 
    
2. Avoiding a fare on public transport      
3. Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
     
4. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties 
     
5. Prostitution 
     
6. Abortion 
     
7. Divorce 
     
8. Euthanasia (terminating the life of the 
incurable sick) 
     
9. Suicide 
     
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Section 3: Demographics 
 
Finally, we would like to ask you some questions about yourself. Please remember that 
you will never be personally identified in this research project or in any presentation or 
publication. The information you give, will be used for statistical purposes only. 
 
Please answer the following question by ticking the appropriate box or writing the 
answer next to the question.  
Gender?                  Female                              Male 
 
What year were you born in? 
_________________________________________________ 
 




To which country do you think you belong the most (whether by virtue of 
citizenship, length of residence, acculturation)? 
 
 
























How important is religion to you?


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APPENDIX D: Value type rankings under five response scales in four individualistic and four collectivistic samples (Version 1) 
 
  ‘Important vs. Unimportant' Response Scale 




sample Finland  Germany  U.K.  New Zealand    Brazil  Japan  The Philippines Turkey  
Schwartz & 
Bardi (2001) 
BE                                                                               1 1 1 1 2  1 2 1 2 1 
SD                                                                               2 2 2 2 1  2 1 3 1 2 
UN                                                                               3 3 3 4 3  3 4 5 3 3 
AC                                                                               4 4 4 3 4  7 6 4 7 4 
CO                                                                               5 6 6 7 7  4 3 2 5 6 
HE                                                                               6 5 5 5 5  6 5 8 6 7 
SE                                                                               7 7 7 6 8  5 7 6 4 5 
ST                                                                               8 8 8 8 6  8 8 7 9 8 
PO                                                                               9 10 10 9 9  9 10 10 8 10 
TR                                                                               10 9 9 10 10  10 9 9 10 9 
  ‘Moral vs. Immoral' Response Scale 
BE                                                                               1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
UN                                                                               2 2 2 3 2  4 2 3 2.5 3 
CO                                                                               3 3 3 5 4  2 3 2 5 6 
SD                                                                               4 4 4 2 3  3 4 4 4 2 
SE                                                                               5 5 5 6 6  5 5 6 2.5 5 
AC                                                                               6 6 6 4 5  6 6 5 6 4 
TR                                                                               7 8 7 10 9  8 7 7 8 9 
HE                                                                               8 7 9 7 8  7 9 10 10 7 
ST                                                                               9 9 8 8 7  9 8 8 7 8 
PO                                                                               10 10 10 9 10   10 10 9 9 10 
 





‘Expectation vs. Free choice' Response Scale 
  Individualistic samples  Collectivistic samples  
Value type 
Pan-cultural 
sample Finland  Germany  U.K.  New Zealand    Brazil  Japan  The Philippines Turkey  
Schwartz & 
Bardi (2001) 
AC                                                                               1 1 1 1 1  2 3 4 4 4 
CO                                                                               2 4 4.5 6 6  3 1 1 2 6 
SE                                                                               3 6 2 7 5  1 4 3 1 5 
BE                                                                               4 3 4.5 2 4  6 5 2 3 1 
SD                                                                               5 2 6 4 2  5 2 7 6 2 
UN                                                                               6 5 7.5 3 3  7 6 5 5 3 
PO                                                                               7 7 3 5 7  4 7 8 7 10 
TR                                                                               8 8 7.5 9 9  9 8 6 8 9 
HE                                                                               9 9 9 8 8  8 10 10 10 7 
ST                                                                               10 10 10 10 10  10 9 9 9 8 
  ‘Right vs. Wrong' Response Scale 
BE                                                                               1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
UN                                                                               2 2 2 3 2  3 3 4 3 3 
SD                                                                               3 3 3 4 4  4 2 5 5 2 
CO                                                                               4 4 4 5 6  2 4 2 4 6 
SE                                                                               5 5 7 6 5  5 5 6 2 5 
AC                                                                               6 6 5 2 3  6 6 3 6 4 
ST                                                                               7 8 8 8 7  8 7 8 8 8 
HE                                                                               8 7 6 7 8  7 8 10 9 7 
TR                                                                               9 9 9 9 9  10 9 7 10 9 
PO                                                                               10 10 10 10 10   9 10 9 7 10 
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‘Good vs. Bad' Response Scale 
  Individualistic samples  Collectivistic samples  
Value type 
Pan-cultural 
sample Finland  Germany  U.K.  New Zealand    Brazil  Japan  The Philippines Turkey  
Schwartz & 
Bardi (2001) 
BE                                                                               1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
UN                                                                               2 2 2 2 2  3 2 4 4 3 
SD                                                                               3 3 3 5 4  2 3 5 3 2 
CO                                                                               4 4 5 6 6  5 5 2 5 6 
AC                                                                               5 6 4 3 3  6 4 3 6 4 
SE                                                                               6 5 7 4 5  4 6 6 2 5 
ST                                                                               7 7 8 7 7  8 7 7 7 8 
HE                                                                               8 8 6 8 8  7 8 10 9 7 
TR                                                                               9 9 9 9 9  10 9 8 10 9 
PO                                                                               10 10 10 10 10   9 10 9 8 10 
Note. Rank orders are based on survey version one. Rank orders for survey version two were very similar (see MDS analysis). UN = Universalism, BE = Benevolence, TR  
= Tradition, CO = Conformity, SE = Security, ST = Stimulation, HE = Hedonism, AC = Achievement, PO = Power, SD = Self-direction. Mean ratings upon which the rank orders 






Appendix D cont’  
 - 335 - 
APPENDIX E: Comparison of MDS representations based on rankings (left figure) and mean ratings (right figure) after transformation to maximal 





















Note. Underlined objects denote individualistic cultural samples according to the literature. B = Brazil, F = Finland, G = Germany, J = Japan, N = New Zealand, P = the Philippines, 
T = Turkey, U = United Kingdom, EXP = ‘expectation vs. free choice’ response scale, MOR = ‘moral vs immoral’ response scale, RIGHT = right vs. wrong’ response scale, GOOD 
= ‘good vs. bad’ response scale, IMP = ‘important vs. unimportant’ response scale.  
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APPENDIX F: Example of free-listed moral traits categories (Filipino responses) 
 Moral trait 
Original Responses 
1 accommodating                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
accomodating                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 angel 
angel 
3 approachable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
approachable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 balanced                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
balanced                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 benevolent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
benevolant                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
6 brave 
brave/ confident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 caring caring                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
has care for others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
cares for others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 catholic 
catholic based beliefs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 charismatic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
charismatic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
10 christian christian                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
christian doctrine                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
11 clean clean                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
clean in thought, word and deed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
12 compassionate a compassionate person                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
compassion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
13 confident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        confident                                         
brave/ confident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 conscientious conscience                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
listens to conscience                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
15 conscious                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
conscious                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
16 considerate considerate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
someone who thinks of other people's feelings                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
a person sensitive to the need of others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
thinks of other opinions to be considered when making decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
sensitive to other people                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
17 controlled                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     controlled                                           
self-control                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 correct                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
correct                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
19 courageous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
courageous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
20 courteous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        courteous                                              
courtesy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
attributes good virtues (courteous, truthful)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
21 critical 
someone who thinks critically                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
22 decent decent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
descent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
23 decided decided                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
makes clear cut decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
makes decisions not only for herself but also for others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
24 democratic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
democratic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
25 dependable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
dependable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
26 dignified                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
dignified                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
27 disciplined                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      disciplined                                         
discipline                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
well-disciplined                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
28 divine                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
divine                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
29 educated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
educated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
30 enthusiastic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
enthusiastic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
31 ethical ethical                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
someone who is ethical                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
ethics                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
32 exemplary role model                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
sets a good example for himself and others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
an example                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 - 337 - 
good-model                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
idol                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
model citizen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
model                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
teacher                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
33 fair fair                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
someone just and fair                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
34 faithful faithful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
faith                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
someone who believes in faith...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
35 firm 
firm principles                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
36 flexible                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
flexible                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
37 follows rules law-abiding                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
does not disobey laws and rules                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
follows rules and regulations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
follows the norms/ laws of the church                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
follows the rules                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
someone who implements the rules                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
38 forgiving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
forgiving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
39 friend 
friends                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
40 friendly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
friendly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
41 generous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         generous                                         
generosity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
giving/ generous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
42 gentle                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           gentle                                         
gentle to others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
one who is gentle                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
43 genuine                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
genuine                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
44 giving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
giving/ generous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
45 god God                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
God like                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Godly 
46 god-fearing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      God-fearing                                          
fear of God                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
47 good good                                  
good person                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
good conduct                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
good & evil                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
one who does good things                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
has a good disposition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
good attitude                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
with good ethics                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
good behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
gives something good to the country                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
good or bad                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
good personality                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
believes in good values                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
performs good manners                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
good standing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
good will                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
good practice                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
good and bad                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
good breeding                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
good upbringing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
someone who is inherently good...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
good trait                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
one who has good judgement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
good citizen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
does something good all the time                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
do gooder                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
attributes good virtues (courteous, truthful)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 - 338 - 
good behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
has good breeding                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
good model to others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
48 grateful 
is grateful for being able to live                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
49 hard-working                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
hardworking                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
50 has beliefs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
beliefs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
51 has integrity integrity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
with integrity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
has integrity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
52 heart 
heart                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
53 helpful helps others (ex: those less fortunate)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
a person willing to help others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
always willing to help                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
helpful to others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
helpful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
54 holy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
holy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
55 honest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           honest                                         
honesty                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
sense of honesty                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
does not cheat                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
56 honourable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
honorable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
57 humanistic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
humanistic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
58 humble                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           humble                                         
humility                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
humbleness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
59 independent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
independent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
60 influential influence of peers                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
influences                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
61 innocent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
innocence                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
62 intangible 
something intangible                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
63 intelligent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
intelligent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
64 just                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             just                                         
always does what is right and just                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
advocates social justice                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
great sense of justice                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
have a great sense of justice and righteousness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
someone just and fair                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
fights for justice 
unjust                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
65 kind                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            kind                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
kind-hearted                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
kindly guy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
one who is kind                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
kindness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
66 knowledgeable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
knowledgable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
67 leader 
leadership                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
68 learner 
learner                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
69 logical 
someone who thinks logically...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
70 loving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          loving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
love                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
loving other people                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
love god                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
71 loyal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
loyal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
72 mature                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
mature                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
73 mindful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
mindful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
74 moral                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            moral                                            
morality                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
how one views morality                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
has good morals                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 - 339 - 
75 nationalist                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
nationalist                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
76 nice nice                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
nice personality                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
77 not harming doesn't cause any harm/ damage                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
does not intentionally harm others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
someone who doesn't do anything bad to others 
against harm                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
78 obedient                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         obedient                                         
obedient and can be respected                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
79 objective 
objectivity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
80 open                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
open-minded                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
81 optimistic optimism                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
optimistic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
82 outgoing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
outgoing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
83 patient                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
patient                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
84 peaceful inner peace                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
aims for peace and equality in the community                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
85 perfect 
almost perfect =P                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
86 perseverant                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
perseverant                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
87 pious                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
pious                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
88 polite                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
polite                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
89 positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         positive                                         
positive thinker                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
90 post-conventional 
at the post conventional level of moral development                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
91 principled                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       principled                                         
have principles                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
has principles                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
principle                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
someone with principles and values                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
92 promising                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
promising                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
93 proper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Proper 
prim and proper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
94 quiet 
quiet-type                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
95 rational 
someone who is rational...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
96 relaxed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
relaxed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
97 religious                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        religious                                         
religiousness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
religiously wise                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
religion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
someone who is religious...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
religious/ has strong belief                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
religious term                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
respects the God of his religion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
practices religion consciensciously                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
has a firm faith in his/ her own religion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
lives according to God's will                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
someone who prays                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
knows how to pray                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
98 resilient                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
resilient                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
99 respectable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
respectable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
100 respected obedient and can be respected                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
respectful/ respected                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
101 respectful respects the God of his religion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
respectful/ respected                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
respects authority except when unjust                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
one who is respectful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
respects his/ her family                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
respect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
has respect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 - 340 - 
a respectful person                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
respects others and his/ herself 
respect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
102 responsible                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      responsible                                         
responsible in ones' duties                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
103 reverent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
reverent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
104 right right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
right and wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
always does what is right and just                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
always what he know is right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
a person who does what is right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
always does the right thing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
does what is right and not the wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
the right thing to do                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
believes what he thinks is right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
what is right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
inclined to do what is right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
follows what is right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
does the right thing even under pressure                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
knows what is right from wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
has the ability to distinguish right from wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
knows what is right and wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
has a sense of what is right and wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
knows right from wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
can distinguish what is right and wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
knows what is wring and right                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
knows right from wrong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
105 righteous righteous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
have a great sense of justice and righteousness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
106 saints                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
saints                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
107 secure 
a secure person                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
108 self-determined has their own set of beliefs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
looks at things in their own perspective                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
109 sharing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
sharing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
110 sincere                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
sincere                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
111 sinless 
close to being sinless/ free of sin                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
112 smart                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
smart                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
113 sociable social skills                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
social aspects of life                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
socially accepted                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
114 soulfulness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
soulfulness                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
115 standing up 
stands up for what he believes in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
116 strict strict (overpowering superego)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
strict/ restrictions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
117 strong 
strong principles                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
118 successful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
success                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
119 suck up 
a suck up                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
120 sympathetic who has sympathy for the poor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
someone who pities others easily                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
121 tactful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
tactful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
122 thoughtful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
thoughtful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
123 tolerant tries his/ her best to be not discriminating against other genders and 
ethnicities                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
124 trust trust                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
trustworthy 
125 truthful truthful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
attributes good virtues (courteous, truthful)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
126 uebermensch                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
uebermensch                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 - 341 - 
 
127 understanding                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    understanding                                         
understands other people's morals                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
128 unselfish                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       thinks of everyone's sake not only his                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
wellfare of others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
service to others'                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
unselfish 
sacrificing for the good of all                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
selfless                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
129 upright                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          upright                                         
morally upright                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
130 uptight                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
uptight                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
131 values values                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
protects values                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
values human rights                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
132 virtuous                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         virtuous                                         
virtue                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
virtues                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
has virtues                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
lives their life with those values/ virtues in mind                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
133 well-balanced                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
well-balanced                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
134 well-mannered well mannered                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
with manners                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
proper etiquette                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
135 well-raised                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      well-raised                                         
upbringing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
136 well-rounded                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
well-rounded                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
137 wise                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             wise                                         
religiously wise                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
wisdom                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
138 yin yang                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
yin yang                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
139 [excluded from 
analysis] 
pagkantas [meaning unclear]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
attitude 
attitudes 
basis                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
characteristic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
culture 
emotions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
environment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
family                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
inbedded in culture                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
internal attributes of a person (emotional, social, etc.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
learned                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
mental processes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
nature and nurture                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
part of society                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
person                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
personality                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
phd (doctorate)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
point of view of society                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
sin                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
subjective, differs in every culture and society                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
temparent                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
the standing of a person in a group/ class                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
theology                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
traits                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
wish it ain't put in fundamentalism                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Note. Responses given by one person are put into one single line.   
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APPENDIX G: Biplots using correspondence analysis based on culturally idiosyncratic moral trait categories (left figure) and all 49 moral trait 

























Note. BR, GE, NZ and PH denote samples from Brazil, Germany, New Zealand and the Philippines respectively. Underlined moral trait categories in the right figure do not 
correspond to any of Schwartz’ (1992) values from his survey.   
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APPENDIX H: Moral trait categories matched to values of the Schwartz’ Value Survey 
 




AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring) AC 
LEADER (influential) INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and 
events) 
AC 
 CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient) AC 
SUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals) AC 
LOYAL (solidary) LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group) BE 
HONEST (authentic, genuine, 
has integrity, sincere, 
transparent, true, truthful) 
HONEST (genuine, sincere) BE 
HELPFUL (supportive) HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) BE 
RESPONSIBLE; RELIABLE 
(dependable) 
RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) BE 
 FORGIVING (willing to pardon others) BE 
WELL-MANNERED 
(courteous, tactful, polite, well-
raised) 
POLITENESS (courtesy,  good manners) CO 
DISCIPLINED (controlled) SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to 
temptation) 
CO 
RESPECTFUL HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS 
(showing respect) 
CO 
OBEDIENT (follows rules, not 
rebellious) 
OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations) CO 
 PLEASURE  (gratification of desires) HE 
 ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, 
etc.) 
HE 
 SELF-INDULGENT (doing pleasant things) HE 
 WEALTH (material possessions, money) PO 
LEADER (influential) AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command) PO 
CONTROLLING SOCIAL POWER  (control over others,  
dominance) 
PO 
 PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE 
(protecting my "face") 
PO 
 OBSERVING SOCIAL NORMS (to maintain 
face) 
PO 
 CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination) SD 
INDEPENDENT (self-determined) INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient) SD 
 CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own 
purposes) 
SD 
LIBERAL FREEDOM  (freedom of action and thought) SD 
INTERESTED (curious) CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring) SD 
 NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my 
nation from enemies) 
SE 
 RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance 
of indebtedness) 
SE 
 FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones) SE 
CLEAN CLEAN (neat, tidy) SE 
 SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society) SE 
 A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty 
and change) 
ST 
BRAVE (courageous) DARING (seeking adventure, risk) ST 
 AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences) ST 
CONSERVATIVE (conventional) RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of 
time-honoured customs) 
TR 
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Moral Category Schwartz’ Value Survey Value type 
WELL-BALANCED (balanced) MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & 
action) 
TR 
HUMBLE (modest) HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing) TR 
 ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE 
(submitting to life's circumstances) 
TR 
RELIGIOUS (Christian, 
faithful, god, god-fearing, holy, 
pray) 
DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief) TR 
JUST (egalitarian, equal, fair, 
impartial, righteous) 
EQUALITY  (equal opportunity for all) UN 
PEACEFUL A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and 
conflict) 
UN 
 UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature) UN 
WISE; ENLIGHTENED WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) UN 
 A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and  
the arts) 
UN 










PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
(preserving nature) 
UN 
 MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life) X 
PROUD (self-respect, high self-
regard) 
SELF RESPECT (belief in one's own worth) X 
LOVING MATURE LOVE (deep emotional & spiritual 
intimacy) 
X 
 INNER HARMONY  (at peace with myself) X 
 PRIVACY ( the right to have a private sphere) X 
RESPECTED (admired, 
honourable) 
SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by 
others) 
X 
FRIEND TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends) X 
 HEALTHY (not being sick physically or 
mentally) 
X 
INTELLIGENT (smart)  INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking) X 
 A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not 
material matters) 
X 
 SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others 
care about me) 
X 
Note. Moral trait categories were here also matched if their frequency did not exceed five percent in any 
of the samples (see above explanation of the 5% judgment rule). Some moral trait categories were 
matched to several values (see e.g. LEADER). Moral categories in boldface are central moral features in 
at least one of the four cultures studied. Features in brackets are those that were allocated to the more 
general moral trait category. The key for value types is: AC = Achievement, BE = Benevolence, CO = 
Conformity, HE = Hedonism, PO = Power, SD = Self-direction, SE= Security, ST = Stimulation, TR = 
Tradition, UN = Universalism, X = values with inequivalent meaning across cultures according to 
Schwartz (1992).   
